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This research aims to offer an original reconstruction of Aristotle’s psychology of 
music that explains his views on the relation between instrumental music and 
emotions. I argue that, contrary to the relevant scholarship, for Aristotle instrumental 
music cannot convey emotions to the listener. What instrumental music does, I claim, 
is to cause an objectless mood or disposition (διάθεσις) that “prepares the way” 
(προοδοποιεῖν) for the emotions.   
 
Most interpreters of Politics VIII (1340a12-29) argue that for Aristotle a piece of 
instrumental music would be able to represent emotions and the listener would be 
moved to the same emotion by a sort of sympathetic contagion. However, this 
interpretation is inconsistent with Aristotle’s account of emotions. For Aristotle a 
necessary condition for the emotions is that those experiencing them “judge” (κρίνειν) 
a situation based on their beliefs. If it is accepted that there is such a thing as an 
emotional contagion through music, then the cognitive theory of emotion presented by 
Aristotle is at risk since no such a judgment would be required.  
 
The thesis is presented in three chapters. In chapter one the cognitive elements that 
give rise to emotions are analysed. The nature of the term παθή is explored as well as 
the difference between its use as a ‘general affection’ and its use as the mental process 
that we now call ‘emotion.’ In this latter sense the emotions are mental states directed 
to an object on which a judgment is made and that are accompanied by pain or 
pleasure. The nature of the emotional judgment is investigated and the possibility of 
its existence in non-rational animals is explored. It is concluded that, even if we accept 
emotions in animals, intentionality and predication of an object are necessary 
conditions for the existence of emotions.  
 
In the second chapter, I discuss two instances where it seems Aristotle makes an 
exception to the judgment as necessary condition for the emotions. First, emotions 
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aroused by the perception of signs of emotions, like the mere voice of the orator (Rhet. 
1408a16-26) and the spectacle in the theatre (Poet. 1453b1-10) and second, emotions 
aroused by bodily changes (De an. 403a25). I argue that in Aristotle’s view in both 
cases the factors at work (voice, sight, bodily condition) only facilitate the arousal of 
emotions, but the actual arousal requires an additional narrative context that supplies 
grounds for the judgment that in turn gives rise to the emotion in question. In the first 
case the orator’s voice and the theatre’s spectacle work just as a condiment (ἥδυσμα) 
that helps to intensify (συναπεργάζεσθαι) the object of judgment (Pol. 1340b17; Poet. 
1449b25; 1450b16; Rhet. 1386a31). Our emotional response has as its object their 
story, not the elements that decorate it. In the second case, the bodily changes are the 
material constituents of emotions; facilitate the generation of emotions: hotness around 
the heart, for example, makes the subject prone to anger; but the emotion of anger 
appears only after a particular situation is evaluated by the mind.  
 
In the third chapter, I turn to the specific case of music. From an exegesis of Pol. 
1340a12-29, I argue that the emotions ostensibly transmitted by music (μουσική) to 
the listener are due to the lyrics of the songs (μέλη), not to the instrumental music 
itself. Therefore the question about the nature of the emotional effect of pure 
instrumental music remains open. My answer to this question is based on the analysis 
of the causal mechanism by means of which instrumental music affects the listener. 
Aristotle’s physiology reveals the physical impact of sound on the sense of hearing, 
and from there to the heart, the first sensorium. Bodily changes in the organ create an 
objectless disposition (διάθεσις) in the listener by relaxing or agitating his body, 
without providing any content for the mind besides the perception of the sound. 
Exciting or relaxing the heart by means of music would leave the listener in the 
disposition of readiness to react emotionally, but the emotion would appear only once 
an intentional object, i.e., the content of the emotion, is presented and evaluated by the 
mind.  
     
Finally, I show the relevance of my interpretation of these dispositions to 
understanding the role of emotions in the education of character in the Politics. 
Aristotle proposes to use only a certain type of music in his educational curriculum, 
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not one too relaxed or too tense, but a middle between them that puts the students in a 
stable and noble disposition that would, in turn, lead them to be guided by reason 
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Music is a beautiful and fascinating phenomenon. There is no known human group 
without it: all cultures, civilizations, countries and tribes have it; music is everywhere. 
It is a fact that humans pursue music in different ways but also they are moved by it. 
From religious frenzy to dancing clubs, from myths about music moving not only 
humans but also animals, plants and even stones1 to the music in the supermarkets that 
induces customers to buy particular products.2 Consciously or not, music moves us not 
only through dance, but also at a physiological level: for example, it has been shown 
in experiments that our pulse and heartbeat are affected when we listen music.3 Even 
the rhythm and speed of our walking seems to be altered depending on the music to 
which we are listening.4 However, there is one particular aspect of music that has 
especially mesmerized philosophers (and non philosophers too): music as the 
language of emotions.  This sentence coined by Deryck Cooke in 19575 encapsulates 
the idea that music is about emotions; that melody and rhythm are representations of 
emotions and thus music is capable of having a contagious effect on listeners’ 
emotions.  
 
At first glance it seems that most people would agree with the idea that music arouses 
emotions. And in fact, this was also my own belief four years ago when I started this 
investigation. Even without words, it seems, music moves us to feel the emotions 
contained within it. Words are not necessary, someone may think, because music is 
not about reasons, beliefs or arguments. Music – the same person would continue – 
does not talk to reason but to our emotions, to our heart… This characterisation, I 
                                                 
1 Hor. Ars. Poet. 394-6; Eurip. Med. 543. See Marchenkov 2009 for the particular relevance of the myth 
of Orpheus in ancient context.  For the general connections between music and myths in Ancient Greece 
see Landel 1999, pp. 148-162. 
2 North et al., 1999. 
3 Etzel et al., 2006 and Haas et al., 1986. Marshall 1937, 27, as quoted by Meyer 1956, 11: “[Music] 
has marked effect on pulse, respiration and external blood pressure… [it] delays the onset of muscular 
fatigue… [and] has a marked effect upon psychogalvanic reflex”.  
4 Franěk et al., 2014. 
5 Cooke, 1959. 
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think, is not an uncommon one; it is a widespread popular opinion shared by 
composers, performers and audiences. Things are not so clear, however, under the light 
of philosophical scrutiny. There are good reasons to doubt, first, that instrumental 
music can represent emotions and, second, that the supposedly represented emotions 
are transmitted to the listener by means of some sort of contagious power.  
 
Unpopular, unromantic or cold as this position may be, it is the task of philosophy and 
science to debunk myths. Music, now we know, is not able to lift stones as one old 
myth tells us,6 nor is a flautist able to hypnotize or lead hundreds of children to drown 
them in the ocean.7  Is music the language of the emotions or should we also consider 
this a myth? Is music able to arouse emotions in us beyond our control, like an 
instantaneous spell in the very act of listening? I do not think so.  Here I would like to 
enter into this debate and make use of the legacy of a thinker who addressed the topic 
of music and emotions at a very early stage: Aristotle, who in his Politics wondered 
whether music had “some influence over the character and the soul” (πρὸς τὸ ἦθος 
συντείνει και ̀πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν).8  
 
To trace the problem back to Aristotle is also what Peter Kivy did. He has pointed to 
Aristotle’s ideas, or at least their translations, as the source of modern 
misunderstandings concerning the problem of music representation. Kivy opened his 
book “Sound and Semblance” (1984) with the remark that translations of the term 
mimêsis in Aristotle’s Poetics rendered in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as 
imitation had “consequences […] for the theory of musical representation” and added 
that, although he is neither capable and nor willing to revise the correctness of such 
translations, he is “concerned to repair the mischief that has been done to what should 
have been a theory of musical representation.”9 According to Kivy, it is not possible 
to “imitate” emotions through sound and so he claims that: “all that Aristotle could 
possibly have meant by music imitating the emotions and mental states of men, unless, 
                                                 
6 Note 1 above. 
7 I refer to the legend of the “Pied Piper of Hamelin”. This folk story is known at least from the 14th 
century and authors such as Goethe and the Brothers Grimm later narrated it. 
8 Pol. 1340a6. 
9 Kivy 1984, 3. 
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of course, he was saying something absurdly false, was that music arouses such 
emotions and states in the listeners.” 10  In his view, there was a historical 
misconception of the problem that has its origin in the interpretation of Aristotle: “The 
problem for music which it raises is the result of the baleful influences of the notion 
of imitation that the translators of Aristotle cast like a pall over the musical 
speculations of the time having to do with what would more happily be called musical 
representation.”11 Not unlike Kivy, I am concerned with music and with what it is able 
to represent, but in contrast to him, I am willing to revise the correctness of the 
translations and the interpretations of Aristotle’s thoughts about music and 
representation, specifically the representation of emotions through music.   
 
In general terms, the present investigation aims to explore and clarify Aristotle’s 
position with respect to music and its effects on listeners. It is an attempt to answer the 
question: How and in which sense are we moved by music? In particular, it focuses on 
the place that ‘musical emotions’ – if such emotions exist – occupy in a more general 
theory of emotions presented in the Aristotelian corpus.  
 
The main problem is that if emotions are cognitive processes that require judgments 
and previous beliefs directed at a particular object, then it is difficult to understand 
how instrumental music could convey information about any object to the listener’s 
own mental processes. If anger, for example, is an emotion about something being 
unjust, how could pure rhythms and melodies say something about it or represent any 
similar object at all? Moreover, what are the judgments or beliefs in the listener that 
would supposedly be contagiously affected by the angry music?  Here I am not 
referring to our emotions aroused by the aesthetic beauty of the piece, or our anger 
caused by our judgment that a particular rendition of the piece does not do justice to 
the original. Nor would anyone dispute that a particular musical work can make us 
remember some past love or have a special meaning by association. The object of my 
analysis is on the emotional contagion that music is supposedly able to produce by 
itself. I am referring to the idea that, somehow, music would be able to convey an 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 4. 
11 Ibid., 5. 
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emotion, such as anger, and we, the listeners, would be moved to that emotional state 
just by hearing it: a sort of musical mysterious spell.  
 
In what follows I will try to prove that, according to Aristotle, absolute music, i.e. 
music without words, is not the cause of an emotional contagion in the listeners but of 
general moods or dispositions devoid of particular objects. In contrast to the arousal 
of emotions proper, which are characterised by the presence of an intentional object 
and an appraisal of it, music provides objectless moods by means of physiological 
changes in its listeners.   
 
What Aristotle offers, I claim in my reconstruction, is an explanation of how listeners 
are moved by music without the need to ascribe to music the power to arouse emotions 
by means of a sort of acoustic contagion. What instrumental music does, Aristotle says 
at 1340a41 in Politics VIII, is to change our disposition (διάθεσις), a different state 
from emotions as are understood in Rhetoric II, the main source for our study of 
emotions in Aristotle. The dispositions that music causes are “bodily movements”. For 
Aristotle, the sonic nature of music allows it to impact the sense of hearing, altering 
with it the heart, the centre of sense perception in his view.  In turn, those changes in 
the heart had an impact on our behaviour and thus were connected with moral 
characters, i.e. good and bad movements with good or bad characters in moral sense: 
some motions produced by music are vulgar and others noble. Those moral characters 
are related to physical motions that are signs of excitement and rest. Too much 
movement is related to a passionate or frenzied state, while too much calm was 
associated, obviously, with rest. Then, as in ethical contexts virtue is in the middle of 
the extremes, the same is the case in music. The Dorian mode, we will see, is the most 
virtuous of the musical modes and is found between the two extremes in terms of pitch. 
Aristotle thought that there was a relationship between the acoustic properties of 
music, especially pitch, and the dispositions that music was able to arouse in its 
listeners. He believed that in the first place instrumental music moved our sense of 
hearing, and from there, through vessels inside the body, the heart, the organ that he 
thought was responsible for sense perception and physiological changes, connected 
with the emotions. Aristotle thought, then, I propose, that music was able to excite or 
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calm the heart and so put the listener in a frame of mind that disposed him to react 
emotionally in front of an object presented to the subject. The bodily process involved 
in the response to music presented by Aristotle is naïve and outdated but its relevance 
is in the consideration of the role of the body in producing the emotional response to 
music; a consideration that is unfortunately absent in the works of many modern 
philosophers of music studying emotions.   
 
Thus, according to Aristotle, I claim, music alters not only the mind but the mind 
through the body. What music is able to produce in the listener, however, is not an 
emotion but the abstract and objectless movements that dispose the listener to react 
emotionally when a proper object is in front of them. In other words, Aristotle did not 
claim that if we hear, for example, ‘angry’ music – such as the soundtrack of a movie 
episode which shows an outburst of anger – we would experience anger immediately. 
Emotions are much more complicated than a mere contagion. If we recognize music 
as expressive of anger we will not experience the same emotion as a consequence. If 
that music accompanies the words of a poet, however, or the actions of a character in 
a play, those words and actions would appear more vividly as words and actions of 
someone who is angry.  Also, following my interpretation of Aristotle, the experience 
of such music would physically affect the body of the listener leaving it in a state 
similar to that of the real emotion. Then, after such influence, the listener would be in 
a state of readiness to react emotionally when an object is presented to him.  
 
This is not metaphysical exploration of music in itself, about its nature or, for example, 
its relation with mathematics or physics. Neither is it an examination of music 
in technical terms, about scales or notes. The focus is on the role that music 
plays in the human experience; is about what happens when we listen to music 
and the way we are  affected by it. It is in this human context that music mostly 
appears in Aristotle. His concern was about the function that music plays in the 
human life and its role in the achievement of happiness. This ethical element 
of music is grounded by the fact that music seems to be able to affect the moral 
character of the listener as well as to carry him to an emotional state. This latter 
power of music is the central point of this discussion: Musical emotions as the 
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epitome of what music is supposedly able to do to human beings. Being moved 
or touched by a musical piece is the starting point of a chain that may lead to 
our happiness or to its opposite. Aristotle – and with him an overwhelming 
majority of Greeks – thought that arts and music particularly had a unique 
power to move the soul of the perceiver. Music was considered to be the most 
powerful tool of the educational system and thus the most important. 
Accordingly, for Aristotle, happiness was the final goal of everyone12 and it 
was only possible in the political community. In order to secure the 
achievement of happiness to all citizens, education was presented as the highest 
occupation that any politician should consider.13 It is not thus an exaggeration 
to say that music had a crucial role in the political project of Aristotle. To 
control music was to control education; to control education was to control the 
city. This was the thought of Plato before Aristotle when he said – and Gramsci 
would later agree – that “musical modes are never changed without change in 
the most important of a city’s laws.”14  For Aristotle, the goal of political 
science was to determine how the legislator ought to rule; he “has to see that 
they [the citizens] become good men, and by what means this may be 
accomplished, and what is the end (τέλος) of the best life” (Pol. 1333a14-16).15 
 
Now, prior to this political and ethical aspect of music, there is a biological one that is 
the center of this investigation. The explanation of how music moves us requires an 
answer that takes into account the human soul understood as the origin of all motions 
in us. It is in his De anima that Aristotle provides us with the basic elements for 
understanding the mental and bodily processes involved in what we now call emotions. 
It is a work devoted to living beings and the functions they are able to perform qua 
animated beings. His psychology or philosophy of mind is thus rooted in a biological 
                                                 
12 Of course, “everyone” here refers to a very small social group. Neither women nor slaves could aim 
to true happiness.  
13 Pol. 1337a10-11: “No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all to the 
education of youth; for the neglected of education does harm to the constitution” (All translations from 
Politics are from Jowett unless otherwise indicated).    
14 Rep. 424c, trans. Gube, rev. Reeve. 
15 NE. 1103b2-6: “Legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is in the wish 
of every legislator; and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution 
differs from a bad one”. 
 
 7 
framework that considers the relations between body and mental activity.   In this 
context, hearing music is a process that implicates sense perception and so the soul is 
affected always with the body. In the same way, being affected by an emotion is also 
a mental and bodily process. This is one of the major strengths of Aristotle’s 
psychology:  the human being is a composite substance made of form and matter. 
Perhaps there is room for intellectual operations separated from the body16 but there 
are no doubts that Aristotle considered sense perception and emotions as mental 
processes always accompanied with bodily changes. 17  For that reason, a 
comprehensive account of emotions must include the formal reasons or cognitive 
processes and the bodily conditions involved.  
 
According to Aristotle, emotions are triggered by judgments about a particular object 
accompanied always by bodily changes and pain or pleasure.18 Their duration is short 
in comparison with other similar phenomena, such as states (ἕξις) or dispositions 
(διάθεσις).19  They involve movements of the inner organs, such as the heart and the 
blood around it, and visible changes of color, temperature, movements of the body and 
the voice. Emotions, contrary to what may be a popular opinion, are not instantaneous 
impulses or reflexes deprived of content or evaluation. On the contrary, they are 
cognitive processes that require the participation of our mind making judgments. To 
experience an emotion is an act of predication; it is to affirm or deny something. If we 
judge that an animal is dangerous and our safety is at risk we may experience fear, our 
heartbeat and pulse may be faster and our face turn pale. The emotion would be 
accompanied with pain and we would be moved to avoid the animal that is the object 
of our fear. On the contrary, if we see that the same animal is in a cage then we may 
evaluate that the situation is not dangerous and that we are totally safe. This cognitivist 
or judgmentalist position has been attributed to Aristotle and it has even said that in 
his work we find “the prototypical cognitive theory of emotion.” 20  William 
                                                 
16 De anima 403a11-12. 
17 Ibid. 403a16-19. δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν De anima 403a25 
18 Rhet. 1378a19-21. 
19 Cat. 8b25-10a16. 
20  Power and Dalgleish 1997, 41; Lazarus 2001, 40: “[T]hose who favor a cognitive-mediational 
approach must recognize that Aristotle’s Rhetoric more than two thousand years ago applied this kind 
of approach to a number of emotions in terms that seem remarkably modern”; and Hinton 1999, 6: “The 
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Fortenbaugh first defended this interpretation in 1975 and since then others have 
refined it: Leighton (1996); Nussbaum (2000); Konstan (2007); and Dow (2015). This 
view is not exempt from controversies. If emotions require judgments and previous 
beliefs, as the cognitivist position suggests, then one must question the role played by 
reason. The scholars mentioned above can be grouped among those that Jessica Moss 
calls “doxatistis”, because a common view in their interpretation of Aristotle is that 
doxa – and with it rationality – is a necessary condition for the arousal of emotions. 
On the other hand, there are those which open the spectrum of the cognitive functions 
to sense perception and especially to phantasia, a faculty of the soul that includes the 
powers of imagination, memory and dreams.  
 
This latter move is helpful because allows emotions to be present in non-rational 
beings. Animals are completely devoid of reason and in small children reason is not 
fully developed; therefore, phantasia is the faculty that does the job of evaluation when 
emotions are present in them.21 Among these scholars are Nehamas (1994); Sorabji 
(1995); Striker (1996); Cooper (1996); Nieuwenburgh (2002); Achtenberg (2002); and 
Moss (2012). The more we move emotions away from reason, the greater the 
possibility that non-verbal stimuli, such as instrumental music, would be able to arouse 
emotions. As I will try to prove, however, even if phantasia were a sufficient condition 
for the arousal of emotions, there is a need for an evaluation and an object.  
 
In the light of this characterization of emotions, the case of music is problematic, 
mainly because it is obscure what evaluation is at play when we – supposedly – 
experience the emotion that is represented by a piece of instrumental music.  Thus, as 
we will see, the hypothesis of ‘musical emotions’ puts at risk the idea that emotions 
                                                 
origins of the cognitive tradition can be traced back to Aristotle’s writings in the Rhetoric. While he 
acknowledged the existence of a physical component to the emotions, Aristotle placed primary 
importance upon cognitive beliefs and judgments.  
21 Of course, Fortenbaugh (1975, 144) rejected the idea that animals could experience emotions: 
“The behavior of a hungry or thirsty animal is not grounded upon an assessment of the particular 
situation. It is caused by a particular bodily condition and cannot be classified as an emotional response. 
Similarly the wiggles of a severed earth worm are not expressions of emotion. The several sections of 
such worm can be said to have sensation and so necessarily epithymia (De An. 413b20-24), but they 
cannot be said to respond emotionally, for they lack the capacity to judge and assess.”  
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are judgments/discriminations and evaluative processes, either aroused by reason or 
phantasia.  
 
Based on Politics VIII it has been argued that Aristotle believed that instrumental 
music is able to represent emotions and arouse them in listeners by a sort of emotional 
contagion. Andrew Ford claims that “music can directly put our souls in a certain 
painful and pleasurable emotional state.”22  Andrew Barker states in his Greek Musical 
Writings that “the music or drama that is witnessed stimulates in us certain intense 
emotions, which are rapidly exhausted,”23  and in another work he states that for 
Aristotle the music listener suffers an “immediate emotional reaction.”24  Similarly, 
Stephen Halliwell believes that according to Aristotle “the hearer of music 
simultaneously recognizes the emotion in the music” and he “feels with the music”25, 
i.e. experiences the same emotions as expressed by the music. Philipp Brüllman, in his 
paper “Music Builds Character, Aristotle Politics VIII 5, 1340a14-b5,” holds the same 
position. According to him, Aristotle believed that “music is able to arouse 
emotions”26 by an “immediate effect”.27 This interpretation is not new at all. In 1812 
Thomas Twining wrote in an essay called On the Word Imitative, as applied to Music 
that accompanied his English translation of Aristotle’s Poetics: “Music produces in us, 
immediately, feelings resembling those of real passion.”28 Others argue that music 
transmits something to the listener but focusses on the moral character and not on 
emotions. Frédérique Woerther says that according to Aristotle “musical mimesis can 
imitate characters directly.”29 According to Roger Scruton, Aristotle thought that “the 
thing imitated in the music was […] automatically imitated by the person who ‘moved 
with’ it. If the music was imitating wrong things, therefore, those who moved with it 
would be imitating wrong things.”30 Finally, Göram Sörbom wrote in his paper called 
Aristotle on Music as Representation: 
                                                 
22 Ford 2004, 319. 
23 Barker 1984, 177, n. 22. 
24 Barker 2002, 105.  
25 Halliwell 2002, 161. 
26 Brüllman 2013, 350. 
27 Ibid. 358. 
28 Twining 1812, 79-80. 
29 Woerther 2008, 100. 




 Music […] can represent character itself, Aristotle writes. Music shows us directly, 
through its images and imitations, paradigmatic examples of character. These examples 
are received immediately and directly through a change of mind of the receiver to the 
character imitated in the sense that the character or disposition is not attached to the   of 
an individual person as it is in what we may call physiognomic imitation of character; it 
is a direct imitation of characters and dispositions.31 
 
The above scholars, either referring to emotions or moral characters, defend the idea 
that according to Aristotle music is capable of a contagious action on the listener in a 
way that is direct, immediate, simultaneous, automatic and instantaneous. None of 
these qualifications is present in Aristotle’s text and so it seems that something has 
been misunderstood. The idea that instrumental music moves the listener’s emotions 
appears uncontroversial among the interpreters of Politics. They have good reasons 
for this. One of these reasons is that Aristotle says that some music produces frenzy 
(ἐνθουσιασμός) which he seems to classify as an emotion (ὁ δ’ ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοῦ περὶ 
τὴν ψυχὴν ἤθους πάθος ἐστίν).32 However, this particular affection (πάθος), as we will 
see in detail, does not qualify as ‘emotion’, properly speaking, according to Aristotle. 
Moreover, another reason to attribute an emotional contagion through music is the 
passage at 1340a19-21 where apparently music can convey emotions like anger, 
gentleness, courage, temperance and “of all the contraries to these, and of the other 
qualities of characters” (καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθῶν). 
These effects, however, occur because of the words accompanying music, as the 
analysis of the text will reveal. Those claiming that for Aristotle music is able to arouse 
an emotional contagion have not considered what Aristotle understood by emotions 
and have taken the term pathos in a sense too broadly, confusing any psychological 
affection, such as frenzy or being excited or relaxed, with emotions. 
  
As Gilbert Rouget states in his Music and Trance, there are good reasons to doubt that 
Aristotle would agree with the idea that someone hearing, for example the Phrygian 
mode, would be directly, immediately, simultaneously or instantaneously in a state of 
trance.  Rouget wrote that this would be a “mysterious musical spell” and it would be 
                                                 
31 Sörbm 2008, 43. 
32 Pol. 1340a11-12. 
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similar to affirming that “half of Greece was permanently thrown into this state”. 
Rouget continues:  
 
For, as all the facts show, aulos players of both sexes, and consequently Phrygian music, did 
not limit their activities to Corybantic rituals. Their services were constantly sought particularly 
for banquets at which there is no record whatsoever of possession ever taking place. Both 
Aristotle and Plato, then, wisely refrained from asserting any such absurdity. Others, however, 
have not hesitated to do so for them, and in their name. By recognizing, not without good cause, 
that music possesses great imitative powers, and by attributing ethos endowed with powerful 
effects to the modes, Aristotle opened the path to all sorts of exaggerated theories.33 
 
One example of what is said in the name of Aristotelian theory of psychology of music 
can be found in a paper by Schoen-Nazzaro: 
 
From what Aristotle says about the power of music to move the listener in harmony with 
itself, it follows that the skilful musician will be able to reproduce almost any emotion so 
that it can be felt and recognized by the listener. He will be able to make him melt with 
tenderness or bristle with range. Even the most hardened heart will reverberate if the right 
string is plucked. This is what imitating emotion entails.34  
 
So, if we agree with Schoen-Nazzaro, the Greek army could march against the Trojans 
armed with musical instruments instead of weapons and play music that would make 
them feel so sad that it would be impossible to them to resist any attack.   
 
Or consider John Marshall’s Aesthetics of Aristotle: 
 
The glory of music lies in its ability to reproduce the rhythm of actual human desire and 
purpose. Purpose is desire passing through emotion into action. There is a certain form of 
the expanding desire, and this expanded desire is what Aristotle thinks of as emotion or 
passion. Thus, hate, love, fear, ambition, friendliness and curiosity are desires which, as 
they expand, are also emotions. Each desiderative emotion has a certain rhythmic form of 
its own, and a certain tonality of its own. It is the rhythm which is the most characteristic 
of the diverse emotions.35  
 
I would like to emphasise that these accounts attribute to Aristotle the idea that 
instrumental music produces emotions by a sort of contagion. These accounts add to 
Aristotle’s text analysis that was not there and that have led to the above-mentioned 
absurdities. 
                                                 
33 Rouget 1985, 226. 
34 Schoen-Nazzaro, 1978, 8.  
35 Marshall, 1953:230. 
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I hold that these additions to the interpretation of Aristotle are based, in part, on a 
generalized and simplified view of the powers of music as well of what Aristotle 
considered to be an emotion. In order to clarify these generalizations and 
simplifications we need first to address some difficulties: Aristotle’s direct treatment 
of musical matters does not help us too much in clarifying these powers of music. The 
final chapter of Politics VIII, the main source that we have on the topic, is brief and 
the text is unfinished. In addition, in Aristotle, scholars say, we found that music has 
a “peculiar but unexplained power to penetrate the soul,”36 that “he does not give 
enough information for u to knows how he saw this working”37 and that, for example, 
his theory of musical ethos “remains determinedly empirical, with almost no 
admixture of musical psychology or another kind of theory.”38 I agree: on the surface 
Aristotle seems to say a lot about music without providing an explicit analysis of his 
own statements. Moreover, he seems to rely a lot on what music theorists (musikoi) 
and philosophers “experienced in musical education” know (Pol. 1341b27-32).39 This 
obscurity, I think, requires the reader's interpretation and an effort to fill in the gaps 
where Aristotle is silent. This must be done not only from conjectures but also by using 
the material where he does talk about his psychology in general, and emotions in 
particular. If Politics says nothing about the underlying psychology of the effects of 
music this is because it is not the place to provide such background, but that does not 
mean, as I will try to prove, that Aristotle has no resources to support the claims he 
makes in the Politics. On the contrary, his account of sound and hearing provides not 
only the psychology of music necessary to explain what he says in Politics but even 
the physiology involved.  This is the main contribution and novelty of the present 
study. It is an attempt to offer a reconstruction of Aristotle’s psychology of music. 
 
Translation, of course, is also an interpretation, and so the solution of textual problems 
and the words we use to translate the Greek into English are crucial.  I will try to prove 
that there has been an historical misunderstanding of Aristotle’s treatment of music 
                                                 
36 Lippman 1964, 118. 
37 Ford 2004, 324. 
38 Anderson 1968, 127. 
39 See Brüllman 2013, 347. 
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which, in part, is due to inaccurate translations of key passages of Politics. Aristotle 
certainly took part in the discussion about music and emotions but, as I want to prove, 
what he said is different from what we have been told. Aristotle did not claim that 
music conveys emotions to its listeners by a sort of contagion, otherwise all his theory 
of emotions would crumble.  
 
The reason for this is made clear in the main argument of this investigation. On the 
one hand we have the cognitivist or judgmentalist interpretation of Aristotle’s account 
of emotions and, on the other hand, we have the supposedly musical expression of 
emotions and the arousal of those emotions in listeners that seems to be present in 
Politics. These two elements are in conflict because, as Geoffrey Madell has put it: 
“An understanding of music’s power to express emotion should totally undermine the 
‘judgmentalist’ view of emotions.”40 This claim, prominent in the modern debate of 
philosophy of music, at least since the appearance of The Beautiful in Music by Eduard 
Hanslick41 in the 19th century, is also a problem to resolve in Aristotle and we need to 
see if he passes the test of modern discussions. If music is able to express and arouse 
emotions in listeners by means of a direct, immediate, simultaneous, automatic and 
instantaneous contagion, as some of the above scholars claim, then the whole 
cognitivist/judgmentalist account of emotions by Aristotle needs to be revised and with 
it a fundamental chapter of the history of the study of emotions. David Konstan is 
aware of this problem and in his defence of a judgmentalist view on Aristotle’s account 
                                                 
40 Madell 1996, 73. 
41Hanslick cknowledges that “there has been considerable agreement that the whole gamut of human 
feelings is the content of music”, however, he denies this saying that “the representation of a specific 
feeling or emotional state is not at all among the characteristic powers of music”. His Arguments goes 
like this: “Only on the basis of a number of ideas and judgments (perhaps unconsciously at moments of 
strong feeling) can our state of mind congeal with a specific feeling. The feeling of hope cannot be 
separated from the representation of a future happy state which we compare with the present; 
melancholy compares past happiness with present. These are entirely specific representations or 
concepts. Without them, without this cognitive apparatus, we cannot call the actual feeling ‘hope’ or 
‘melancholy’; it produces them for this purpose. If we take this away, all that remains is an unspecific 
stirring, perhaps the awareness of a general state of well-being or distress. Love cannot be thought 
without the representation of a beloved person, without desire and striving after felicity, glorification 
and possession of a particular object. Not some kind of mere mental agitation, but its conceptual core, 
its real historical content, specifies this feeling of love. Accordingly, its dynamic can appear as readily 
joyful as sorrowful, and yet be love. This consideration by itself suffices to show that music can only 




of emotions he is forced to deny that Aristotle thought that music was able to arouse 
emotions:  “Generalized mood as melancholy, the feelings inspired by music, wonder 
or awe at nature’s grandeur; [those] do not count as pathê for Aristotle, although they 
often qualify as emotions in modern inventories.” 42   I agree with Konstan, but 
unfortunately he does not deal with what Aristotle says in Politics about music and 
emotions. My task will be to discuss those passages and make sense of them without 
jeopardizing the cognitive interpretation of emotions. My position is that music 
produces affections in the soul, but these affections differ from the emotions (properly 
speaking) that are discussed in Rhetoric. If we have a correct interpretation of what 
Aristotle says about music and its power over listeners, his account of emotions would 
be safe. 
 
Looking at this more closely, what are the reasons behind an incompatibility between 
“musical emotions” and a “cognitivist theory of emotions”? Recently, Stephen Davies 
has highlighted three main philosophical topics that are controversial when we talk 
about music and emotions43, which I think should also be applied to Aristotle: 1) 
Expression of emotions in music; 2) Mirroring responses and contagion to music’s 
expressiveness; and 3) Negative responses.  
 
The expression of emotions in music is problematic because only sentient creatures 
experience emotions and so it would be logical that only they would be able to express 
them. However we have the experience of recognizing music as sad, angry or happy 
and so it seems that somehow there is something in the music that resembles emotions 
and allows us to recognize them.   
 
‘Mirroring responses’ refers to the supposedly emotional contagion that music would 
be able to produce. Having accepted that music can represent emotions, for example 
anger, the mirroring response presupposes that the listener of such music would 
experience the same emotion. This is also problematic because it involves us somehow 
being affected by a contagious emotion without actually having an object. If we 
                                                 
42 Konstan 2007, 39. 
43 Davies 2013.  And for a good summary of the modern discussion about music and emotions see Davis 
2012. 
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experience the anger that is supposedly expressed in the music, what is the object of 
our anger? It would be strange to say that we are angry with the music or the composer. 
Or, should we say that it would be a general feeling without a specific object? Would 
it be some sort of emotional feeling, devoid of any content?  
 
Finally, the response to negative emotions refers to the painful feeling associated with 
negative emotions. In the case of music this is problematic because it seems 
unreasonable to want to experience painful emotions. If music were able to make us 
sad, it is worth asking why we would desire to deliberately experience sadness.  
 
Aristotle does not explicitly address these problems but fortunately a reconstruction of 
his view on these matters is possible. This is a difficult task because, as mentioned 
above, there are textual problems with the Greek translation that I believe cause the 
misunderstandings. One of the most significant problems is whether or not Aristotle 
includes the lyrics of the songs when he speaks of music acting on the listener. If 
Aristotle means the powers of music to move the listener including words then we are 
faced with a different problem. Words convey ideas and can tell stories, narrations 
about characters, their deeds, personalities and misfortunes. The whole plot and the 
information in it is the subject of judgments that may lead to emotional responses. This 
was in fact what Aristotle affirmed about the Greek drama; the recognition of what 
happens to the characters in a play is pitiful and fearful because something similar 
could happen to us. If the analysis of music made by Aristotle in Politics VIII includes 
the lyrics then the effect on the listeners cannot be ascribed to the pure effect of music 
only. I think that Aristotle was well aware of this and so his treatment of the matter 
reflects this distinction. Music broadly understood as music and words is a different 
phenomenon to pure instrumental music and so are the respective psychological effects 
these two kinds of music have on their listeners.  
 
Two positions are confronted here. On the one hand, there are those advocating an 
interpretation that considers Aristotle as referring to pure instrumental music. Among 
them we should consider first of all Franz Susemihl who, in a key passage of Politics 
VIII, where some manuscripts present a lacuna, added an emendation that changes its 
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meaning. As it is, the passage at 1340a13 suggests that music, even apart from rhythms 
and melodies, is a mimesis of actions, moral characters and emotions. In addition, those 
who listen to such representations would be moved to feeling the same emotions 
represented. Susemihl adds in the lacuna “τῶν λόγων διά” with the resulting 
translation: “Even without words rhythms and melodies move men’s feeling in 
sympathy” [emphasis added]. Stephen Halliwell thinks that we are “obliged to accept” 
Susemihl’s emendation at 1340a13 arguing that  “without this textual alteration, it 
remains opaque why Aristotle, when trying to show that music can change its hearer 
psychologically, would here wish to cite the power of words to elicit emotional 
sympathy independently of rhythms and melodies.”44  I will argue that the emendation 
is not only wrong but misleads the whole interpretation of Aristotle’s position with 
respect to music and emotions.  
 
Scholars devoted to technical aspects of Ancient Greek music should at least consider 
the conflict between the alleged emotional contagion produced by instrumental music 
and emotions understood as cognitive processes rather than instantaneous reactions. 
Those working with the Aristotelian account of emotions should, in their turn, test 
whether the cognitivist view of emotions that is reconstructed mostly from Rhetoric is 
compatible with Aristotle’s remarks about music and its effects over the listeners.  
 
Last but not least, Aristotle’s position on the topic, I believe, should be considered not 
only as part of the history of ideas but also on its own philosophical merits. I think that 
what Aristotle offers is a position worthy of analysis even confronted to  modern 
theories.  
  
The order of the discussion of these matters in the thesis will be as follows. In the first 
chapter, The nature of emotions, I focus on what ‘emotions’ are for Aristotle. Only 
after doing this will it be possible to understand the relationship between music and 
emotions.  In the first section entitled Pathê as general affections I focus on the term 
pathos and how it can be understood as a general affection as well as an equivalent to 
the modern term ‘emotions’. This distinction is necessary in order to focus on the more 
                                                 
44 Halliwell 2002, 244. 
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restricted usage of the word. We are not looking for any affection stimulated by music, 
but a particular type of affection that refers to psychological processes that we call 
emotion. This sui generis type of affection is precisely the focus of the second section 
of this chapter: Pathê understood as emotions.   In this section I analyse the account 
of emotions in Rhetoric to show the essential characteristics that Aristotle attributed 
to them. By ‘essential characteristics’ I mean the cognitive elements:  the judgments 
and the intentionality of the emotions. Here I argue that a necessary condition for the 
existence of the emotions is the presence of a judgment, i.e. a predication about reality 
that is accompanied by feelings of pain and pleasure; certain desires and also tendency 
actions, like the tendency to flee away of the object of fear or fight against the source 
of anger. 
 
The second chapter entitled Emotions without judgments? deals with two possible 
objections to the cognitivist approach presented in chapter one. The two objections are 
based on the two respective cases of emotions aroused by signs and emotions aroused 
by bodily changes. I mean in the first case the emotions aroused just by the perception 
of a sign of an emotion, for example experiencing pity in the very act of seeing 
someone suffering or by the mere listening to his sad crying. In the second case I deal 
with the emotions caused by bodily alteration. Since emotions are always accompanied 
by bodily changes, it may be argued that due to a change, for example, of the body 
temperature, the subject may be moved to anger. I will reject both cases showing how 
the essential elements presented in chapter one should also be present if there is an 
emotion: there must be a judgment, feeling of pain and pleasure and intentionality 
towards an object. Otherwise, there would be an objectless mood that, while having 
some similarities with emotional states, is not the same as such states.  
 
Having secured this cognitivist view of Aristotle’s account of emotions, I will look at 
music in chapter three: Aristotle on music. The first section considers the general 
context in which music was seen as related to psychological changes before Aristotle; 
how the ancient Greeks thought about the powers of music to move the soul. 
Understanding this will make it easier to see why Aristotle's position has been 
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confused with the previous tradition that perceived music – and emotions – as 
irrational forces able to cast mysterious spells over its listeners.  
 
The second section will consider Aristotle as a philosopher of music and the place the 
discussion of music takes in the general context of Politics, the main source for the 
topic in the whole corpus.  
The third section is devoted to the textual problems that make it hard to believe that 
Aristotle believed in a musical contagion of emotions. I try to illustrate what Aristotle 
does not say about music and in particular highlight the contradiction that emerges 
between the alleged musical contagion of emotions and his more general cognitivist 
view of emotions presented earlier.  
 
Having raised the main problem for those who advocate that Aristotle proposes a 
contagion of emotion through music, I address in the fourth section the particular case 
of “angry music”, in order to show that either Aristotle does not say that music 
representing the voice of someone angry instantly makes the listener experience the 
same emotion, or that all the interpretations that describe Aristotle’s account of 
emotions as cognitivist need to be rejected as inconsistent. The alleged musical 
contagion of emotions does not satisfy the essential elements for the arousal of 
emotions: appraisal, feeling of pain or pleasure, and intentionality.  
 
After establishing that music is not responsible for a contagion of emotions, in the fifth 
section I offer an alternative explanation to the apparent inconsistency between 
Rhetoric and Politics VIII. From the analysis of the text I discuss the dispositions that 
music arouses in listeners. These dispositions, I argue, are prior to an emotional 
response, are activated through mere sense perception and from there through the body 
creating an objectless mood that promotes the appearance of later emotions. In the 
sixth section I describe these dispositions as Aristotle does in a three-fold way: in a 
polarity that goes from rest to excitement and finds its mean in the Dorian mode. I 
show also the signs of awareness of the altered dispositions produced by music in the 
works of the authors who followed Aristotle. I suggest that Aristotle helped to 
introduce a shift from mere musical contagion of emotions to a more sophisticated 
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model that did not undermine the cognitive account of emotions. The tripartition of 
the psychological effects of instrumental music is manifested in the different 
dispositions adopted by listeners.  
In section seventh I discuss the nature of these dispositions (διαθέσεις) that 
instrumental music produces and why these dispositions, contrary to emotions, are not 
directed at any particular object.  
 
Finally, in the eighth, and last, section of chapter three, I focus on the ethical aspect of 
musical effects: how music, according to Aristotle, contributes to a happy life 
habituating the soul to be disposed in a virtuous way, i.e. how music habituates young 




















1. First Chapter: The nature of the Emotions. 
1.1 Pathê as general affections 
 
 
The modern term emotion finds its equivalent in the Greek pathos (πάθος).  While 
emotion refers to some sort of psychological affection, the Greek pathos is an 
ambiguous term. For this reason it is necessary to distinguish when Aristotle uses the 
term pathos to refer to a phenomenon that is equivalent to our modern emotions from 
the usage of the term to refer to something different. This is crucial in order to 
understand what Aristotle believed the connections were between music and emotions.  
Music produces certain pathê in listeners, however, as we will see, those pathê do not 
qualify as the ‘emotions’ that are the object of our enquiry.  
 
In a broad sense, pathos can refer to anything that is received by a subject which is 
passive about that affection. In other words it is what happened to something in a 
passive way, contrary to what something does as an active agent. A ball being kicked 
is receiving a πάθος; an object being divided is experiencing a πάθος. Juha Sihvola 
puts it very clearly: 
 
Affections [πάθη] are all those temporary, accidental and contingent changes or movements 
that happen to an agent because of exogenous causes, changes that the agent passively 
experiences or undergoes in contrast to what he or she does in accordance to one’s function 
or nature as the result of internal principle motion.45    
 
As Sihvola notes, the usage of πάθος even in this broad sense, is not free from 
ambiguities. For example, in Categories 9a28-29 πάθη are described first as qualities  
(ποιότητες) while a little further at 9b32 and 10a9-10 they are not. In Categories 8 
Aristotle describes four kinds of qualities. First, there are qualities “according to a 
natural capacity or incapacity” (κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν).46 They refer to 
natural attributes or capacities. Examples given by Aristotle are to be a runner or a 
boxer and to be healthy or sick. Those are qualities according to natural capacity or 
                                                 
45 Sihvola 1996, 108. 
46 Cat. 9a14-26. 
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incapacity: a runner or a boxer is called thus because they do what they do easily or 
being “unaffected”. Properties like being hard or soft are also qualities in this sense; 
they refer to the natural capacity or incapacity of something to be, for example, easily 
or not easily divided. There is also a type of quality understood as a “shape and the 
external form of each thing” (ποιότητος σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσα 
μορφή).47 It literally refers to the contour and shape of an object, as well as to the 
straightness, curvedness and anything like that.  
 
United in one group are qualities in the sense of a state (ἕξις) and a disposition 
(διάθεσις).48 States are qualities that are difficult to change and permanent. Given 
examples are knowledge and virtues such as justice and temperance. Dispositions, on 
the contrary, are easily changeable. Examples of dispositions given by Aristotle are 
being hot and being chilly and sickness and health “and the like,” and then Aristotle 
adds that “a man is in certain disposition in virtue of these but he changes quickly from 
hot to cold and from being healthy to being sick.”49 We may be tempted to suppose 
that Aristotle is referring here only to human dispositions, but these are just examples; 
disposition here should be understood in a broad sense and can also be present in 
inanimate beings.  
 
Now, a key characteristic of a disposition is that if it lasts long enough it may turn into 
a state. This would be the case of knowledge, as someone in the process of learning is 
not in a state of knowledge properly speaking but in a disposition that may be easily 
changed.  
 
                                                 
47 Cat. 10a11-16. 
48 Cat. 8b25-9a13. “We call disposition the arrangement of that which has parts, in respect of place or 
of capacity or of kind; there must be a certain position, as the words ‘disposition’ shows  (Διάθεσις 
λέγεται τοῦ ἔχοντος μέρη τάξις ἢ κατὰ τόπον ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ κατ’ εἶδος· θέσιν γὰρ δεῖ τινὰ εἶναι, 
ὥσπερ καὶ τοὔνομα δηλοῖ ἡ διάθεσις) Met. 1022b1-3. The concept of disposition will occupy our 
attention later since dispositions, particularly moral and bodily dispositions, are precisely what 
instrumental music is able to change in the listener. For the moment we need to continue with the focus 
on πάθη. 
49 Cat. 8b37-9a4: διάκειται μὲν γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ θερμοῦ 
ψυχρὸς γιγνόμενος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς τὸ νοσεῖν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μή τις καὶ 
αὐτῶν τούτων τυγχάνοι διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη πεφυσιωμένη καὶ ἀνίατος ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος οὖσα, ἣν 
ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύοι. 
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The last type of qualities in Categories are “affective qualities and affections” 
(ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη). 50  Examples of affective qualities are 
sweetness, bitterness and sourness, and all of their kind, also hotness and coldness and 
paleness and darkness. Things possessing these qualities are thus qualified; e.g. 
sweetness is a quality of honey. They are called affective qualities because they 
produce an affection of the senses. One problem here is that hotness and coldness were 
already mentioned as dispositions (διάθεσις), so it seems that they can be understood 
as such or as affective qualities and affections. The distinction seems to depend on 
how permanent the coldness or hotness is in the object. The case of paleness, darkness 
and others colorings is different; they can be permanent qualities of objects but also 
they can be called affective qualities “because they themselves have been brought 
about by an emotion: [for example] when ashamed one goes red and when frightened 
one goes pale” (Cat. 9b11-12). When these properties are easily dispersed, like in the 
case of the emotions, they are just momentary affections and not qualities. Thus “a 
man who reddens through shame is not called ruddy, nor one who pales in fright pallid” 
(Cat. 9b30-34). The same is the case with someone experiencing anger (ὀργή); he is 
not qualified as an angry person but rather as someone affected by anger in a particular 
moment.51 Therefore an affection (πάθος) could be not only an emotion properly 
speaking but also the particular affection suffered with each emotion, i.e., turning red 
or pale.  Aristotle adds that if an affection (or disposition) is repeated over time it may 
turn into a quality. This will be the case of moral habits: acting justly just one time 
constitutes a disposition, and then, if that disposition is repeated over time, it may turn 
into a permanent state of virtue. The same happens in Aristotle’s theory of education: 
by habituation of repeated affections and dispositions, towards the right objects 
obviously, we are led to acquire virtue as a permanent state.52  
 
Now, as mentioned above, at 9a29 Aristotle says that an affection (πάθος) is a quality 
of some kind. The problem arises later at 9b31 and 10a9-10 when he explicitly says 
that an affection (πάθος) is not a quality. My interpretation is that emotions (e.g. anger) 
                                                 
50 Cat. 9a29-10a9. 
51 Cf. EE 1220b15. 
52 “Character [ethos], as the word itself indicates. Is that which is developed from habit [ethos]; and 
anything is habituated which, as result of guidance that is not innate, through being changed a certain 
way repeatedly, is eventually capable of acting in that way” (EE 1220a39b3). 
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and the affections that accompany them (e.g. turning red) are not permanent and so 
only count as temporary qualities. Now, if they are permanent in an object, or – in the 
case of humans – permanent either from birth, illness or habit, then they will be stable 
qualities. If at 9a29 Aristotle puts the emotions as qualities it is only in this sense of 
temporary qualities and not permanent ones. The same, I think, is the case with 
dispositions. Those count as qualities even though they are “easily moved” (εὐκίνητα) 
and as the affections (πάθη) are “easily disperse[d] (ῥᾳδίως διαλυομένων)”. So I 
interpret that if the dispositions are called qualities it is only in relative terms, i.e. they 
are only “temporary qualities” that may become permanent ones if there is a constant 
repetition. This is not, however, evident in the text and so the explanation has to be 
supplied. For my purposes, what is relevant is the transient nature of the emotions and 
dispositions as opposed to the stability of the states or moral habits that are acquired 
as a second nature.53  
 
The treatment of πάθη in Metaphysics V 21 (1022b15-20) brings a further problem. 
There, πάθος receives four meanings:  
 
(1) A quality (ποιότης) in respect of which a thing can be altered, e.g. white and 
black, sweet and bitter, heaviness and lightness, and all the others kinds. (2) The 
already actualized alterations. (3) Especially, injurious alterations and 
movements, and above all, painful injuries. (4) Experiences pleasant or painful 
when on a large scale are called affections (trans. Ross).  
 
The first meaning given to πάθος, a quality (ποιότης) has already been discussed. 
Together with the second meaning in the passage, it gives a very broad sense to πάθος: 
an alteration that something undergoes by reason of an external cause.54 The third and 
fourth meanings offer a definition of πάθος closer to what we understand as emotion. 
Here, something different is under consideration and πάθος, we are told, refers 
especially (μᾶλλον) to injurious alterations and movements (βλαβεραὶ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ 
                                                 
53 For a complete discussion of the problems here with Aristotle treatment of the qualities see Ackrill 
1963 and Furth 1988. For the analysis of emotions in the Categories in the Medieval tradition see 
Knuuttila 2003.  
54 See also the general treatment of pathos as passive affection in On generation and corruption I, 7 and 
Physics VII, 3.  
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κινήσεις,), painful injuries (λυπηραὶ βλάβαι) and cases of advantageous things and 
pain on large scale (μεγέθη τῶν συμφορῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν). It is interesting that the 
affections that we called emotions are particularly associated with injurious 
alterations: painful injuries and great pleasure and pain.  According to Amélie 
Oksenberg Rorty’s paper “Aristotle on the Metaphysical Status of Pathe” the painful 
and harmful condition of pathê is such because affections are characterized as an 
exogenous alteration that modifies the inner nature of a being. In this sense, emotions 
inflict a certain violence on us. Certainly, some pathê could be beneficial and also 
produce pleasure but ultimately they are always a modification that involves an 
‘aggression’ with respect to a previous state. That previous state is the normal and 
permanent way of being of an object and then, by the affection, it is temporarily 
altered.55  
 
In conclusion, the pathê can be understood in a broad sense as general affections 
received by a subject passively, they are of short duration and so are momentary 
qualities of an object that, in the case of constant repetition over time, may become 
permanent qualities of that object. However, we need a more restricted use of the word; 
we need to understand what Aristotle means when he uses the term pathos applied to 











                                                 
55 See Rorty 1984, 529. 
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1.2 Pathê as emotions 
 
 
Beyond the general account in Metaphysics and Categories, the other sources 
containing relevant material for the study of emotions are De anima, History of 
Animals, Topics, Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric. In these works, the term πάθος 
can generally be translated as emotion rather than affection. It is this more restricted 
sense of the term πάθος, as emotion, that now we are going to explore. Due to its 
ambiguous nature, however, in each case the meaning of πάθος depends on the context 
and we should bear this in mind.   
 
There is no single Aristotelian work devoted to the treatment of what we now call 
emotions. In the list provided by Diogenes Laertius at least three works possibly 
referring to emotions are mentioned, but none of them have survived. 56 In light of this, 
what we can do is a reconstruction from the remaining texts. Rhetoric has been the 
preferred work of most scholars for such a task. It is the work that offers the more 
detailed account of emotions in Aristotle. However, I think, that should not be taken 
as the only source.  Rhetoric is a work concerned with convincing an audience and so, 
In my opinion, that what is said in Rhetoric cannot be taken as a complete scientific 
reflection by Aristotle’s standards on the nature of the emotions. Emotions are not only 
cognitive, but are also bodily processes. Like Paul Nieuwenburg, I believe that “we 
should not expect to find Aristotle’s definitive views on emotions in Rhetoric 2.1-
11.”57 A proper Aristotelian account of emotions should be complemented with the 
biological corpus, particularly those works concerned with human psychology.58 One 
of the most important works there is De anima, where Aristotle deals with the complex 
study of emotions, explaining that it is a twofold phenomenon. This is so because “the 
emotions are enmattered reasons” (τά πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν)59 “Enmattered” refers 
                                                 
56 On being affected or having being affected (Περὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ πεπονθέναι); On Emotions or On 
Anger (Περὶ παθῶν <ἢ περὶ> ὀργῆς) and Emotions (Πάθη). 
57 Nieuwenburg 2002, 87. More drastically Copper 1999, 406: “Aristotle provides no general, analytical 
account of the emotions anywhere in any of the ethical writings. And we are in for disappointment if 
we look for this in his supposedly scientific account of psychological matters in the De Anima”. 
58 De anima, De sensu, Generation of animal and Movement of animals. 
59 De anima 403a25. 
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here to the bodily changes that are the material cause of the emotions and as such are 
an object of study of natural sciences. The “reason” refers, I interpret, to the formal 
cause, i.e. a desire caused by a judgment about a situation that makes that particular 
emotion and not something else. This formal element is the object of study of 
dialecticians rather than natural scientists. It deals with the “whys and wherefores” at 
a cognitive level; the reasons for which a particular situation makes us react with anger 
or pity or any other emotion. This cognitive side of the emotions is what I am to discuss 
now. In particular, I will focus on the judgments that are the necessary conditions for 
the arousal of emotions. This will reveal that in order to experience, for example anger, 
we need to judge that someone has insulted us. If this is a necessary condition for the 
arousal of anger, then an objection can be made against those who claim that 
instrumental music can first imitate anger, and secondly, transmit that emotion to the 
listener.   
 
Now, as previously noted, Rhetoric is the work preferred by scholars as the main 
sourse for the reconstruction of the Aristotelian Theory of Emotions. Following this 
tradition, I too will now focus on Rhetoric. There, we find a sort of definition at 
1378a19-21: “The πάθη are all those things changing in respect to which those who 
have them differ with respect to their discriminations (κρίσεις) and which are 
accompanied by pain and pleasure.”60 The term κρίσις is interpreted on a cognitivist 
reading as involving judgment. In fact, rational judgment appears to be involved in all 
the emotions discussed in Rhetoric, as is emphasised by the use of verbs such as 
οἴομαι61 and νομίζω62 in contexts where it is said that a particular emotion is aroused 
as a consequence of what we believe or think. For instance, let us consider fear:  
 
If fear is associated with the expectation that something destructive will happen to us, plainly 
nobody will be afraid who believes (οἰομεν́ων) nothing can happen to him; we shall not fear 
things that we believe (οἴονται) cannot happen to us, nor people who we believe (οἴονται) 
                                                 
60 ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή. (trans. 
Sihvola). Freese (Loeb, 1926) translates: “The emotions are all those affections which cause men to 
change their opinion in regard to their judgments, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain” and 
Roberts (The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Barnes, 1984): “The emotions are all those feelings that 
so change men as to affect their judgments, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure”. 
61 1379b6; 1380b15; 1381a2; 1382b31; 1383a26; 1383b9; 1385b20; 1387b15; 1387b30; 1388b9. 
62 1380b18; 1382b10; 1383a4; 1385b24. 
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cannot inflict them upon us; nor shall we be afraid at times when we think (οἰομένους) 
ourselves safe from them (trans. Rhys Roberts).63 
   
The idea behind the cognitivist approach is that emotions are complex cognitive 
processes rather that pure physiological and mechanical reactions. Thus, an emotion 
always involves the perception of something and a judgment about it; it is an 
intentional process directed to a particular object.  This apprehension is accompanied 
by an evaluation in the form of a proposition. Anger, for example, is a process that 
requires us to “perceive” (imagine, remember or think) something and to evaluate that 
that object is, for example, offensive to us or to someone we care about.  Emotions 
would then involve us saying that X is Y and that act of predication of Y about X would 
be a judgment necessary for the arousal of the emotion. If the judgment is modified, 
then the emotion is also altered: that is precisely the task of the orator in Rhetoric. 
 
The definition of emotions in Rhetoric is a strange one. To say that emotions are “all 
those things changing in respect to which those who have them differ with respect to 
their discriminations” appears not to say much about their nature but only to describe 
their effects. The other problem is that the change of a judgment could be caused by a 
number of different variables, such as a headache, for example.64  To know how 
emotions change our judgments is, at least, a starting point to getting an idea of what 
emotions are. Emotions as described in the definition of Rhetoric are responsible for 
changes in our judgments; the orator therefore needs to affect the emotions of the 
audience to change their minds.  The orator does not, however, change an audience’s 
mind by inflicting physiological changes, like headaches, on his audience but he does 
so with arguments. Now let us focus on how emotions can change judgments.    
 
Stephen Leighton has identified three ways in which our judgments are altered because 
of an emotion according to Aristotle: insincerity, favour/disfavour, and misperception. 
Insincerity would be the case when we ‘alter’ our judgment because of our feelings 
towards someone or something. If we love someone then it may be the case that in a 
courtroom we hold a position ‘A’ when we really think ‘not-A’. As Leighton puts it: 
                                                 
63 1382b29-33. 
64 Fortenbaugh 1970, 54. 
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“we make certain judgments in public that are at odds with what we really believe.”65 
In this case, however, I think that the judgment is not altered at all, but supplanted or 
covered by another one.  
 
More interesting are the cases where we are faced with an ambiguous situation and we 
respond either favouring or disfavouring the person we have to judge. Faced with a 
situation where we need to judge, for instance, whether someone is guilty or not, we 
may be inclined towards one or other verdict because of our emotions towards the 
accused. It is quite clear: if we love or hate the accused then our judgment will be 
conditioned and inclined to convict or acquit. Hope is also an emotion that works in 
this way: someone experiencing hope judges in a favourable way that what he desires 
is achievable. One problem with this interpretation apears in cases where there is no 
ambiguity. If the facts are clear enough it does not seem to matter how strong our 
emotions are, our judgment will be based on the facts without distortion. If there were 
crystal clear evidence that a beloved one is guilty then the favour/disfavour 
explanation of how emotions alter our judgment would not work.  
 
The third explanation is as follows: emotions can alter our perception and thus our 
judgments. Leighton quotes Nicomachean Ethics in giving two such examples: 
 
Anger (θυμός)66 seems to listen to arguments to some extent, but to mishear them, as do 
hasty servants who run out before they have heard the whole of what one says, and then 
muddle the order, or a dog barks if there is a knock at the door, before looking if it is a 
friend. So anger, by reason of the warmth and hastiness (θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα) of its 
nature, when it hears, though not hearing an order, springs to revenge. (1149a23-32, 
Ackrill’s revision of Ross’ translation). 
 
 
                                                 
65 Leighton 1996, 208. 
66 The translation of θυμός as anger requires some explanation. Although in many places (for example 
Rhet. 1369a4, 1369b11 and 1378a30-33) the term can be translated with certainty as ‘anger’ there are 
others where a different translation is required. In Topics 113a36-b1 ὀργή is described as belonging to 
θυμός, not as its equivalent.  Also in Politics it is said that θυμός is responsible for a friendly feeling 
(1327b40-1328a); which is in contradiction with the desire of retaliation involved in anger. However, 
in the present passage we can be sure that both terms are equivalent because what is said here about 
thumos is exactly the same that we read about orgê in other places. The characterization of thumos as 
being of a warm and hasty nature; its connection with the perception of a slight and the consequent 
desire of revenge, all of these are clear signs that θυμός could be replaced by ὀργή. For a further 
discussion of the relation between the two terms see Pearson 2012, 111-117. 
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The cause of the misperception here is the warmth and hastiness (θερμότητα καὶ 
ταχυτῆτα) of anger. These two qualities of the emotion are interesting since it seems 
that there is a reference to something beyond the purely cognitive element. Warmth 
and hastiness, in my opinion, refer to the bodily aspects of anger.  In chapter 2.4 I will 
focus on the “enmattered” aspect of the emotion in detail, i.e. the role that the body 
plays in emotions according to Aristotle. However, let me advance something here and 
note how the “temperature” and “velocity” of the anger have an impact on the 
cognitive aspect. It may be thought that the warmth and hastiness are metaphors to 
refer to the nature of anger, but, we will see, they actually refer to a very concrete 
aspect of the bodily condition that is involved in the emotion, i.e. the physiological 
changes that occur in someone experiencing anger. Somehow this physical warmth 
and hastiness make the subject affected to such an extent that he mishears and so has 
a distorted judgment of reality.  
 
I agree with Leighton with these three ways in which emotions alter our judgments: 
insincerity, favour/disfavour and misperception, the latter being caused by bodily 
changes that alter our perception.   
 
These changes, however, only tell us what effect the emotions produce on our 
judgments but not what emotions are or how they come into existence. An interesting 
passage quoted by Leighton, which helps to answer these questions, is found in De 
Insomniis (460b3-16): 
 
We are easily deceived about our perceptions when we are in emotional states, some in 
one state and others in another; e.g. the coward in his fear, the lover in his love; so that 
even in a very faint resemblance the coward expects to see his enemy, and the lover his 
loved one; and the more one is under the influence of emotion, the less similarity is 
required to give this impressions. Similarly, in fits of anger and in all forms of desire all 
are easily deceived, and the more easily, the more they are under the influence of emotions. 
So to those in fever animals sometimes appear on the wall from a slight resemblance of 
lines put together. Sometimes the illusion corresponds to the degree of emotion so that 
those who are not very ill are aware that the impression is false, but if the malady is more 
severe, they actually move in accordance with appearances. (trans. Leigthon based on 
Hett’s translation).  
 
 
In this passage there is also a reference to biological changes that cause a 
misperception. The effect of high temperature alters perception and so someone thus 
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affected misperceives reality. However, now I want to focus on the first part of the 
passage where Aristotle says that the coward expects to see his enemy and the lover 
his loved one. This expectation goes beyond material causes; it is not the product of 
mere bodily changes but it has to do with certain beliefs. The person suffering fear 
holds the belief that, for example, an enemy is a threat and so, in his fear, he 
erroneously perceives other stimuli as his enemy. It is not his temperature or any other 
bodily condition – or at least not those bodily conditions in the absence of other factors 
– that cause him to see the enemy, but a belief. To understand this let us take one 
particular emotion, anger, as example. Anger is defined in Rhetoric as a desire for 
revenge for a slight that is perceived as undeserved and is accompanied with pain 
(1378a30-2). Here the mind perceives an object and makes an evaluation of it; it judges 
that one has been slighted and that judgment is the origin of the emotion. It is a 
necessary condition for the arousal of the emotion. As Konstan claims, however, “the 
judgment is not the emotion itself,”67 but what elicits or triggers an appraisal and 
consequent emotion. The judgment is not equal to the emotion but nonetheless it is 
necessary to produce the emotion. There is an object that the subject perceives and 
judges and, as a result of such judgment, the emotion arises when the object perceived 
produces desire and pain or pleasure, or both. 
 
The question now is about the nature of that judgment and whether or not it is 
exclusively rational.  This is important for my purposes because it may be seen that 
the more emotions are moved away from rational judgments the more plausible it is to 
find emotions in instrumental music, i.e. music without words (λόγοι). However, as I 
will try to show, even if reason as a necessary condition for the emotions is removed, 
there is still need of a “judgment” that involves a predication of an object, and that 
object of the emotions seems to be absent in the perception of instrumental music and 
in its alleged emotional contagion.  
 
The discussion is divided between those who think that according to Aristotle 
emotions require a rational component and those who claim that the participation of 
                                                 
67 Konstan 2007, 21. 
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phantasia is a sufficient condition for their existence. Among the former group is 
William Fortenbaugh, who refers to the judgments mentioned in Rhetoric as thoughts68 
and so he states that, for example, the efficient cause of anger is the thought of a slight. 
In the case of fear, the emotion would be caused by the thought of imminent danger. 
He thus affirms that “for Aristotle the thought of outrage and the thought of impending 
danger are nor merely characteristic of anger and fear respectively. They are necessary 
and properly mentioned in the essential definitions of anger and fear.” 69  The 
consequence of establishing thought as a necessary condition for emotions is that 
irrational animals would be excluded from any emotional experience. According to 
Fortenbaugh, “human behaviour as against animal behaviour is cognitive.”70 He then 
adds: “the behaviour of animals manifests considerable critical capacity and therefore 
may be spoken as discriminating behaviour. But the discriminations of animals remain 
at the level of aesthesis. They are not cognitive in the sense of propositional judgments 
open to the persuasion of reasoned logos.”71 To deny emotions to animals and also to 
small children based on their lack of rationality in the first case, and – as Aristotle 
would say – in their undeveloped rationality in the second, is problematic. First of all, 
it is a claim that appears counterintuitive. Anyone who has had a dog as a pet would 
say that dogs can express a sort of happiness, sadness, anger or fear. And not only that, 
they can change their “emotional” state if they perceive that something has changed in 
a similar way to how a man is moved to another emotional state when his judgment is 
altered. A dog perceives somebody to be a threat and so acts showing its teeth, 
however, after a while the perception of the same person as a threat changes and with 
it the attitude of the dog. Is there any evaluation made by the dog? What kind of 
discrimination is possible without reason? 
 
                                                 
68  Fortenbaugh 1975, 17: “Aristotle showed that that emotional response is intelligent behavior open to 
reasoned persuasion. When men are angered, they are not victims of some totally irrational force. Rather 
they are responding in accordance with the thought of unjust insult. Their belief may be erroneous and 
their anger unreasonable, but their behavior is intelligent and cognitive in the sense that is grounded 
upon a belief which may be criticized and even altered by argumentation”.  
69 Fortenbaugh 1975, 12. 
70 Ibid. 39. 
71 Ibid. 48, n. 1.  
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According to Aristotle there are two different types of desires: irrational and rational.72 
On the one hand rational desires – only available to humans – are those that require an 
assumption (ὑπόληψις) i.e. assuming that something is the case. The term ὑπόληψις 
can be also translated as opinion, and so it is to believe that something is the case. On 
the other hand, irrational desires, such as thirst, hunger or sexual desires, are not 
responsive to rational commands.  No persuasion is possible against feeling hot or 
hungry; those affections may be fought back by virtue but not extinguished by reason 
because they are totally deaf to arguments: 
 
I call irrational all those [desires] that are not the result of any assumption. Such are all those 
which are called natural; for instance, those which come into existence through the body –
such as the desire of food, thirst, hunger, the desires connected with taste, sexual pleasures, 
in a word, with touch, smell, hearing, and sight. I call those desires rational which are due 
to our being convinced; for there are many things which we desire to see or acquire when 
we have heard them spoken and are convinced that they are pleasant (Rhet. 1370a18-26). 
  
An idea in the same vein is found in NE: “there is no gain in being persuaded not to 
be hot or in pain or hungry or the like, since we shall experience these feelings 
nonetheless” (1113b26-30). On the contrary, when we experience a rational desire we 
can be convinced with arguments and so change the desire. Now, conviction is the 
result of persuasion and only rational beings can be persuaded.73 It therefore seems 
difficult to explain how non-rational animals could experience emotions as these latter 
are presented in the Rhetoric. There are nonetheless many cases where it seems that 
animals experience emotional states. Again, let us imagine a dog showing aggressive 
behaviour against a potential aggressor. If the latter stops being perceived by the dog 
as a threat then the dog seems to decrease his rage. This is exactly what Aristotle tells 
us, and not in the biological corpus, but in Rhetoric: “Even the behavior of dogs proves 
that anger (ὀργή) ceases towards those who humble (ταπεινουμένους) themselves, for 
they do not bite those who sit down” (1380a24-26).74 In Rhetoric this example seems 
an auxiliary model and does not stand as a sure case of emotions, however, it raises 
                                                 
72 Rhet. 1370a17-26. 
73 “Opinion is attended by conviction, for it is impossible to hold opinions without being convinced of 
them: but no brute is ever convinced, though many have imagination. Further, every opinion implies 
conviction, conviction implies that we have been persuaded and persuasion implies reason. Among the 
brutes, however, though some have imagination, none have reason (De anima 428a-19-24). 
74 “Will beasts act under the influence of pain; for they attack because they have been wounded or 
because they are afraid” (NE 1116b31-32). 
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the question of the necessity of a rational desire in order to experience an emotion. 
Fortenbaugh’s position is that Aristotle uses two different frameworks to explain why 
in some instances animals appear to experience emotions. In his paper ‘Aristotle: 
animals, emotion, and moral virtue’ he defends the idea that, according to Aristotle: 
“Animals are marked by sensation and impulse”, and that “they do not have a share of 
the biological faculty of intelligence and therefore cannot judge that an insult has 
occurred or that a particular danger is imminent.”75  The cases where Aristotle seems 
to ascribe emotions to animals occur, Fortenbaugh holds, in the biological corpus and 
not in his ethical works. In each of them there is a different framework being used. In 
the cases where Aristotle ascribes emotions to animals he is using a Platonic 
framework that includes the tripartition of the soul and “associates epithymia and 
thymos indiscriminately with both human beings and animals.”76 On the other hand, 
there is a human framework where bipartition is used. This would be the case of the 
ethical works where Aristotle places emotions “as cognitive phenomena.” 
Fortenbaugh concludes his paper: “[T]he zoological view which construes emotions 
and temperaments as non-cognitive phenomena is useful for describing animal 
behaviour but poorly suited for elucidating different kinds of intelligent, human 
action.”77 All the cases where emotions are ascribed to animals should be understood 
as anthropomorphism or as analogies or metaphors of human emotions.   
 
Richard Sorabji rejects Fortenbaugh’s position claiming that, according to Aristotle, 
animals, despite not having rationality, are endowed with an analogous faculty that 
allows them to make perceptual and post-perceptual predications (imagination, dreams 
and memory). By means of sense perception animals are not only able to perceive 
something but also to predicate it from something else. This, Sorabji points out, does 
not mean that animals have conceptions or beliefs. He says that it is more like: 
“something is predicated of something.” 78  For example, Sorabji points to 
Nicomachean Ethics, where it may be argued that when the lion perceives that (ὅτι) 
an ox is nearby, we are looking at a case of predicational perception. In fact, the “that” 
                                                 
75 Fortenbaugh 1971, 137. 
76 Ibid. 145. 
77 Ibid.157. 
78 Sorabji 2001, 19. 
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clause also appears in De anima when Aristotle says that through phantasia we 
perceive that (ὅτι) a white thing is round or that it is a man (418a21-22, 430b29-30). 
Non-rational animals are deprived of reason and thus of any assumptions or beliefs 
(DA 428a19-24). They are, however, endowed with phantasia79 – or at least some of 
them – and so they could also make discriminations and these “predications” even 
without reason.  
 
However, to predicate is a strong verb to ascribe to animals and I am not convinced 
that the lion perceiving that the ox is near is enough to conclude that for Aristotle 
animals’ minds are endowed with predicational capacities. It is only one case and it is 
not improbable that it was just a slip. The passage is not focused on animals having 
predicational powers, but whether or not they enjoy smells or sounds. 
 
There may, however, be alternative means of explaining animal emotions without 
ascribing predications to them.  The Greek term κρίσις can be translated as 
discrimination, division and separation. In cognitive terms all animals are endowed 
with certain amount of this faculty. It certainly belongs to humans but to a lesser extent 
also to non-rational animals since is not exclusive of reason but is found in the powers 
of perception80 and imagination.81 A lamb, for example, can discriminate between a 
wolf and another lamb and so it will flee in the presence of the former. Somehow the 
wolf must represent pain for the lamb because we are told that in animals “the origin 
of motion is […] the object of pursuit or avoidance in the sphere of action.”82 So, the 
animal is moved when there is desire of something and sense perception presents to 
the animals’ mind the object that is the satisfaction of the desire: 
 
                                                 
79  415a11; 428a10-11, 22-24; 433b28-30; 431a1-7. There are two types of phantasia, rational  
(λογιστική) and of sense perception (αἰσθητική) (De anim. 433b29). Non-rational animals only have 
the second. 
80 NE 1126b3-4; 1109b20 and De anima 426b10-121; 432a16. 
81 “Imagination is the faculty in virtue of which we say that an image present itself to us, and if we 
exclude the metaphorical use of the term, it is some of the faculties or habits in virtue of which we 
judge (κρίνομεν), and judge truly or falsely. Such faculties or habits are sensation, opinion, knowledge, 
intellect.” (De anima 428a1-5); “Imagimation and sensation are common ground with though, since 
all three are faculties of discrimination (κριτικὰ) though differing according to distinctions stated 
elswewere” (Movement of animals 700b19-22). 
82 Movement of animals 701b33-34: Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τῆς κινήσεως τὸ ἐν τῷ πρακτῷ 
διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτόν. 
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For whenever a creature is actually using sense-perception or phantasia or thought towards 
the thing for-the-sake-of which, he does at once what he desires. For the activity of the desire 
takes place of questioning or thinking. “I have to drink,” says appetite. “Here’s drink,” says 
sense perception or phantasia or thought. At once it drinks. This, then, is the way that 
animals are impelled to move and act: the proximate reason for movement is desire, and this 
comes to be either through sense perception or through phantasia and thought.  (701a29-
701b1. trans. Nussbaum).  
 
 
According to Aristotle, this practical syllogism does not require the faculty of reason 
and I think that it may be applied to the case of the lamb and the wolf above. The 
awareness of the wolf must produce pain in the lamb, and so the lamb flees with fear. 
I am not sure about Sorabji’s predicational content made by phantasia, I do not know 
what sort of predication the lamb would make about the wolf. Would it be that the 
lamb perceives the wolf as a threat or as something dangerous and as a consequence 
experiences fear? This alternative is problematic because it would appear that the lamb 
holds a belief about the wolf. It also involves the concept of danger or threat, but 
animals cannot grasp concepts according to Aristotle. Can the lamb rather than  
believing that the wolf is a threat only perceive it as one? In either case I think that for 
Aristotle there must be at least some intentionality, some perceptual grasp of an object, 
i.e. the wolf, which is object of pain/avoidance. In De anima we are told that sensation 
is analogous with thinking in the sense that the pursuit or avoidance of an object, 
pleasant or painful, is like (οἷον) affirmation and negation (De anim. 431a8-9). The 
lamb, we would say, perceives that the wolf is painful and then “avoids/negates” the 
wolf by some analogous sort of “saying.” If this is the case, we should agree with 
Martha Nussbaum and say that Aristotle “views pain as an intentional state with 
cognitive content,”83 and so the lamb’s pain is intended over or is about the wolf. The 
lamb does not need to believe, perceive or predicate that the wolf is a threat, but only 
discriminates that the wolf is something painful. This awareness of the wolf as painful 
is enough to make the lamb desire to avoid it. This seems to be confirmed in 
Nichomachean Ethics: 
 
For reason or imagination informs us that we have been insulted or slighted, and anger, 
reasoning as it were that anything like this must be fought against, boils up straight away; 
while appetite, if reason or perception merely says that and object is pleasant (ἡ δ’ ἐπιθυμία, 
ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις), springs to the enjoyment of it. Therefore 
                                                 
83 Nussbaum 2001, 64. 
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anger obeys reason in a sense, but appetite does not (NE 1149a32-b3, Ackrill’s revision of 
Ross’ translation). 
 
I am not wholly committed to the idea that an animal using its imagination would ‘say’ 
that something is pleasurable or painful. If this were the case, it would be only 
analogous to rational predication. However, what I do claim and what is relevant for 
my purposes here, is that in any case, whether we accept that animals have emotions 
as per Sorabji or whether  following Fortenbaugh, we ascribe to them only something 
analogous to human emotions, for Aristotle the existence of an object for the emotions 
is necessary, and the perception of that object must always be accompanied by the 
feeling of pain or pleasure. So, even in the cases of irrational emotions, if we allow 
their existence in accordance with Sorabji’s analysis, we require an intentional 
awareness accompanied by a discrimination of whether the object is painful or 
pleasurable.  
 
Jessica Moss also claims that for Aristotle animals have at least some emotions.84 She 
wants to expand the cause of emotions not only to beliefs but to post- perceptual 
appearances, i.e. phantasiai, as sufficient conditions for the existence of the emotion 
in humans. One of her arguments is that the mind never thinks without images 
(phantasiai).85 According to Moss, phantasia is enough to make evaluative judgments 
since Aristotle conceives “all human passions as involving appearances of things as 
good or bad.” 86  She presents phantasia as a way of accepting or endorsing a 
representation in a process that is parallel to that of belief. Anger or pity, for example, 
would require the operation of phantasia. This is so because for Aristotle “insults” and 
“undeserved well doing”, she thinks, are perceptible. According to Moss, Aristotle 
does not explain how this is possible but nevertheless is committed to this view. To 
prove this, Moss argues first that Aristotle holds that “all painful and pleasant things 
are perceptible” 87  and secondly, in conjunction with this, that “the passions are 
essentially pleasurable and painful responses.” Her conclusion is that “the things to 
                                                 
84 Moss 2012, 73 and note 11. 
85 431a16-17; 432a9-10. 
86 Moss 2012, 69. 
87 Ibid. 88. 
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which they are responses must be perceptible.” To support her claim she quotes EN 
1149a32-34: 
 
Logos or phantasia has shown that something was hubris or a slight (ὀλιγωρία), and spirit 




In order to perceive with phantasia an “undeserved well-doing”, which is a 
requirement to experience anger, we need an underlying concept of justice and I do 
not think that Aristotle would agree with the idea that such a concept is an object of 
sense perception.  Perceiving a physical attack does not involve an apprehension of a 
universal concept like justice and, we will see, for Aristotle justice is present in the 
concept of a slight (ὀλιγωρία), the object that is the cause of anger.   
 
Now, although Aristotle does not make the distinction explicitly, it is necessary to 
distinguish different types of emotions, or more precisely, different objects of 
emotions. To accept Moss’s view that the faculty of phantasia is enough to arouse 
emotions would lead us to accept that animals can also experience them. There are, 
however, emotions that require highly complex concepts unavailable to non-human 
animals. Consider, for example, pity. This is an emotion that requires an idea of justice 
and so irrational animals cannot experience it, and unless we want to accept that 
Aristotle says so, we need to leave it exclusively for humans. But the fact is that non-
rational animals have no access to the concept of justice.88 Even in the case of emotions 
that seem more basic and likely to be ascribed to animals, like anger89 and fear,90 there 
are objections to be made. Anger, as is described in Rhetoric, not only involves the 
concept of justice but also the hope (ἐλπίς) of retaliation.91 In turn, fear is defined as 
the anticipation (προσδοκία) of a future misfortune. 92  If these elements are the 
                                                 
88 Pol. 1253a7-19: “Speech is intended for the valuable (συμφέρον) and harmful (βλαβερός), and 
therefore likewise the just (δίκαιος) and the unjust (ἄδικος). And it is a characteristic of man that he 
alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings 
who have this sense makes a family and a state”. 
89 Rhet. 1380a24. 
90 HA 609a31-b1; 609b16-17; 622b14-15; 627a16-18; 629b8-30; 630B8-13; PA 650b27-33; 667a11-
22; 679a4-14, 25-30; 692a20-4. 
91 Rhet. 1378b2. 
92 Rhet. 1382b29. 
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constituents of these emotions then animals cannot experience them, since no animal 
experiences hope or anticipation.93 An animal cannot experience an affection about a 
reality that is not available to it. Animals deprived of sight, such as a worm, cannot 
process any visual stimuli. The case would be similar with emotions: animals, being 
deprived of reason, cannot access moral concepts or have hopes or anticipation. At 
most, their “emotional reactions”, or what seem to be their emotional reactions, must 
be confined to the realm of sense perception and feelings of pain and pleasure.  
 
Again, I am not in a position here to resolve the difficult question of whether animals’ 
emotions are real or just analogous to human emotions. What I do want to conclude 
from this section is that in either case, there must at least be an intentionality 
accompanied with an appraisal of pain or pleasure. The objects of those appraisals 
need to be available to the perceiver, who, either by the mere means of phantasia or 
with the participation of reason, will experience either pain or pleasure towards the 
objects presented. 
 
Humans, who are the focus of this study, can make more sophisticated discriminations 
than animals. Not just those available to sense perception and those involving 
something as pleasurable or not, but also judgments about moral situations that involve 
complex concepts. All these judgments and concepts, we will see now, are a significant 
problem for the alleged contagion of emotions through the mere listening of 
instrumental music. 
   
The emotions presented in Rhetoric have as necessary conditions judgments directed 
towards an object and the accompaniment of pain or pleasure. Therefore, the 
“intentionality” of the emotions refers to the act of judging that the perceiver does 
about an object and the accompanying feeling of pain or pleasure. 
 
                                                 
93 PA 669a21: “It has been said that the lung exists as a provision to meet the jumping of the heart. But 
this is out of question. For man is practically the only animals whose heart presents this phenomenon 
of jumping, insomuch as he alone is influenced by hope (ἐλπίς) and anticipation (προσδοκία) of the 
future”. 
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I have purposefully not addressed in this section the role of the body in the emotions. 
This is a part of the discussion in the next section devoted to the question whether 





























2. Second chapter: Emotions without judgments? 
 
 
As seen above, whether we accept that emotions are aroused by means of a rational 
evaluation or on the basis of a perceptual appraisal made by phantasia, in both cases 
we are in the presence of a cognitive process that involves a predication that X is Y and 
causes either pain or pleasure. This is an agreement among all the accounts of 
Aristotle’s “theory of emotions” mentioned above. In the case of animals, as we saw 
in chapter 1.2, this predication is only analogous with the human judgment. 
 
All those interpretations should be rejected as inconsistent if it is accepted that 
according to Aristotle instrumental music is able to arouse emotions in its listeners by 
means of a sort of a contagious effect. Fortenbaugh’s position, and in part my own too, 
is to deny that Aristotle is talking about instrumental music in book VIII of Politics 
when he – apparently – says that music imitates emotions. Fortenbaugh wrote: 
 
Young children are to be taught moral principles and towards this end words are 
important. Just as Plato disapproved of wordless rhythms on the grounds that it is 
difficult to tell what they represent (Laws 669e1-4), so Aristotle disapproved of flutes 
which make the usage of words impossible (1341a24-5). The musical paideia is not 
concerned with developing a pattern of reactions to pleasant and painful sensations, 
but rather with virtue and the ability to make correct assessments (1340a15-18).94 
 
Although Martha Nussbaum defends a strong cognitivist position in her interpretation 
of Aristotle’s account of emotions, still in the same work she advocates the possibility 
of instrumental music representing and arousing emotions in the listener. 
Unfortunately she does not explore how such possibility would fit in with the 
Aristotelian account and she focuses only on modern sources leaving it to us to address 
the problems that arise from those two claims.95  
 
The problem for all the accounts surveyed earlier is that if we accept that music –which 
supposedly imitates anger – makes listeners angry by virtue of the very process of 
                                                 
94 Fortenbaugh 1975, 48-49. 
95 Nussbaun, 2003, 249-294.  
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listening to it, then there is no need for any judgment, nor intentional content, to work 
with either reason or phantasia. But before analyzing the particular and central case of 
music, which will be the object of a special section, let me now focus on other ways 
in which emotions can apparently be aroused, which may help us to understand the 
relationship between music and emotions. 
 
There are at least two “mechanisms” that may, each, present an alternative to emotions 
being aroused by appraisals.  The first I call “emotions by signs”, the second “emotions 




2.1 Emotions aroused by visual signs 
 
 
a) “Fear and pity may be aroused by sight (Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινὸν ἐκ 
τῆς ὄψεως γίγνεσθαι); but they may also be aroused by the very structure and 
incidents of the play, which is the better way and shows the better poet. For the plot 
in fact should be so framed that, even without seeing the things take place, he who 
simply hears the account of them shall shudder and feel pity at the incidents […] 
Those, however, who make use of the spectacle to put before us that which is merely 
monstrous and not productive of fear, are wholly out of touch with tragedy (Poetics 
1453b1-10). 
 
b) Those who heighten (συναπεργάζομαι) the effect of their words with suitable 
gestures, voices (φωναῖς), appearance, and dramatic action generally, are especially 
successful in exciting pity: they thus put the disasters before our eyes, and make 
them seem close to us, just coming or just past. Anything that has just happened, or 
is going to happen soon, is particularly piteous: so too therefore are the signs 
(σημεῖα) of suffering–the garments and the like of those who have already suffered– 
the words and the like of those actually suffering–of those, for instance, who are on 
the point of death. For all this, because it seems close, tends to produce pity. Most 
piteous of all is it when, in such times of trial, the victims are persons of noble 




In the passages a) and b) there are visual cues that are said to arouse emotions alongside 
the plot, particularly pity. In Rhetoric pity is described as follows:  
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A kind of pain excited by the appearance (φαινομένῳ) of evil, deadly or painful, which 
befalls one who does not deserve  (ἀναξίου) it; an evil which one might expect to come 
upon himself or one of his friends, and when near. For it is evident that one who is likely 
to feel pity must be such as to think (οἴεσθαι) that he, or one of his friends, is liable to 
suffer some evil (1385b11-16). 
 
From the definition of pity in Rhetoric we can conclude that a necessary condition for 
the appearance of this emotion is the appraisal that something bad and undeserved has 
happened – or will happen – to us or to someone we care about. Passages a) and b) say 
that pity can be generated by visual effects but also by sounds and dramatic actions. 
Those sensible objects are called signs; they make reference to something else and so 
there is an act of inference or reading by the perceiver between those signs and what 
they stand for. For example, a little girl in ragged clothes and with signs of 
hypothermia inspires pity because – most probably – no one would think that an 
innocent little girl deserves such condition. Nonetheless, by themselves, i.e. taken 
isolated, the signs are useless to arouse emotions; they need to refer to a particular 
character that is immersed in a narrative context.  If we know, as imaginary as this 
may sound, that the pitiable little girl presented is in fact an evil witch in disguise, then 
that information is enough to dissociate the signs perceived from the pity that they 
otherwise would produce. In order to arouse emotions in the audience of a theatre, it 
is essential that they are convinced about the deeds of the characters in the story. The 
costumes, scenography or sounds are subsidiary elements that help to heighten 
(συναπεργάζομαι) the effects of the words and so they work as emotions’ enhancers.    
 
In Politics it is said that works of visual arts only display signs of emotions but no 
moral characters or only to a slight degree, i.e. we cannot tell if the character portrayed 
is noble or vulgar just by it appearance.96 Referring to that passage, Stephen Halliwell 
claims that, according to Aristotle, faced with a work of visual arts:  
                                                 
96 “The objects of no other sense [besides hearing], such as taste or touch, have any resemblance 
[ὁμοίωμα] to moral qualities; in visible objects [ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς] there is only a little, for there are figures 
which are of a moral character, but only to a slight extent, and all do not participate in the feeling about 
them. Again, figures and colors [σχήματα καὶ χρώματα] are not imitations of character [ὁμοιώματα τῶν 
ἠθῶν], but signs [σημεῖα], indications which the body gives of emotions [πάθεσιν]. There is not too 
much difference, but in so far as there is any, young men should be thought to look, not to the works of 





[The perceiver] requires a larger framework of suppositions for its justification [of the 
moral character]–among other things, a narrative framework, that is (in the terms of 
Poetics), an implicit structure of ‘action’. The perception of character i[n] such cases 
will be a process of discursive inference, a ‘reading’ of the implied relationship between 
action and character, rather than recognition of an intrinsic property of the ordered 
“shapes and colours” of the material artwork.97   
 
I agree with Halliwell here. Mere sense perception is neither enough to know the moral 
character of a sculpture nor to make a complete judgment that conduces to emotional 
arousal. It is also necessary to understand the context in which they appear. Besides 
needing a context, visual arts by themselves appear in Aristotle as emotional elicitors 
of a second kind. There is one passage from De anima at 427b21-4 that shows that 
mere images in paintings are not enough to produce emotions as strong as emotions 
generated by beliefs:  
 
When we are of opinion (δοξάσωμεν) that something is terrible or alarming, we at once 
feel the corresponding emotion, and so, too, with what is reassuring. But when we are 
under the influence of imagination (κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν) we are not more affected 
than if we saw in a picture (γραφῇ) the objects which inspire terror or confidence. 
 
Considering this passage, it seems that Aristotle is being inconsistent. How could we 
react emotionally to how an actor looks but not to a picture of him? One alternative is 
offered indirectly by Konstan. In his view there was a transition between a classical 
paradigm of art that focused on idealized figures and the increment of realism or 
naturalism in the Hellenistic period. He wrote:  
 
In contrast with the Hellenistic styles, the art of the classical age seems almost 
expressionless. A glance at vase paintings, whether of the black–figured variety or the 
red–figured that superseded it around the year 500, indicates that for all the advances in 
draughtsmanship over the archaic period, very little effort was expended in representing 
emotions by way of facial expression. 
 
    He adds:  
 
Expression is minimal […] because the information relevant to an understanding of the 
emotions in question lies in the stimulus and its evaluation, not in the visible sign of an 
otherwise opaque inner state.98 
                                                 
97 Halliwell 2002, 242-43. 
98 Konstan 2007, 30. Another problem with the passage at 427b21-4 is that it seems to affirm that the 
emotions produced by phantasia are less intense than those produced by beliefs. This appears in 




One option is thus to consider that Aristotle had in mind the visual arts which were 
poor in their expression and so less efficient in affecting the emotions of the observers. 
The visual cues in the theatre, on the contrary, were contextualized in a bigger picture 
and so easily associated with the inner states of the characters. In the theatre, although 
the actors were wearing masks, they were able to use their voice and perform actions:  
 
The thought of the personages is shown in everything to be affected by their language –
in every effort to prove or disprove, to arouse emotion (pity, fear, anger, and the like), 
or to maximize or minimize things. It is clear, also, that their mental procedure must be 
on the same lines in their actions likewise, whenever they wish them to arouse pity or 
horror, or have a look of importance or probability. The only difference is that with act 
the impression (φαίνεσθαι) has to be made without explanation (διδασκαλίας); whereas 
with spoken word is has to be produced by the speaker, and result from his language. 
What, indeed, would be the good of the speaker, if things appeared (φαίνοιτο) in the 
required light even apart from anything said? (Poet. 1456a36-b8). 
 
 
The appraisals that lead to an emotional arousal may be directed towards the actions 
performed by the characters themselves or to their words.  There is a context where 
the audience can read the signs presented and evaluate the situation. Certainly, nihil 
est in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu; and following this principle we should say 
that, necessarily, the emotions aroused need to be first stimulated by the sense 
perception. In De anima it is unambiguously stated that “imagination (φαντασία) […] 
is never found by itself apart from perception, any more than is conviction (ὑπόληψις) 
apart from imagination” (427b14-16). Conviction (ὑπόληψις) is replaced in line 20 by 
δοξάζειν so there is no risk in affirming that either in the case of an appraisal made by 
phantasia or reason there is always need of an object provided by sense perception at 
the origin of the emotion. The appearance of a little girl freezing and with her clothes 
ragged may said to be at the “origin” of our pity, and to some degree this is true. But 
although our emotion needs the sensory stimulus, the proper object of the emotion is 
not the little girl’s ragged clothes, her purple lips or shaking voice, but herself, with all 
those sensible cues, in her unjust condition, and that is the implicit judgment we make 
when led by all these cues.  
                                                 
One option of interpretation is that here Aristotle means that if we only imagine something fearful, i.e. 
a mental image of a lion, it is devoid of real risk. It would be different if we have the image provided 
by phantasia of a real lion marching against us.  
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2.2 Emotions aroused by mere voice 
 
 
c) To express emotion, you will employ the language of anger (ὀργιζομένου λέξις) in 
speaking of outrage; the language of disgust and discreet reluctance to utter a word 
when speaking of impiety or foulness; the language of exultation for a tale of glory, 
and that of humiliation for a tale of pity; and so in all other cases. This aptness of 
language is one thing that makes people believe in the truth of your story: their 
minds draw the false conclusion that you are to be trusted from the fact that others 
behave as you do when things are as you describe them; and therefore they take 
your story to be true, whether it is so or not. Besides, an emotional speaker always 
makes his audience feel with him (συνομοπαθεῖ), even when there is nothing in his 
arguments; which is why many speakers try to overwhelm (καταπλήττουσι) their 
audience doing mere noise (θορυβοῦντες). Furthermore, this way of proving your 
story by displaying these signs (σημείων) of its genuineness expresses your personal 
character. (Rhet. 1408a16-26). 
 
d) It is, essentially, a matter of the right management of the voice to express each 
particular emotion (πρὸς ἕκαστον πάθος)99 – of speaking loudly, softly or between 
the two; of high, low or intermediate pitch; of the various rhythms that suit various 
subjects. These are the three things –volume of sound, modulation of pitch, and 
rhythm – that a speaker bears in mind (Rhet. 1403b26-32). 
 
 Passages c) and d) are very interesting for my project because they directly refer to 
the effect that mere voice can have over the listener, and so there may be a connection 
with the effects that instrumental music has on an audience. First, the speaker needs to 
use a language suitable for his speech and his audience. In this respect, Aristotle seems 
to be following Plato who believed that there is one type of speech appropriate for 
each type of audience. According to Plato, anyone who wants to teach rhetoric needs 
to know three things:   
 
He will classify the kinds of speech and of soul there are, as well as the various ways 
they are affected and explain what causes each since the nature of speech is in fact to 
direct the soul, he must know how many kinds of soul there are. If his speaking, teaching, 
or writing lacks and he still claims to be speaking with art, don’t believe him because he 
is not a real rhetorician (Phaedrus 271b). 
 
                                                 
99 Cf. Anderson 1968, 260: “Both Plato and Aristotle contend that music is the great medium of ethos; 
neither considers the possibility of ethos in nonmusical sound”.  
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The term λέξις used by Aristotle in passage c) may be translated as ‘speech’ or 
‘language’ but also may be understood as referring to a particular style of diction. I 
think that Aristotle is not referring here to vocabulary but to the way in which things 
are said.  The speaker should try to match his words with a particular voice in order to 
be more convincing. In a similar way for Plato in the Phaedrus passage there is a 
correlation between a particular kind of soul or its affections and a particular type of 
talking. Volume, pitch and rhythm are the three elements that the speaker should 
consider in order to express those emotions.100 This is crucial because, Aristotle says, 
“the way in which a thing is said does affect its intelligibility.”101 The human voice is 
able to “express” emotions in the sense that a particular type of voice – defined by its 
volume, pitch and rhythm – is a sign of an emotional state. In Politics, as indicated 
above, Aristotle says that in paintings and sculptures moral character is represented 
only to a slight degree. What we find in visual arts are indications of emotions: ἐπίσημα 
ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν.102 So voice, considered as physical sound rather than words with 
semantic content, can also be considered as a sign of emotions; a bodily expression of 
an inner state. Volume, pitch and rhythm could be equated in this sense with the 
paleness or redness that accompanies fear and shame. Other thing is the representative 
power of the voice in terms of linguistic sign.  In Rhetoric we read: “Words represent 
things (ὀνόματα μιμήματα ἐστίν),103 and they [the poets] had also the human voice at 
their disposal, which of all our organs can best represent other things (ἡ φωνὴ πάντων 
μιμητικώτατον τῶν μορίων ἡμῖν).” 104  It would be tempting to interpret here the 
mimetic power of voice as the capacity to express emotions but the status of the most 
                                                 
100 At 1413b22, 31 changes in speech and pitch are mentioned in connection with delivery. At 1414a15-
17 there is reference to volume.  
101 1404a10-11: Not, however, so much importance as people thinks. All such arts are fanciful and 
meant to charm the hearer. Nobody uses fine language when teaching geometry. 
102 1340a34-35. 
103 De interpretatione 16a3-13: “Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul (Ἔστι μὲν 
οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν εν̓ τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα), and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. 
And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are 
in the first place signs of—affections of the soul—are the same for all; and what these affections are 
likenesses of—actual things—are also the same [...] Just as some thoughts in the soul are neither true 
nor false while some are necessarily one or the other, so also with spoken sounds. For falsity and truth 
have to do with combination and separation. Thus names and verbs by themselves—for instance ‘man’ 
or ‘white’ when nothing further is added—are like the thoughts that are without combination and 
separation; for so far they are neither true nor false”. 
104 1404a20-21.   
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mimetic refers to the faculty to pronounce words, which are defined by Aristotle as 
signs of mental affections, which in turn are likenesses of reality. 
 
Now, utterances, noises, screams, etc. may be signs of emotional states but not 
representations of those emotions. The same is true for other bodily changes. For 
example, paleness is just a sign of fear but not a representation of it. This interpretation 
is confirmed at 1405a34 where in discussing metaphors Aristotle points out that to 
refer to poetry as “the scream of Calliope” is a bad metaphor. The reason for this, he 
says, is that although poetry and scream are both sounds, the second is meaningless 
(ἀσήμοις).105 He certainly is not saying that a scream cannot be a sign of pain, but what 
he is saying is that it has no semantic content.  Animals utter different sounds with 
different purposes106 but always using their voice (φωνή) as a sign (σημεῖον) of pain 
or pleasure (Pol. 1253a7-19). In De interpretatione (16a28-9) Aristotle states that 
“inarticulate noises – of beasts, for instance – do indeed reveal something, yet none of 
them is a name” (ἐπεὶ δηλοῦσί γέ τι καὶ οἱ ἀγράμματοι ψόφοι, οἷον θηρίων, ὧν οὐδέν 
ἐστιν ὄνομα). In modern linguistics this nonverbal feature of speech is called 
intonation and it refers to the capacity to express emotions in speech by means of 
acoustic properties. If those acoustic properties can be transferred to music then there 
will also be expression of signs of emotions in music.107 Our voice certainly changes 
                                                 
105 De anima 420b27-421a2; (trans. Smith): “Not every sound, as we said, made by an animal is voice 
(even with the tongue we may merely make a sound which is not voice, or without the tongue as in 
coughing); what produces the impact must have soul in it and must be accompanied by an act of 
imagination, for voice is a sound with a meaning (σημαντικός), and is not merely the result of any 
impact of the breath as in coughing; in voice the breath in the windpipe is used as an instrument to 
knock with against the walls of the windpipe”. 
106 Hist. anim. 536a26. Cf. Hist. anim. 488a31-b1: “Some animals emit sound [psophêtika] while others 
are mute [aphôna], and some are endowed with voice [phônêta]: of these latter some have articulate 
speech [dialekton echei], while others are inarticulate [agramata]; some are given to continual chirping 
and twittering some are prone to silence; some are musical [ôdikas], and some unmusical [anôda]; but 
all animals without exception exercise their power of singing [adein] or chattering [lalein] chiefly in 
connection with the intercourse of the sexes” (trans. Thompson).  
107 The relation between the “musicality of the emotions” and the “emotional content” of our speech is 
a matter for contemporary studies that can be contrasted with Aristotle’s approach. In modern research 
in the field of musical cognition Henkjan Honing has pointed out that the Infant Direct Speech (IDS) is 
a sort of music with emotional content. The IDS, or “babble music” as he calls it (Honing 2011, 3), is 
the baby talk that adults establish with babies of the sort  “de do do do, da da da”. Related to this, he 
explains, we see that there are sentences with different contents which are expressed with different 
intonations. For example, phrases in English expressing encouragement like “that’s the way” or “well 
done” are usually characterized by an “ascending and subsequently descending tone”. On the contrary, 
phrases expressing warnings like “no, stop it” or “be careful, don’t touch it” are characterized by a lower 
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in different emotional states and Aristotle was well aware of this. The orator needs to 
use the right volume, pitch and rhythm to match a specific emotion.  Is there, however, 
a specific sound for each emotion? How does pity sound?108 In Ancient Greek, as well 
as in modern English, there are interjections and exclamations that have expression: in 
English aha means “I understand”, aww may denote that something is cute or pitiful; 
grr stands for “I am angry”, etc. In Ancient Greek ἆ, according to Liddell and Scott, 
was used to express pity, envy or contempt; ἔα surprise; and οὐαί anger and pain. In 
passage c) Aristotle says that when the speaker’s arguments are weak he can impact 
his audience with mere noise (θόρυβος), so one option is that he is referring to these 
interjections. It seems that Aristotle thought that the voice was able to express 
emotions or at least their audible features. However, here we need to draw a 
fundamental distinction between the expression and arousal of emotions. Even 
granting that pure vocal sound could be a sign of a psychological state there is a gap 
between recognizing it in others and experiencing the same emotions ourselves. In 
other words, to recognize that someone is experiencing anger does not imply that we 
will feel the same emotion. Besides, it is wrong to affirm that each emotion has a 
particular audible sound attached or another visible feature: envy, for example, seems 
totally mute and invisible.109 Also, blushing can equally be a sign of shame or anger. 
                                                 
pitch and a “staccato–like rhythm” (Ibid. 4). Based on this fact, he concludes that: “if the speech were 
to be filtered out so that its sound or phonemes were no longer audible and only the music remained, it 
would be clear whether encouragement or warnings was involved. This is because the relevant 
information is contained more in the melody and rhythm than it is in the words themselves” (Ibid.). This 
may lead to understand IDS as a preparation for speech proper, but Honing offers another option: “[A]n 
alternative might be to see IDS not as preparation for speech but as a form of communication in its own 
right: a kind of ‘music’ used to communicate and discover the world for as long as ‘real’ speech is 
absent. If you subsequently emphasize the type of information most commonly conveyed in babble 
music, or rather, those aspects of speech in which infants have the greatest interest during their first nine 
months, the conclusion must be that bubble music is first and foremost a way of conveying emotional 
information. It is an emotional language that, even without grammar, is still meaningful” (Ibid.).  
108 “Aristotle listed and described the emotions –the effects– to which the orator (like the poet and bard, 
or dramatists and actor, or musician) can appeal: anger, calmness, fear, shame, love and have, pity and 
so forth (some of which, no matter how attainable by rhetoric, are not –for example envy and emulation– 
within the capacity of music to imitate)”, Shueller 1988, 65. 
109 Cf. Cicero, De Oratore III, 216-17: “Nature has assigned to every emotion a particular look and tone 
of voice and bearing of its own; and the whole of a person’s frame and every look on his face and 
utterance of his voice are like the strings of a harp, and sound according as they are struck by each 
successive emotion. For the tones of the voice are keyed up like the strings of an instrument, so as to 
answer to every touch, high, low, quick, slow, forte, piano, while between all of these in their several 
kinds there is a medium note; and there are also the various modifications derived from these, smooth 
or rough, limited or full in volume, tenuto or staccato, faint or harsh diminuendo or crescendo. For there 
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Furthermore, it is not evident that an emotion is always displayed in the same way. 
Anger has as material cause the boiling of the blood around the heart110 but we are not 
told that it is always accompanied by a specific visible bodily reaction. We may expect 
a typical facial expression – frowning, maybe redness and the voice harsher than usual 
– but this characterization does not do justice to the spectrum of forms in which an 
emotion may appear. Anger may be expressed in an explosive and aggressive way but 
also in a calm and quiet behavior.  An interesting passage in History of Animals may 
help us here: 
 
Vocal sound and modes of language differ according to locality. Vocal sounds are 
characterized chiefly by their pitch, whether high or low, and the kinds of sound capable 
of being produced are identical within the limits of one and the same species; but 
articulate sound, that one might call ‘language’ (ἡ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἄρθροις, ἣν ἄν τις ὥσπερ 
διάλεκτον εἴπειεν), differs both in various animals, and also in the same species 
according to diversity of locality; as for instance some partridges cackle, and some make 
a shrill twittering noise. Of little birds, some sing a different note from the parent birds, 
if they have been removed from the nest and have heard other birds singing; and a 
mother-nightingale has been observed to give lessons in singing to a young bird, from 
which spectacle we might obviously infer that the song of the bird was not equally 
congenital with mere voice, but was something capable of modification and 
improvement. Men have the same voice or vocal sounds, but they differ from one another 
in speech or language. History of Animals IV, 9 (536b9-21). 
 
It is thus probable that Aristotle did not believe in a unique sonority associated with 
each emotion. Animals would learn different sounds to express the same feelings 
according to locality. The inner biology of the body would certainly be the same. For 
example, in the case of anger, men of all countries and times would suffer the heating 
of their blood around the heart and, we will see, this change in the temperature of the 
heart may arouse inner motions with a connection with the acoustic features of an 
angry voice: the inner bodily alterations may have an effect on the production of 
sound.111 However, from the passage above, it seems reasonable to deduce that birds 
from different localities express their desires with different sounds, for example fear, 
and its associated desire to avoid the fearsome object. While experiencing fear the 
coldness of their hearts would be invariable to any bird and, it is logical to think that 
it would also affect their voices invariably. However, the influence of the cold heart 
                                                 
are none of these varieties that cannot be regulated by the control of art; they are the colours available 
for the actor, as for the painter, to secure variety”.  
110 De anima 403a29-403b2. 
111  Generation of animals V, 7 and Problemata XI, 36. Cf. Problemata XI, questions 53 and 60. 
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over the voice would modify a voice that is already altered due to cultural influences, 
i.e. a voice that has learned a particular sound to express fear. Thus, despite a tendency, 
i.e. a cold heart affecting a fearful voice, each individual would produce a different 
fearful voice in accordance with its culture.112  It therefore seems reasonable to doubt 
that for Aristotle there would be only one way in which human anger, fear, or any 
other emotion, would be expressed by the same voice’s sound. 
 
However, even accepting that there is a particular voice for a particular emotion, it 
does not follow that its recognition will move us to experience the same emotions. Let 
us accept that there is one universal angry voice. If that is the case we may hear a 
couple fighting and be able to recognize that they are angry even though we do not 
understand their words; they may be even speaking in another language and we may 
still be able to distinguish aspects of their vocal sound that we can recognize as angry. 
However, without making a judgment, an appraisal about us or some person we care 
about being insulted, we will not experience the emotion of anger. We do not 
experience anger just because we hear someone’s angry voice. The role that Aristotle 
attributes to the speaker’s pure voice is that it may help to make himself and his story 
more convincing; to intensify the effect of his words. It works as an accessory or 
decoration but by itself it says nothing beyond expressing anger.113 Now, if angry 
music is a representation of an angry voice, the same would happen. Hearing music 
representing an angry voice is not enough to cause the experience the of same 
emotions.114  
 
                                                 
112 Modern studies show that newborns' cry melody is shaped by their native language, see Mampe et 
al., 2009. 
113 Alfarabi (2008, 376-8), in his Commentary to Aristotle’s Rhetoric comments on the way in which 
the speech and the speaker himself can be shaped by means of how his words are expressed:  “There is 
also the person’s facial expression, or appearance, or the shape and look of his body, or what he does 
when he speaks, as when he announces a terrible thing approaching and shows the face of someone 
terrified and fleeing; or when he recommends something and he himself does what he recommends to 
other. This will show that he is sincere. This type is used with discourses on virtue and lack of virtue. 
The facial expression, the appearances, the shape, and the action suggest a state that makes the statement 
credible and also suggest in his adversary a state that makes the statement incredible. Finally there is 
the manner of speaking, voice quality, and intonation which suggest the matter about which there is 
discourse, as when a person speaks of tragedies that have befallen him, and uses a tone showing that he 
is moved; or when he threatens a person and uses a tone showing that he is angry”.  
114 If angry music is not a representation of an angry voice but of the emotion itself, then we face other 
objections. See for this chapter 3.4. 
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In conclusion, there are signs of emotions, either visual or audible, used by poets and 
orators. The characters in a play and the speakers in a trial are more credible if they 
appear as those persons who have experienced the things they talk about. Their voice 
and gestures are physical signs of emotional states that the audience is able to 
recognize. However, those signs by themselves are not sufficient to be the object of 
the judgments that generate emotions. The signs need to be placed in a context, implicit 
or explicit, either expressed in the words of the speaker or in the actions of a character. 
It is only in a particular context that the signs could be judged emotionally. It is not 
enough for an emotional arousal to recognize a sign of emotions in another, e.g. 
someone crying (or his/her mimetic representation); it is necessary to make a judgment 





















2.3 Voice as music and music as voice    
 
 
The analysis of human voice requires a further consideration since what is said in 
relation to the human voice can be easily transferred to instrumental music. As Darwin 
pointed out, “in considering the mode in which vocal utterances express emotion, we 
are naturally led to inquire into the cause of what is called expression in music.”115 In 
Aristotle we find a similar idea when he says that no musical instrument has voice 
(φωνὴ) properly speaking but only by analogy to the human voice (De anim. 420b5-
7). 
 
As seen above, a speaker needs to consider the pitch, volume and rhythms of his voice; 
all these elements are present in music too. In De anima, Aristotle highlights the 
connection between the two:  
 
Voice is a sound made by an animate being. No inanimate thing is vocal, though it may 
by analogy be said to be vocal, as in the case of the pipe, the lyre and all other inanimate 
things that have pitch [apotasis] and tune [melos] and articulation [dialektos]: for these 
qualities, it would seem, the voice also possesses (De anima 420b5-8; trans. Hicks).116 
 
 
The musicality of the voice was also acknowledged by Aristotle’s disciple Aristoxenus 
when he wrote that “there is a kind of melody in speech, which depends upon the 
accents of words, as the voice in speaking rises and sinks by natural law.” 117 
                                                 
115 Darwin 1872, 88-89. 
116 Wagner, 1995, 122: “The oldest, truest, most beautiful organ of music, the origin to which alone our 
music owes its being, is the human voice”.  
117 Elem. Har. 1.18.4-6 (trans. Macran). Three centuries after Aristotle the historian Dionysius of  
Halicarnassus wrote (On Literary Composition XI, 125-6): “The science of public oratory is after all a 
sort of musical science, differing from vocal and instrumental music in degree not in kind. In oratory, 
too, the words involve melody, rhythm, variety and appropriateness; so that in this case also the ear 
delights in the melodies, is fascinated by the rhythms, welcomes the variations, and craves always what 
is in keeping with the occasion. The distinction between oratory and music is simply one of degree”. 
The relation of speech and music as two nonverbal mediums to communicate emotions founds later 
support in Helmholtz 1954, 371; Rousseau 1986 and Spencer 1857, this last one “ventured to explain 
the characteristics of both [emotions in music and voice] on physiological grounds, saying they are 
premised on ‘the general law that feeling is a stimulus to muscular action’ (p. 400). In other words, he 
hypothesized that emotions influence physiological processes, which in turn influence the acoustic 
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Aristoxenus nonetheless recognizes a fundamental distinction: “In ordinary 
conversation we avoid bringing the voice to a standstill, unless occasionally forced by 
strong feeling to resort to such emotion.”118 His point is that, in comparison with 
music, in speech we do not maintain the same sound over a long period unless we 
experience a strong emotion. These emphases in speech are also meaningful although 
not in the same way as words. Aristotle would say that they are signs of emotions 
which can express something beyond words. The expression “it is not what you say, it 
is how you say it” encompasses the same spirit of Aristotle’s idea quoted above: “the 
way in which a thing is said does affect its intelligibility.” 119 Later Aristotle goes in 
the same direction: “It is not enough to know what to say, but one must also how to 
say it (ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν).”120 
 
Theophrastus also followed Aristotle and wrote a treatise in one book entitled On 
delivery. 121  The work has not survived but there are references to Theophrastus’ 
thought on the topic; one of those reports is found in Athanasius:122 
 
[R]hetoric delivery is the greatest help in regard of persuasion. [Theophrastus says] 
referring to the principles and the emotions of the soul and the knowledge of these, so 
that the movement of the body and the pitch of the voice are in harmony with the entire 
science.123   
 
Whether or not Theophrastus is relying on Aristotle's Rhetoric as Fortenbaugh 
suggests124 is a matter of scholarly discussion. It nonetheless sounds probable that he 
does, due to the similarities between the two positions:  for example, the connection 
                                                 
characteristics of both speech and singing. This motion, which we refer to as Spencer’s law, formed the 
basis of most subsequent attempts to explain reported similarities between vocal expression and music 
(e.g., Fónagy & Magdics, 1963; Scherer, 1995; Sundberg, 1982)”. I owe this quote and the modern 
references to Juslin and Laukka 2003, 770. 
118 Elem. Harm. I, 9, 31. Similarly Theophrastus, as reported by Plutarch’s Symposiacs (p. 623, Ed. 
Xyl): “There are three principles in music, grief, pleasure and enthusiasm; for each of these passions 
turns the voice from its usual course, and gives it inflexions different from those of ordinary speech.” 
Quoted by Twining 1912, 78. 
119 1404a10-11. 
120 Rhet. 1404b15-16. 
121 Diogenes Laertius 5.48 
122  Athanasius’ Prefatory Remarks to Hermogenes’ On Issues RhGr vol. 14 p. 177.3-8 Rabe = 
Theophrastus no. 712 FHS&G, Fortenbaugh 270. 
123 According to Plutarch (Questiones Conviviales 623a-c) Theophrastus connected voice with the 
expression and excitement of emotions. In De recta ratione audiendi 37f-38a Plutarch says that 
according to Theophrastus hearing is the most emotional (pathêtikôtatê) of all senses.  
124 See also Solmsen 1938, 1941 and Sonkowsky 1959.  
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between the emotions and bodily states is definitely present in Aristotle. However, 
Aristotle was not the first to notice it; the connection between the expression in vocal 
sound and music is already present in Plato. In the Republic 399a-c Socrates suggests 
leaving only two musical modes that could imitate the voices of a courageous and 
moderate man: 
 
Leave me the mode that would be suitable to imitate the tone (φθόγγους) and intonation 
(προσῳδίας) of a courageous person who is active in battle or doing other violent deeds, 
or who is failing and facing wounds, death, or some other misfortune, and who, in all 
these circumstances, is fighting off his fate steadily and with self-control. Leave me also 
another mode, that of someone engaged in a peaceful, unforced, voluntary action, 
persuading someone or asking a favor of a god in prayer or of a human being through 
teaching and exhortation, or, on the other hand, of someone submitting to the 
supplications of another who is teaching him and trying to get him to change his mind, 
and who, in all these circumstances, is acting with moderation and self-control, not with 
arrogance but with understanding, and is content with the outcome. Leave me, then, 
these two modes, which will best imitate the violent or voluntary tones of voice of those 
who are moderate and courageous, whether in good fortune or in bad. 
 
We will see that Aristotle echoes Plato in his treatment of music in Politics. 
Moderation is a key element in their appreciation of good art, not only in aesthetic 
terms but also with respect to ethics.  
 
Aristotle seems to be rationalising the Greek moral maxim of nothing in excess (μηδὲν 
ἄγαν) and to incorporate it not only in his ethics but also in his understanding of music 
as movements that can be appreciated in sound. This happens because there is a 
correlation between the inner state of the soul, the body and the behavior of the human 
being as a whole. Aristotle thus connects different characters with different types of 
sonorities: 
 
Character also may be expressed by the proof of signs, because for each class and habit 
there is an appropriate style. I mean class in reference to age –child, man, or old man; to 
sex–man or woman; to country–Lacedemonian or Thessalian. I call habits those moral 
states which form a man’s character in life; for not all habits do this. If then anyone uses 
the language appropriate to each habit, he will represent the character; for the uneducated 
man will not say the same things in the same way as the educated.125 
 
Both Plato and Aristotle divided people into noble and vulgar. The first kind were 
characterized as being more intellectual and the second driven by bodily desires. These 
                                                 
125 Poet. 1408a25-32. 
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features of moral characters are tightly connected with emotions.  Consequently, the 
appearance of people, their voice and even the way they move show their moral 
condition. Unfortunately, as pointed by Fortenbaugh, Aristotle does not explain how 
the voice expresses emotions and characters. The description of the emotions in 
Rhetoric is directed towards their rational elements but the use of the voice in delivery 
is directed to the irrational part of the soul. Fortenbaugh puts it clearly: 
 
Delivery is different from persuasion […] It does not aim to arouse emotion through 
logos but rather to express emotion by means of voice and bodily movement. This is not 
to forget that orators use delivery to arouse and calm their audience, but they do so while 
(and largely because) they are conveying an impression of themselves: that they are calm 
or angry, deeply moved or quite unmoved […] What an orator says and his delivery can 
and should work together. Only the latter is not a matter of logos but rather of voice and 
movement. This means that any account of pathê suitable to the needs of delivery will 
contain information different from that found in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 2.1-11.126  
 
The analysis of delivery reveals that in Rhetoric there is a twofold nature of emotions 
that is consistent with other works of Aristotle. Body and soul are always affected 
together when an emotion arouses. When we are persuaded of something, it is because 
there is an opinion, i.e. a judgment, that something is the case, a predication of some 
attribute or state of some thing. Without the words there is no persuasion, but there is 
also something appealing to the irrational part of the soul. Although sometimes 
emotions are called irrational without qualification (τὰ ἄλογα πάθη) 127 , Aristotle 
believed that somehow they are between rationality and irrationality. He explains that 
the soul has a rational principle comprising of two parts: “one of which has a rational 
principle in itself, and the other, not having a rational principle in itself, [which] is able 
to obey such principle.”128 The same idea is repeated in several places.129 If the soul 
                                                 
126  Fortenbaugh 1985, 278. 
127 1111b1; cf. 1105b21-23. 
128 1333a16-18. 
129 1098a3-5: “One part has such principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense 
of possessing one and exercising thought”; 1102b13-1103a3: “There seems to be also another irrational 
element in the soul –one which in a sense, however, shares in a rational principle. For we praise the 
reason of the continent man and of the incontinent, and the part of their soul that has reason, since it 
urges them aright and towards the best objects; but there is found in them also another natural element 
besides reason […] Therefore the irrational element also appears to be two–fold. For the vegetative 
element in no way shares reason, but the appetitive and in general the desiring element in a sense shares 
in it, in so far as it listens to an obeys it; this is in the sense in which we speak of playing heed to one’s 
fathers or one’s friends, not that in which we speak of ‘the rational’ in mathematics. That the irrational 
element is in some sense persuaded by reason is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof 
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can be divided in this way then it is logical to presume that it can also be affected in 
two different ways. Emotions, although not having a rational principle in themselves, 
are able to listen to the arguments made by words, and that is precisely why the speaker 
is able to affect the audience’s emotions. But as we have mentioned, there are two 
types of audiences. One of these types is more easily moved by irrational elements 
either in the theatre or in the law court. This is why Aristotle points to delivery as 
something vulgar (1403b35-1404a1) as well as tragedy as more vulgar (φορτική) than 
epic poetry (1461b29, 1462a4). The reason is that it involves bodily expressions like 
gestures (σχήματα 1462a3, σημεία 1462a6) and motion (κίνησις 1461b30, 1462a8-
11). Coincidentally, in Poetics we read that the best art is that “which addresses the 
best public” while “an art addressing any and everyone is of a very vulgar order”. 
Thus, he continues, the public of common art “cannot see the meaning, unless they 
[the artists] add something themselves, that causes perpetual movements of performers 
– bad flute players, for instance – rolling about, if quoit-throwing is to be represented, 
and pulling at the conductor, if Scylla is the subject of the piece. Tragedy, then, is said 
to be an art of this order.”130 Most people, Aristotle thought, were compelled by 
sensual stimuli in art rather than by the rational element present in the words. In 
Rhetoric it is exactly the same: the audience is of two types and because of the 
“defects” of the majority the orator needs to use “tricks” to move them: 
 
The right thing in speaking really is that we should be satisfied not to annoy our hearers, 
without trying to delight them: we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond 
the bare facts: nothing, therefore, should matter except the proof of those facts. Still, as 
has been already said, other things affect the result considerably, owing to the defects of 
our hearers. The arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance, 
whatever it is we have to expound to others: the way in which a thing is said does affect 
its intelligibility. Not, however, so much importance as people think. All such arts are 
fanciful and meant to charm the hearer. Nobody uses fine language when teaching 
geometry (Rhet. 1404a). 
 
                                                 
an exhortation. And if this element also must be said to have reason, that which has reason will be 
twofold, one subdivision having it in strict sense and in itself, and the other having a tendency to obey 
as one does to one’s father”; 1219b27-31: “The parts of the soul partaking of reason are two, but they 
partake not in the same way, but the one by its natural tendency to command, the other by its natural 
tendency to obey and listen” and 1333a17: “The soul is divided in two parts, one of which has a rational 
principle in itself, and the other, not having a rational principle in itself, is able to obey such principle”. 
130 1461b29-32. 
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    In Rhetoric, as well as in Poetics, there is a precedence of words over performance. 
The content of what is said is the most important element of the voice considered as 
sound, and so, as Aristotle says, “it is hearing that contributes most to the growth of 
intelligence”, but only “incidentally” and the reason for that, he explains, is that 
“rational discourse is a cause of instruction in virtue of it being audible, which it is, 
not in its own right, but incidentally; since it is composed of words, and each word is 
a symbol (De sensu 437a11-15).131 This is so because there is a precedence of reason 
over irrationality; rationality that lies in the words, not in the sounds accompanying 
the voice.  
 
Now, Aristotle refers to irrational desires in Rhetoric (1370a18-26) putting together 
those which “come into existence through the body” like hunger, thirst and sexual 
pleasures and in general all those connected with touch, smell, hearing and sight. By 
way of contrast, he says that there are rational desires that are “due to our being 
convinced.” So we can assume that there is a clear distinction between the bare hearing 
of pure voice’s sounds and hearing words.132  
 
According to Aristotle, the science of harmonics is subordinated to arithmetic (Post. 
Analytics. 75b14-17)133 and so it possible to understand and enjoy part of it in a 
rational engagement. It is, however, remarkable that when Aristotle reflects in Politics 
on the reasons for which people listen to music he mentions that one motive is the 
amusement (παιδιή) and relaxation (ἀνάπαυσις) that people get from it, just like the 
pleasure they get from sleep and drinking (Pol. 1339a16-17), which seems to say that 
                                                 
131 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ πρὸς φρόνησιν ἡ ἀκοὴ πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται μέρος. ὁ γὰρ λόγος αἴτιός ἐστι 
τῆς μαθήσεως ἀκουστὸς ὤν, οὐ καθ’ αὑτὸν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἐξ ὀνομάτων γὰρ σύγκειται, τῶν 
δ’ ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον σύμβολόν ἐστιν. 
132 Consider Walker 2008, 88: “Aristotle says that if a speaker’s style and delivery successfully embody 
the ‘volume, harmony, rhythm’ of say, anger, the listener will experience a kindred feeling, even if the 
speaker in fact says nothing at all, and insofar as the speaker’s hupokrisis of “anger” rings true, the 
typical listener will credit what he says as grounds for that emotion […] there will be limits of course: 
of what the speaker says seems radically inconsistent which his expressed emotion, the audience may 
be unpersuaded to join his feeling, just as if the voiced prosody of his style failed to match the listeners’ 
sense of what ‘anger’ sounds like.”  
133 “[One cannot] prove by any other science the theorems of a different one, except such as are so 




the pleasure of hearing music is something irrational or at least that one of the pleasures 
of hearing music lacks reason. This may be the reason for which even some animals 
experience pleasure in music.134 This irrationality was also considered by Plato who, 
although followed Pythagoras in respect of the connections between music and 
numbers, also recognized something irrational in it. Thus he wrote in Laws 675c-d: 
 
No animal that enjoys the use of reason in its maturity is ever born with that faculty; or 
at any rate with it fully developed. During the time in which it has not yet attained its 
characteristic level of intelligence it is completely mad: it bawls uncontrollably, and as 
soon as it can get on its feet it jumps about with equal abandon. Let’s think back: we 
said that this situation gave rise to music and gymnastics […] and also that this was the 
source of man’s appreciation of rhythm and harmony.   
 
Plato recognizes that there is something “corporeal” in music; something irrational and 
non-verbal. His main interest lies in the rational part and so he declares that when 
music is deprived of words it is “extraordinarily difficult to know what rhythm and 
harmony are supposed to signify” and to know “what worthwhile object they imitate 
and represent” (Laws 669e). This is why music must be subordinate to the words: 
“rhythm and harmony must conform to the words and not vice versa” (Rep. 400d). I 
think that Aristotle holds the same view. In individual human development, 
irrationality “is prior to rationality” and the proof, Aristotle says, is that “spiritedness 
and wishing and desire are implanted in children from their very birth, but reason and 
understanding are developed as they grow older” (Pol. 1334b21-24). Certainly there 
is rationality in a musical composition, structures that are unavailable to non-human 
                                                 
134 Aristotle allows some marvellous instances where animals seem to enjoy music. Thus, we find 
evidence in Politics and in History of Animals: “Let the young practice even such music as we have 
prescribed, only until they are able to feel delight in noble melodies and rhythms, and not merely in that 
common part of the music in which most men or children and even some animals find pleasure. (Pol. 
1341a3-16); “When hunted the creatures [hinds] are caught by singing or pipe-playing on the part of 
the hunters; they are so pleased with the music that they lie down on the grass. If there be two hunters, 
one before their eyes sings or plays the pipe, the other keeps out of sight and shoots, at a signal given 
by the confederate. If the animal has its ears cocked, it can hear well and you cannot escape its ken; if 
its ears are down, you can.” (HA. 611b26-31); “The eared owl […] it is rogue and mimic: while it apes 
the dance of the hunter, his accomplice comes behind and catches it. The common owl is caught by a 
similar trick (HA. 59723-26). However: “Temperance and profligacy have to do with those two senses 
whose objects are alone felt by and give pleasure and pain to brutes as well; and these are the senses of 
taste and touch, the brutes seeming insensible to the pleasures of practically all the others senses like, 
e.g. harmony or beauty; for they obviously have no feeling worth mentioning at the mere sight of the 




animals, but there is also sound which, contrary to rational arguments, is empty of 
predicative content. It is not a coincidence that λόγος, depending on the context, can 
be translated as word or reason.135 Wordless music (ἄλογος μουσική) is not only 
deprived of nouns and verbs but also of rational content and any predication. 
Considering this it would be tempting to think that only complex emotions, like those 
involving reason and concepts such as justice, are not expressible by means of mere 
voice or in instrumental music. But as I showed earlier also basic emotions need 
predications, if not rational at least perceptual analogous predications directed at an 
intentional object. I will return again to this point but for the moment what I want to 
show is that wordless sound, either in the voice of the orator or in instrumental music, 
may express the audible characteristics of human emotions, if there are any. Accepting 
that instrumental music is able to imitate the sound of someone experiencing anger, 
for example its speed, volume, timbre and intonation, also involves accepting that there 
is a particular voice for anger. This is problematic, because it limits the different bodily 
reactions that may accompany anger. Aristotle seems to accept that there is at least a 
one-to-one relationship between the formal/cognitive aspect of the emotions and the 
material/bodily element. A particular and distinguishable movement of the blood 
around the heart is thus always a necessary condition of becoming angry. Nothing is 
said, however, about the necessity of a particular physiognomy, such as facial 
expression or voice qualities. Aristotle characterizes anger as an emotion that involves 
impulsiveness and from there it may be suggested that a certain fast motion can be 
transferred to the voice of someone experiencing anger. From everyday observation 
we may agree that the voice of someone experiencing anger is characterized by high 
volume and speed, and that in terms of timbre it can be described as “rough” rather 
than “soft”. This characterization is not, however, universal and many instances of 
anger may fall into a totally opposite place. In any case, even if the two premises are 
                                                 
135 The connection between words and reason is well documented in Aristotle: “It is hearing that 
constitutes most of the growth of intelligence. For rational discourse is a cause of instruction in virtue 
of being audible, which it is, not in its own right, but incidentally; since it is composed of words, and 
each word is a symbol. Accordingly, of persons destitute from birth of either sense, the blind are more 
intelligent than the deaf and dumb” (De Sensu 437a 11-16) Also in History of Animals 536b3: “Men 
that are born deaf are in all cases also dumb; that is, they can make vocal sound, but they cannot speak”. 
In Politics 1253a7-14: “man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And 
whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for 
their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and 
no further)”. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 47c and ff. 
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accepted – first, that there is a particular sonority for a particular emotion and, second, 
that instrumental music is able to imitate that sound –there is no causal necessity to 
accept that the mere hearing of the sound of the voice or of instrumental music is 
enough to transmit the emotion expressed to the listener. To recognize that someone 
is angry is not the same as to be infected by the same emotion. If we hear “angry 
music” there would be an effect of music that is prior to the emotional judgment: in 
the first place there is a physical impact in the sense of hearing; there is sense 
perception of what is heard but not the necessary appraisal of a situation that may 
arouse the emotion.  
 
This last idea leads us to another way in which emotions apparently can be aroused: in 
the next section I discuss the emotions aroused by physiological changes. 
 
 
2.4 Emotions aroused by bodily changes 
 
 
One of the most important elements in the Aristotelian account of emotions is the role 
played by the body. Most scholarship devoted to the emotions in Aristotle has been 
centered on cognitive aspects leaving more or less unattended the question of bodily 
conditions that is essential to fully understand Aristotle’s thoughts on emotions. The 
Rhetoric is mostly silent in this respect and if it were our only source we would be 
obligated to conclude that emotions are independent of the bodily processes or that the 
body has a small role to play in his account of the emotions. However, this is not the 
case, for the Rhetoric does not refer to the body because is a dialectical account of the 
emotions, not one of the realm of natural sciences. The situation is, of course, different 
in the biological corpus. In De anima both aspects, mental and corporeal are found 
together: 
 
Emotions of the soul (τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη) appear to be all conjoined with body: such 
attributes, viz., as anger, mildness, fear, pity, courage; also joy, love and hate; all of 
which are attended by some particular affection of the body. This is shown by the fact 
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that sometimes violent (ἰσχυρή) and palpable (ἐναργής) affection (πάθημα) occurs 
without producing in us exasperation of fear, while at other times we are moved by slight 
and scarcely perceptible (ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν) ones, when the blood is up and the 
bodily condition is that of anger. Still more is this evident from the fact that sometimes 
even without the occurrence of anything terrible men exhibit all the symptoms of fear. 
If this is so, the emotions are evidently reasons in matter (δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί 
εἰσιν). Hence they must be defined accordingly: anger, for instance, as a certain 
movement in a body of a given kind, or some part or faculty of it, produced by such and 
such cause (ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε”) and for such and such end (403a16-27, Hicks’s 
translation slightly modified).   
 
This passage may be seen as a counterpart to the cognitivist account of emotions in 
Aristotle. Differently from Rhetoric, here the body takes a more important role. 
Sometimes, Aristotle says, we experience all the symptoms of fear even without the 
occurrence of anything fearful (μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαίνοντος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι 
γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου).136 Based on this, Stephen Everson (1995) thought with 
respect to the emotions that “when there is a particular affection of the psuchê, there 
is a material state which is sufficient for its occurrence”.137 Aristotle is careful enough 
not to say that the emotion of fear is aroused but rather the symptoms of it.  The state 
of the body is not enough for the appearance of the emotion, there must be also a 
reason. As Sherman has pointed out, “Passions are viewed not as blind promptings and 
urgings that merely happened to us, but rather as selective responses to articulated 
features of our environment.”138 We will nonetheless see in this section that the body’s 
state favors the emergence of the emotion because the physical condition of our body 
can change our perception of the intentional object of the emotions.139 Here there is 
nothing sophisticated: changes in our body affect our mood. Being hungry or not 
sleeping well may cause a “bad humor.” If we are thirsty or under the influence of any 
desire we may be prone to anger and easily stirred up (Rhet. 1379a17-18) if someone 
gets in our way.  
 
It is true that people’s beliefs and, in general, states of mind are what the orator needs 
to know in order to convince them. Those mental states are in turn shaped by material 
                                                 
136 403a23-24. It is worth noting the modern research made by Joseph LeDoux (The Emotional Brain, 
1996) which shows that it is possible to experience fear even without being conscious of the object of 
that fear.  
137  Everson, S. (1995), 'Psychology', in J. Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle 
(Cambridge University Press)186. 
138 Sherman 1991, 9. 
139  Parts of animals 651a12-14 and De somniis 460b1-16.  
 62 
causes: hormones, drugs, food, illness, etc. These are elements that may alter our mood 
and so leave us in a state prone to reacting emotionally. Over this factor the orator has 
no power and so it does not surprise us that Rhetoric’s main focus is not on the bodily 
factors that predispose the audience of the orator. Aristotle and his school were, 
however, well aware of the influence of the body over mental states. These connections 
between mind and body were presented through the humoral theory. The affections of 
the body affect our behaviour; for example, we read that “melancholic people sleep 
more because they have the inner region cold” (On sleep 457a27), or in Nicomachean 
ethics at 1117a10-15 it is said that sanguine and drunk people seem brave “because 
they think they are the strongest and can suffer nothing”. Physiological changes 
accompany emotions, such as “when ashamed one goes red [or] when frightened one 
turns pale” (Categories 9b13-15); these are signs of the emotions in the body triggered 
by a certain beliefs. It is not the case that only reason makes the body react after a 
judgment, but reciprocally the body can alter the judgment, like someone in anger or 
drunkenness acts in some sort of ignorance about what he is doing (NE. 1110B25-24). 
The Peripatetic author of the Problems acknowledges the relation between the body 
and emotions.140 Most notably in book XXX question 1, the author shows how wine 
can affect the soul by inducing (παρασκευάζειν, 953a35) different characters in men, 
making them irritable, benevolent, compassionate, reckless, more talkative, eloquent, 
bold, insolent, frenzied, savage, taciturn or amorous. Wine and the changes it produces 
over the temperature and moisture of the different parts of body are not the efficient 
cause of the emotions but just the material conditions. However, there seems to be a 
place for an affection of the soul produced by a physical condition but without an 
external reason. We read: “Black bile, which is naturally cold […] produces (ποιεῖ) 
apoplexy or torpor or despondency or fear” (954a21-24). Here the “productive” faculty 
of black bile should not be taken as the sufficient condition for the appearance of the 
emotion; at most, without the external stimuli, it can produce a weak affection or 
superficial feeling.  It is the announcement (εἰσαγγέλλειν) of something alarming that 
produces fear in those who have their body cold and so prepared (προωδοποίηται) for 
the entrance of the emotion. The Aristotelian author says that sometimes we 
                                                 
140 Why are the drunken more easily moved to tears? It is because they become hot and moist, and so 
they have no command over themselves are affected by trifling causes? (Problems, III, 24). 
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experience faintheartedness (ἀθυμία) and feel grief (λυπεῖσθαι) “without being able to 
describe any cause for it” and when that sort of affection, he continues, occurs to a 
slight degree it is called superficial affection (ἐπιπόλαια πάθη) (954b15-19).  In the 
passage of De anima above we found a parallel to this, sometimes, it says, “we are 
moved by slight and scarcely perceptible causes, when the blood is up and the bodily 
condition that of anger. This is still more evident from the fact that sometimes even 
without the occurrence of anything fearful men exhibit all the affections of fear” 
(μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαίνοντος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου, 
403a19-24). In Movement of animals 701b16-33 the same idea is repeated; a small 
change in the body causes the physiological responses characteristic of the emotions: 
“When by reason of heat or cold or some kindred affection a change is set up in the 
region of the heart, even in an imperceptibly small part of the heart, it produces a vast 
difference in the body, blushing, let us say, or turning white, and tremblings and 
shivers and their opposites.” The evidence in other passages of Aristotle confirms the 
Aristotelian “spirit” of the Aristotelian problem, most notably in Parts of animals II, 
4. There we read at 650b27-29: “Great excess of water makes animals timorous. For 
fear chills the body; so that those [animals] whose heart contains such watery mixture 
are prepared beforehand (προωδοποίηται) for the operation of this emotion”. In 
Rhetoric the same idea is expressed: “[Old men] are cowardly, and are always 
anticipating danger; unlike that of the young, who are warm-blooded, their 
temperament is chilly; old age has paved the way (προωδοπεποίηκε) for cowardice; 
fear is in fact, a form of chill.”141  
The use of the verb προοδοποιέω in Parts of animals, Rhetoric and Problemata 
referring to the same matter confirms that the idea of the body “preparing the way” for 
the emotions was present in Aristotle and his school.  The general idea of the bodily 
state preparing the occurrence of emotions can be found in Parts of animals 651a12-
14: “The character of the blood affects both the temperament and the sensory faculties 
of animals in so many ways. This is indeed what might reasonably be expected, seeing 
that blood is the material of which the whole body is made.” Similarly, at 667a11-18 
we find that there is a correlation between the size of the heart and the character of an 
animal: “When the heart is of large size the animal is timorous, while it is more 
                                                 
141 Rhet. 1389b39-31. 
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courageous if the organ be smaller and of moderate bulk.  For in the former the bodily 
affection which results from terror already pre-exists (πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ φοβεῖσθαι 
προϋπάρχει).”142 Thus, the body has influence over the emotion in the sense that it 
facilitates its arousal; it creates the conditions in which an emotion would more easily 
occur. For Aristotle, however, emotions are more complex than those mere 
physiological changes.  
 
The emotions as defined in De anima 403a25 are “enmattered reasons” (τὰ πάθη λόγοι 
ἔνυλοί εἰσιν). This means that for Aristotle emotions are a process involving mind and 
body together. The λόγοι here are the “reasons” which cause the emotion but also a 
constitutive element of the emotions themselves; they are the objects of our beliefs, 
the cognitive element of the emotion.  
 
Let me explain this with the help of what we find in Rhetoric. In order to experience 
pity we need to perceive someone we care about suffering at the same time as we 
believe that his suffering is undeserved. Otherwise we even may feel pleasure, if we 
see someone who is suffering a deserved misfortune or if he is someone we hate.143 
The same principle appears in Poetics. The emotions are about the actions; about the 
deeds of the characters and in that sense about a narration of deeds. There is need of 
an ‘aboutness’ which our beliefs reflect.  This is the intentionality of the emotions that 
we presented in the first chapter. 
 
Bodily changes thus act as a breeding ground that prepare the way144 for the emotions 
but are not a sufficient condition for their arousal. Similarly, as we will see, the action 
that music or wine can produce in us is empty of content by itself; it is only a 
physiological change. This does not mean that emotions require an antecedent bodily 
affection as a necessary condition to be aroused. It means that altering the body 
predisposes the subject to being easily affected when the stimulus that produces the 
                                                 
142 667a15. See also 650b27 and 692a20. 
143 “For he who is pained at the sight of those who are undeservedly unfortunate will rejoice or will at 
least not be pained at the sight of those who are deservedly so” (Rhet. 1386b26-28 ). 
144 PA 650b27-29 and Rhet. 1389b31-31. 
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emotion appears, i.e. the intentional object that is subject of our judgment. Chilling the 
heart is not an emotional state in itself but it puts the animal in a state of readiness to 
react with fear since coldness in the region of the heart is the material cause of fear.145 
That physical change in our body predisposes the mind to be easily moved and so it 
may change its judgments; but the wine or the music itself is not what is responsible 
for the contents that could be the object of our emotional judgments.146 What they do 
is prepare a suitable biological ambience and so a frame of mind. In De anima 403a27 
it is clearly stated that “Anger must be defined as a certain movement in a body of a 
given kind, or some part or faculty of it, produced by such and such a cause for such 
and such an end (ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε).” Accordingly, it continues: “Anger would 
be defined by the dialectician as desire for retaliation or the like, by the physicist as a 
boiling of the blood or heat which is about the heart: the one of them gives the matter, 
the other the reason” (De anima 403a29-403b2). Those who advocate that in Politics 
instrumental music has a contagious emotional effect need to show the “reason” for 
those emotions. I mean, what sort of “desire of retaliation” experiences someone 
listening to a piece of instrumental music that supposedly expresses anger?   Would 
all listeners of “angry music” have a desire of revenge? Against what?  
 
In this chapter we have investigated two cases where it seems emotions are aroused 
without any judgment. First, in the section labelled emotions aroused by signs we 
explored the voice of the orator as well as the visual elements in the theatre. In both 
cases we saw that the mere recognition of something as expressive of an emotion is 
not enough for the arousal of an emotion. At most, those signs of emotions may 
contribute to making the message or the situation more credible, but if an emotion is 
to be aroused in the listener/spectator, a judgment is also necessary. In other words, 
                                                 
145Also, as Fortenbaugh 2008, 38 points: “the condition of the body may be a factor in explaining both 
strong and weak responses to a particular situation.”  
146 Once again it is worthy to remember that we can react emotionally to the music, the wine or any 
other thing. We may be ‘sad’ that the wine is over, ‘fear’ to drink one more cup or get ‘angry’ because 
it does not taste as good as expected.  Similarly we can judge that the music played is not a fair rendition 
of the original piece and say that we are angry about it. These cases are not under dispute, the music, 
the wine or anything else can be an intentional object for our judgment. What had been said is that there 
is not a mechanical transmission of emotions.    
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the mere recognition of someone experiencing an emotion is not a sufficient condition 
for the arousal of the same emotion in the person making such recognition.  
 
In the second section of the chapter we have explored the influence of the body in the 
emotional experience. It has been shown that for Aristotle the body is always altered 
as an essential part of the emotional process and so is labelled as the material cause of 
the emotions. However, the mere bodily changes are not enough to arouse an emotion. 
At most, bodily changes can predispose the subject and put him in a state of readiness 
to react emotionally, but the emotion would only appear after an object is evaluated 
by the mind. The bodily disposition of the subject is not a sufficient condition for the 
arousal of the emotions; at most it can create a general mood which is objectless. Such 
mood, since it is objectless, can not be labelled as emotion (pathos) by Aristotle in the 
restricted sense of Rhetoric but as a different type of affection. 
 
Our next task is to focus on Aristotle’s thoughts on music, particularly its relationship 
with emotions.  In our next chapter we will explore the context in which Aristotle 
discussed the effects of music; we will see the conceptions of authors before Aristotle 
about the relation between emotions and music and from there the different approach 
presented by Aristotle. We will focus on the discussion in Politics where Aristotle’s 
major treatment of music takes place and on the basis of which most scholars have 
argued that Aristotle believed in a contagion of emotions through music.  
 
From what we have seen in this chapter, if music can alter the body, particularly the 
heart, music would also create an objectless disposition. One of our tasks in the next 
chapter is to discover if that is an option for Aristotle, and if so, what mechanism he 
offers to explain such musical impact on the listener and what are the consequences 







3. Third chapter: Aristotle on Music 
3.1 Music’s powers before Aristotle 
 
Before analysing Aristotle on music and emotions in detail it is worth having a quick 
survey of the earlier Greek ideas about music and emotions. In what follows I will give 
some examples of what the Greeks thought about the powers of music to influence 
listeners. By doing so I hope to show how different the approach of Aristotle is and 
why it is not possible to put him in the same tradition without some important 
qualifications.   
Prior to Aristotle there were numerous stories in literary and philosophical sources 
telling us about the powers of music.147 Music, it was thought, was able not only to 
move humans, but also animals and plants. The semi–mythological figure of Orpheus 
was a paradigmatic example of this, even charming Hades in the underworld with his 
music (Eurip. Med. 543).  
The whole universe was thought to be constructed upon a musical structure. The 
planets were in mathematical ratios equivalent to musical intervals and so produced 
the Music of the Spheres (Timaeus 36a, 46c-e ; De caelo 290b11-291a26.). In the 
human domain, the powers of music were connected with medicine, for both body and 
mind. Already Homer mentions its powers, how the muses gave the art of music to the 
poets (Od. 479) and how they cheer up men at the feast (Od. 150, 152). Music helped 
to fight against diseases, for instance, a pestilence was stopped by means of prayers 
set to music (Iliad, 472-474).  
 
Later came the influence of Pythagoras, who thought that music helped to achieve 
moral perfection  (Diog. Laert. VIII, 32-33) and health for the body (Iamb. De Vit. 
Pyth. XXV; Aristox. Fr. 24). His school of thought also developed mathematical and 
acoustic investigations about the nature of music (Plut. De Mus. 30) and it is said that 
he made technical contributions such as the eight-stringed lyre and it was he who 
perfected the modern scale (Nicom. I, 9; Cf. Boeth. Inst. Mus. 20). Similarly, Damon 
                                                 
147 A rich collection of references to stories about the powers of music, on which I am drawing in this 
section, is found in Bruno Meinecke’s chapter Musica and Medicine in Classical Antiquity, in Music 
and Medicine, Ed. Dorothy M. Schullian and Max Schoen, 1948. 
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of Athens thought about the moral uses of music, as Athenaeus relates:  “Quite 
properly Damon of Athens and his followers say that songs and dances are the result 
of the souls’ being in a certain motion; and those songs which are good and beautiful 
produce similar souls, whereas the opposite kind produce the opposite”. (Atheaneus 
Deip. XIV 628c). Plato, perhaps influenced by the Pythagoreans, also conceived music 
as medicine for the soul (Laws, II, 664b-c and X, 903d) and believed that music was 
able to put the soul aligned with the whole Cosmos (Tim. 47d). 
 
Music had healing powers which now would fall under what we understand by 
shamanism or some sort of obscure magic. Democritus, in Aulus Gellius' report, wrote 
in his On Deadly Infections that it was possible to use music to cure snakebites (Aulus 
Gellius IV, 13). In turn, Theophrastus, we are told, believed that sciatica was cured by 
pointing an instrument to the painful area and playing music directed at it. (Athen. 
Deip. 624). Terpander, called sometimes the “Father of Music”, saved the Lesbians 
and Ionians from diseases using his music (Boeth. Int. Mus. I,1). We are told also that 
using his art he dissuaded the Lacedaemonians of subversion (Plut. De Mus. 42).  
 
Music, of course, was an important part of Greek culture. It was an artistic expression 
aiming at what is beautiful but also served as a depository of knowledge. As Havelock 
pointed out,148 before the invention of writing the oral tradition used mnemotechnics 
to transmit knowledge from one generation to other. In that context μουσική was the 
main instrument used: words adorned in rhythms and melodies helped to communicate 
the cultural heritage because verses and melodies are easier to remember in the world 
of oral culture. 
 
The connection between music and emotions was also seen as close. This connection 
seems even a “natural” one to us. The idea of music as the “language of the emotions” 
seems evident and well spread, not only as a popular opinion, but even among 
composers and musicians.149 It is only in the domain of philosophy of music that this 
                                                 
148  Havelock 1963, 197-214. 
149 Meyer 1956, 1: “Composers of all cultures, theorists of diverse schools and styles, aestheticians and 
critics of many different persuasions are all agreed that music has meaning and that this meaning is 
 
 69 
popular idea has been an object of critical analysis. In ancient Greece the situation was 
similar. Only a few thinkers openly rejected that instrumental music could represent 
emotions and arouse them in listeners and consequently they also rejected its value as 
an educational and moral tool. The author of the Hibeh Papyri, Philodemus of Gadara 
and Sextus Empiricus are some of those who doubted the powers of instrumental 
music. As a counterpart, Aristotle can be placed following a line of thought on music 
in the tradition of Pythagoras, Damon of Athens and Plato. Of course, this must be 
clarified. Although Aristotle seems to follow his predecessors in the idea that music 
contributes to virtue, he took a different approach to it, especially cleansing it of 
metaphysical, religious and mystical attributions that were considered false by him, 
like the Music of the Spheres or the idea that the whole cosmos was constructed 
following a musical–mathematical pattern.150  
 
In many respects Aristotle followed his master and music was not an exception: many 
of his ideas were already present in Plato. Let us consider, for example, the following 
passage from Republic where Socrates discusses the role of music in the ideal city with 
Glaucon:  
 
Aren't these the reasons, Glaucon, that education in mousikê is most important? First, 
because rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the soul more than anything 
else, affecting it most strongly and bringing it grace, so that if someone is properly 
educated, it makes him graceful, but if not, then the opposite. Second, because anyone 
who has been properly educated in mousikê will sense it acutely when something has 
been omitted from a thing and when it hasn't been finely crafted or finely made by nature. 
And since he has the right distastes, he'll praise fine things, be pleased by them, receive 
them into his soul, and, being nurtured by them, become fine and good. He'll rightly 
object to what is shameful, hating it while he's still young and unable to grasp the reason, 
but, having been educated in this way, he will welcome the reason when it comes and 
recognize it easily because of its kinship with himself (Rep. 401d-402a).  
 
                                                 
somehow communicated to both participants and listeners”. Consider Mozart, who in a letter to his 
father said that in his Seraglio, in the Belmonte’s aria in A major, “the throbbing of his loving heart is 
indicated [in] the two violins in octaves [...] One sees the trembling – the wavering – one sees how his 
swelling breast heaves – this is expressed by a crescendo – one hears the whispering and the sighing – 
which is expressed by the first violins, muted, and a flute in unison”. Or consider Ives 1962, 36, when 
he describes the opening of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony as “the soul of humanity at the door of divine 
mysteries, radiant in the faith that it will be opened—and the human become divine”.  
150 cf. Timaeus 36a, 46c-e. 
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As we will see, Aristotle followed his master in many respects about music and 
education; for example, the influence of music on character and the importance of 
habituation in liking what is good and disliking what is bad. However, he also took his 
own path and made important distinctions that Plato did not consider.  
Plato believed that certain musical modes were able to imitate the human voice and so 
the guardians should be habituated only to the music that represented virtuous men. 
The expressive power that Plato attributes to music is not as clear as may be thought 
at first glance. In Republic 400d he says that the music should follow the words and 
not the other way round. It should also be noted that although in the passage above 
Plato talks about the rhythms and harmonies of mousikê, in the previous sections he 
had dealt heavily with poetry and the contents that should be included in music. In 
fact, a little before this passage, also at 400d, Plato says that a good character is 
achieved using fine words, harmony and rhythms.  That is why I disagree with 
Malcolm Schofield who says about this passage: 
 
 It is striking that it’s not the consciously understood words (logoi) that are cited as the 
influence which will do most to shape the soul […] but the music in senso stretto that is 
designed to match them. Unconscious assimilation is for Plato more important in the 
process than conscious understanding and the mode in which the right content is 
assimilated is more powerful than the content itself. 151    
 
 
Plato is explicit twice when he says that instrumental music should be chosen to follow 
the words (Rep. 398d and 400d). It is true that in the passage from Republic above 
Plato mentions instrumental music, i.e. rhythms and harmonies, as what “permeates 
the inner part of the soul more than anything else, affecting it most strongly and 
bringing [the soul] to grace.” But this is only one reason for which musical education 
is most important. The second one is that the person properly educated in mousikê 
would be a better judge of works of art and nature and would also be habituated to 
reject what is shameful. Now, the words of the poets are also present in mousikê for 
Plato, and although they do not reach the soul of the listener with the same strength as 
instrumental music does, they still have priority over melodies and rhythms. This is 
why in Laws 669e Plato says that it is extraordinarily difficult to know what 
                                                 
151Schofield 2010, 232. 
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instrumental music imitates and whether or not an imitation of pure instrumental music 
has any value: 
 
The poets divorce rhythm and movement from the melos by putting tuneless words into 
metre, and rob melos and rhythms of words by using stringed instruments and pipes of 
their own. When this is done, it is extraordinarily difficult to know what the rhythms and 
harmony without logos are supposed to signify and what worthwhile mimetic enactment 
they depict (Laws 669e). 
 
 
Certainly, Plato believed in the power of music to influence the soul, but his view is 
more complex and I think it would be simplistic to accept that he thought instrumental 
music could arouse any emotion without qualification. I am not, however, claiming 
that he would face the same problem detected in Aristotle, i.e. the apparent 
inconsistency between a cognitive account of emotions and an emotional contagion 
through instrumental music.  Plato does say that music can imitate courage and also 
good or bad moral characters (Laws 790e-79Ib). In the Republic, immediately after the 
passage above, he says at 402c that before educating the guardians it is necessary to 
know what is “moderation, courage, liberality, and high-mindedness, and all their 
kindred and their opposites.”152 He says that we need to know what these things are in 
themselves but also what their images are. Those images are not mentioned but, given 
the context, he seems to refer to paintings, sculptures, poems, music and in general 
any artistic form able to imitate those virtues. From passages like these it has been 
argued that Plato believed that music imitates emotions and produced those in 
listeners.153 
                                                 
152 σωφροσύνης εἴδη καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ 
τὰ τούτων αὖ ἐναντία 
153 Schoen-Nazzaro 1978, 263. Sorabji 2002, 84. It is interesting that Plato associated the musical 
paideia with the idea that young children cannot understand the reasons of their enjoyment and distastes 
in the musical representations. I mention this because it seems Plato believed there was something 
irrational in music as well as in the emotions. In both cases first there is an account of irrational forces 
acting upon men. In Plato, for example (Phdr. 267d1) the words that move emotionally are described 
as able to do a  “magic spell” (κηλεῖν). Similarly, as Fortenbaugh pointed out, Gorgias in his Encomium 
of Helen talked about the soul moved to emotions as being charmed with drugs: “The effect of speech 
upon the structure of the soul is as the structure of drugs over the nature of bodies; for just as different 
drugs dispel different secretions from the body, and some bring an end to disease, and others to life, so 
also is the case of speeches. Some distress, others delight, some cause fear, others embolden their 
hearers, and some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion.  Gor. Hel. 14. (trans. J. 
Dillon and T. Gergel).” Something similar was said about music. Polybius in his Histories refers to 




For Aristotle, emotions are not the product of speeches acting like spells or drugs, but 
reasoned beliefs shaped through arguments.  According to Fortenbaugh, before 
Aristotle “it was easy to think of emotions as diseases whose victims suffer a 
misfortune curable only by drugs and inspired incantations.” 154  Music was also 
cleansed of mysterious realities, as mentioned earlier. Aristotle rejected the 
Pythagorean ideas still present in Plato’s thinking that connected music to 
cosmological realities. There was, however, a lot that Aristotle preserved, for example 
part of his account of acoustics and hearing which will be part of further analysis. 
 
In conclusion, although the context in general seems to show that music was 
considered to have great power over listeners, there was also some important 
scepticism. Particularly, Plato considered that it was extremely difficult to know what 
music was about when unaccompanied by words and accordingly established that 
music should be ordered to follow words and not the inverse. The examples given in 
this section offer some idea of the context in which Aristotle developed his ideas. It is 
clear that in general Greeks believed in the power of music to affect the human soul. 
However, we should not rush to put Aristotle in the same tradition without important 
qualifications. This will be task of the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
 
3.2 Aristotle on Music 
 
Did Aristotle know much about music? Was he interested in the subject? If he was, to 
what extent? He was the best disciple of Plato who was a Philosophe-musicien par 
excellence155 as well as a master of Aristoxenus, the most important music theorist of 
the Antiquity. Aristotle thus seems placed in between two philosophers who were both 
very concerned with musical matters. However, despite the influence of Plato and 
                                                 
trickery of a charlatan.”  According to Polybius, Euphorus wrote that “music was made to charm and 
bewitch” (4.20.5=F 8). 
154 Fortenbaugh 1975, 15. 
155 Bélis 1986, 54. 
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Aristoxenus, at first sight the evidence suggests that our questions will be answered in 
the negative. There is no known surviving treatise by Aristotle related to music theory. 
What we can find in Aristotle’s works are some passages where he takes musical terms 
or problems as analogies to explain other questions. He also discusses some problems 
of acoustics; the production of sound and its perception. Finally, and more 
substantially, there are educational concerns about music at the end of the Politics. 
There, Aristotle says that a free man should study music, not so far as to become a 
musician himself, but enough to be able to judge music played by others.156 In the 
same line he affirms that “no freeman would play or sing unless he were drunk or in 
jest (οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος)”.157 Maybe these short passages work also 
as a declaration of Aristotle himself, about his relationship with musical studies. The 
musical practice, at least the professional one, was considered handwork and so 
unworthy of a freeman. 
 
The truth is that we have nothing by Aristotle that we can call a treatise of music 
theory. Some scholars such as Gibson or Bélis seem to confuse the fact that there is no 
extant work of Aristotle devoted to music with the idea that never was one.158 Barker 
is more cautious saying, “he produced no original work, so far as we know, in either 
mathematics or harmonics.” 159  Against these modern scholars is the account of 
Diogenes Laertius who ascribes to Aristotle two different works called On music.160 
He also enumerates several works of Aristotle concerned with arts in general, poetics 
and education; subjects that could perfectly well have embraced some musical 
subjects. 161  About Archytas, who was a prominent mathematician and musical 
theorist, two different works of Aristotle are mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in his 
list of Aristotle’s works: the first consisting of three books and the latter of one book 
                                                 
156 Pol. 1339a34 – b20. 
157 Pol. 1339b9-10. 
158 “[Aristotle] devoted no single work to music”, Gibson, 2005, 23; “il ne lui a pas consacré de trité, et 
exception faite du livre VIII la Politique”, Bélis, 1986, 54. 
159 Barker 1989, 66. 
160 5.26.5 and 21. In the second one Jonathan Barnes and Gavin Lawrence give the reading Πυθιονῖκαι 
μουσικῆς αʹ (Pythian Victors in Music) putting together the lines 20-21.  
161 Περὶ ποιητῶν (5.22.2); Περὶ παιδείας (5.22.19); Τεχνῶν συναγωγὴ (5.24.21); Τέχνη (5.24.23); Ἄλλη 
τέχνη (5.24.25) and Πραγματεία τέχνης ποιητικῆς (5.24.27). 
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compounded of excerpts of Plato’s Timaeus and Archytas’ works. 162  It is worth 
mentioning, as Huffman notes, that “Aristotle wrote more books on Archytas than any 
other individual figure.”163 Mathematics and harmonics being the main concerns of 
Archytas, it is not improbable that Aristotle himself was preoccupied with these 
matters, at least referring to Archytas. It is true that Diogenes Laertius lived around 
500 years after Aristotle and it is fair to doubt about his list; but I think that it is not 
unreasonable to believe him. If there were a thinker who covered a broad spectrum of 
studies, it was Aristotle. Furthermore, in his surviving works we find some interesting 
passages about music; passages which can be “the tip of the iceberg”, glimpses of a 
more extensive study carried out by Aristotle. We do not know if Aristotle wrote about 
music theory. The evidence is scarce and vague and, I claim, insufficient to answer the 
question about the depth of Aristotle’s knowledge of music. 
 
Gibson seems to be sure that Aristotle was not “a musical expert”,164 that he had a 
“lack of consistency when referring to music issues” and that his “grasp of the 
Pythagorean musical theory is less than perfect.” The main passage used by Gibson as 
evidence is in Metaphysics X 1053a10 where Aristotle is discussing the “one” or the 
“unit.” This “unit” is the principle and measure in each different science. In the case 
of music the “unit” is the diesis, which is equivalent to a “quarter-tone”, the smallest 
perceptible interval recognized by ancient Greeks. Aristotle says that: “In music [the 
first principle and measure is] the “quarter-tone” because it is the least interval”; and 
a few lines later adds: “But the measure is not always one in number, sometimes there 
are several; e.g. the quarter-tones (not to the ear, but as determined by the ratios) are 
two.”  The idea of two minimal units is obscure and – without further evidence – there 
is no definite answer as to what Aristotle is referring to.165 Whether or not Aristotle 
had a good understanding of the science of harmonics is beyond the scope of this 
research. What we do know is that Aristotle, probably still influenced by his master 
                                                 
162 Περὶ τῆς Ἀρχυτείου φιλοσοφίας (5.25.4) and Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου καὶ τῶν Ἀρχυτείων  (5.25.4). 
Evidence of Aristotle’s writings on Archytas is also found in Damacius’ Dubitationes et Solutiones, 
306: “Aristotle in his work on Archytas [...]”. 
163 Huffman, 2005, p.4. 
164 Gibson 2005, 23. 
165 Ibid. and also see Barker 1989, 73. 
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and Pythagoreans, subordinated the harmonic science to arithmetic. 166  It was his 
disciple Aristoxenus, “a purer Aristotelian than Aristotle himself,” who confronted the 
Pythagoreans more decidedly.167 This idea is proposed by Barker, who suggests that 
one of the most important contributions that Aristotle made to the study of music was 
made by him but indirectly, through his student Aristoxenus. Barker explains an 
Aristotelian principle which he calls the “same domain” rule, meaning that the object 
of study of a science and its principles must be understood with the elements of that 
science. In his words, one cannot ‘demonstrate’ or ‘scientifically explain’ features of 
something falling into one domain or under one genus by reference to the essences of 
things that fall under another.168 Aristotle almost always follows this principle but in 
the case of harmonics he makes an exception and subordinates it to arithmetic. 
Aristoxenus did not accept that exception and in that sense Barker says that he “was 
purer Aristotelian than Aristotle himself.” Yet whilist Aristotle followed the 
Pythagoreans and Plato, saying that music is subordinate to mathematics, or at least 
the science of harmonics to arithmetic, he did not envision a divine musical model laid 
down by muses or a celestial imperceptible music. Despite considering harmonics 
subordinated to numbers he also recognized an approach based on sense perception: 
 
Some [...] sciences have almost the same names; thus there is a mathematical astronomy 
and a nautical astronomy, mathematical harmonics and harmonics based on hearing. In 
these cases it is the task of those who use perception to know the fact that, and that of the 
mathematical scientists to known the reason why: for the latter possess the demonstrations 
of the causes, and often do not known the fact that, just as people who studied the universal 
often do not known some of the particular instances because they have not observed them. 
(Posterior Analytics 78b 34-79a6, trans. Barker). 
 
Aristoxenus also articulated this idea, presumably influenced by his studies in the 
Lyceum: 
 
We must therefore give an account of harmonics and its parts [...] we try to give these 
matters demonstrations which conform to the appearances, not in the manner of our 
predecessors, some of whom used arguments quite extraneous to the subject, dismissing 
perception as inaccurate and inventing theoretical explanations, and saying that it is in 
ratios of number and relative speeds that the high and the low come about. Their accounts 
are altogether extraneous, and totally in conflict with appearances. Others delivered 
                                                 
166 Post. Analytics. 75b14-17. 
167 Barker1989, 68. 
168 Ibid., 67. 
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oracular utterances on individual topics, without giving explanations or demonstrations, 
and without even properly enumerating the perceptual data. We, on the other hand, try to 
adopt initial principles which are all evident to anyone experienced in music, and to 
demonstrate what follows from them.169 
 
 
This trust in sense perception is the Aristotelian hallmark of Aristoxenus’ approach to 
music. Plato rejects sense perception as a criterion of science because in his overall 
philosophy there is a divine mathematical proportion written in the heavens and ruling 
everything. 170  This mathematical structure of the universe stands as a dogmatic 
paradigm; an ideology that must be followed even if the evidence of the senses is 
opposed to it. This is what Aristotle criticizes about the music of the spheres171 and 
about the over-mathematization of reality. In Metaphysics 985b31-986a11 Aristotle 
refutes the Pythagorean doctrines and shows how they try to save their model: 
 
[The Pythagoreans] saw that the attributes and the ratios of the musical scales were 
expressible in numbers; since, then, all other things seemed in their whole nature to be 
modeled after numbers, and numbers seemed to be the first things in the whole of nature, 
they supposed the elements of numbers to be the elements of all things, and the whole 
heaven to be a musical scale and a number. And all the properties of numbers and scales 
which they could show to agree with the attributes and parts and the whole arrangement 
of the heavens, they collected and fitted into their scheme; and if there was a gap anywhere, 
they readily made additions so as to make their whole theory coherent. E.g. as the number 
10 is thought to be perfect and to comprise the whole nature of numbers, they say that the 
bodies which move through the heavens are ten, but as the visible bodies are only nine, to 




Aristotle’s concerns with music are down-to-earth; what we find in his work is music 
in the human, non-celestial, sphere. Politics is the place where most of what we have 
of Aristotle on music is found. The specific context is the educational curriculum that 
Aristotle proposes for his ideal state. There, music played a fundamental role because 
of its power to affect the soul. In what follows I will present Aristotle’s educational 
curriculum and show what music is able to do to its listeners and why it should be 
included in the constitution of the state. 
 
                                                 
169 Elem. harm. II 32, 10-34 (trans. Barker).  
170 Timaeus 36a, 46c-e. 
171 De caelo 290b11-291a26. 
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3.3 Music in Politics 
 
 
If we apply the four causes to music we would have to say that the composition made 
by the artist is the formal cause; the material cause would be the sound made with the 
instruments; and the efficient cause the performers. What about the final cause? 
Following Aristotle’s thought, the answer should be happiness. The whole polis is 
oriented to human happiness (Pol. VII, 13) and so music contributes to the polis attains 
to it. For Aristotle happiness was “the realization and perfect exercise of 
excellence”(1332a1) and so music was included in his ideal state as a powerful tool to 
achieve it, having a preponderant role in his educational program.  
 
Education was so important because a city is only as good as its citizens.  For Aristotle, 
the legislator “should direct his attention above all to the education of the youth; for 
the neglect of education does harm to the constitution”(1337a11-14). This must be 
done from the very beginning because the same occurs with children as with the 
spectator in the theatre:  “The spectators grew fond of the voices which they first heard. 
And the same principle applies universally to association with things as well as with 
persons, for we always like best whatever comes first” (1336b30-32).172 
 
Aristotle’s educational curriculum depends on his anthropology. The right education 
depends on the particular stages of life as well as on the character of those being 
educated. Here it is important to remember that for Aristotle slavery was in part 
something natural. According to him, humans were naturally divided into a small 
group of people disposed to rule and a vast majority of inferior people not suited to 
govern themselves, among them were all women and natural slaves.173 This sort of 
                                                 
172 Cf. Rep. 376e: “the beginning of any process is the most important, especially for anything young 
and tender.  
173 “And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over 
the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is 
always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature 
than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. 
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thinking is simply wrong but we need to always remember it when Aristotle talks about 
education because he has in mind a limited group of privileged individuals. This group, 
the citizens, should be directed to what is noble and virtuous, to what is done for its 
own sake and not for something else.  
 
The consequence of this is that leisure has a predominant role in the Aristotelian 
curriculum. According to Aristotle, the end of war is peace and the end of toil is leisure 
(1334a14-15). Leisure, Aristotle says, “is better than work and is its end” (1337b33), 
because “the first principle of all action is leisure” (1137b31). The cultivation of noble 
pleasure is what corresponds to a free man and music, as we will see, plays a key role 
in its development.  
 
We also need to consider Aristotle’s understanding of the human soul at different ages. 
Humans are born with rationality but this is somehow present only in potentiality and 
is developed over time. The first part of the soul to be educated is thus not reason but 
those aspects of the soul connected with the body, i.e. desires and emotions. Aristotle 
says: “As the body is prior in order of generation to the soul, so the irrational is prior 
to the rational. The proof is that anger (thumos) and wishing and desire are implanted 
in children from their very birth, but reason and understanding are developed as they 
grow older.”174 For this reason, Aristotle says, the cultivation of the body should 
precede that of the soul, and should be followed by the training of the appetitive part.  
This is not to say that children totally lack reason, but it is something that grows and 
develops fully after the body and the irrational parts of the soul.  
 
During the first period, which goes between zero and five years, children should play 
in order to develop their limbs. Those games should not be vulgar, or tiring or 
                                                 
Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; 
this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind. Where then there is such a difference as that between 
soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, 
and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all 
inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another's 
and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is 
a slave by nature.” (Pol. 1254b6-23) And a little further he says again: “It is clear, then, that some men 
are by nature free, and others slaves” ( Pol. 1254b39-1255a2). 
174 Pol. 1334b 20-25. 
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effeminate. They should also hear tales (λόγοι) and stories (μῦθοι)175 which would be 
chosen by the directors of education and should be imitations (μιμήματα) of future 
occupations in order to prepare children to them. Until they are seven years old they 
must live in their home and it is expected that in that period they “acquire a taint of 
meanness” because of what they see and hear in their domestic contact with slaves 
(1336b2-3). The indecency of speech then should be totally banned by the legislator. 
This is why Aristotle does not allow youth to attend the performances of iambi and 
comedy, at least until they are old enough to drink wine at the common tables and their 
education has turned them immune to their vulgar effect.  
 
After the first seven years at home children should be educated by the state. The 
process should be divided into two stages; the first one from seven to fourteen years 
old and the second from there until twenty-one.  Unfortunately Aristotle does not 
explain any of the differences between the two stages; he describes his whole 
curriculum without mentioning at which age each discipline should be imparted.  
 
He goes on to present the typical educational program that comprises four branches of 
studies: gymnastic, reading, writing and μουσική. To these four, drawing is sometimes 
added. All of these are divided between useful and liberal. Gymnastic is for the sake 
of the wellbeing of the body, and reading and writing are considered useful for 
practical purposes. The only branch of study analyzed at length is μουσική and it 
occupies the last five chapters of the book VIII of Politics. For the moment I translate 
μουσική as music but later some fundamental considerations will be made.  
 
Music is included in the Aristotelian educational program primarily because it is a 
noble way to spend one’s free time. Aristotle constantly reminds us that leisure is 
more important than what we do under compulsion:  
 
It is clear then that there are branches of learning and education which one must study 
merely with a view to a pastime in leisure (ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολὴν), and these are to be 
valued for their own sake; whereas those kinds of knowledge which are useful in business 
are to be deemed necessary, and exist for the sake of other things. And therefore our fathers 




admitted music into education, not on the ground either of its necessity or utility, for it is 
not necessary, nor indeed useful in the same manner as reading and writing, which are 
useful in moneymaking, in the management of a household, in the acquisition of 
knowledge (πρὸς μάθησιν) and in political life” (1338a9-17).176 
  
From this passage it would be tempting to believe that music is “useless.”  However, 
Aristotle considers four different “usages” for music: amusement and relaxation; 
edification of moral character; noble leisure; and catharsis. These are different causes 
of musical practice and so it seems that it is not an activity done for its own sake. Even 
if we accept that we can use music for purposes beyond itself, it would be unfair, based 
on the pleasure derived from it, to say that we cannot listen to it for its own sake. The 
case would be similar with philosophy understood as theoretic contemplation: we do 
it for its own sake and at the same time we get pleasure from it. Aristotle does not 
consider pleasure as the final goal of life but more as a necessary accompaniment of a 
happy life. Similarly, music can be experienced for leisure without further aims: 
Innocent pleasures are not only in harmony with the end of life, but they also provide 
relaxation. And whereas men rarely attain the end, but often rest by the way and amuse 
themselves, not only with a view to a further end, but also for the pleasure’s sake. It may 
be well at times to let them find a refreshment in music. It sometimes happens that men 
make amusement the end, for the end probably contains some element of pleasure, though 
not any ordinary or lower pleasure; but they mistake the lower for the higher, and in 
seeking for the one find the other, since every pleasure has a likeness to the end of action. 
For the end is not eligible for the sake of any future good, nor do the pleasures which we 
have described exist for the sake of any future good but of the past, that is to say, they are 
the alleviation of past toils and pains. And we may infer this to be the reason why men 
seek happiness from these pleasures. But music is pursued, not only as an alleviation of 
past toil, but also as providing recreation” (1339b25-42). 
 
Aristotle sets out the aims of music in a tripartite fashion, similar to the composition 
of the human being: the bodily pleasures of amusement and alleviation of toil 
described in the passage above; the cultivation of moral character (through the spirited 
part of the soul); and finally, the intellectual leisure and the prudence (φρόνησις) that 
we get from music. The basic pleasure of amusement and relaxation from work is 
common (κοινός) and felt and shared by everyone (μετέχειν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς, ἧς ἔχουσι 
πάντες αἴσθησιν).177 In this case, pleasure is confused with the aim and sought for its 
own sake. The situation is different with the noble leisure that we can get from music. 
Unfortunately, Aristotle does not further explain the implications of the noble leisure 
                                                 
176 Cf. NE X, 6. 
177 1340a2-3. 
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in the practice of music, nor the practical wisdom/prudence (φρόνησις) associated with 
it (1339a26). The treatment of music in the classroom is then focused neither on bodily 
pleasures nor on intellectual ones, but rather on the spirited part of the soul that needs 
to be educated first in children in order to shape their moral character.  
 
We are now faced with one of the most problematic aspects in the interpretation of 
Aristotle’s thoughts about music and with the core question of this investigation: what 
kind of influence [does music have] on the character and the soul? (11340a5-6). 
 
Before continuing it is fundamental to focus on the text because depending of the 
translation it would be more or less easy to make a coherent interpretation of Aristotle's 
overall position. A critical passage occurs at 1340a13 where Aristotle says that musical 
representations “even apart from the rhythms and the melody themselves” (χωρὶς τῶν 
ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν.) move the listener accordingly.  
 
Text A) When men hear imitations, even apart from rhythms and melodies themselves 
(χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν), their feelings move in sympathy (συμπαθεῖς). 
Since then music (μουσική) is a pleasure, and excellence consists in rejoicing and loving 
and hating rightly, there is clearly nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and 
to cultivate as the power of forming right judgments, and of taking delight in good 
characters and noble actions. (τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ 
ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν) (1340a19) Rhythms and  songs (μέλη) supply imitations of anger 
(ὀργή) and gentleness (πραότης), and also of courage (ἀνδρεία) and temperance 
(σωφροσύνη), and of all the contraries to these, and of the other qualities of characters 
(ἤθη), which are very close to the real ones, as we know from our own experience, for in 
listening to such strains our soul undergo a change (μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων). The habit of feeling pleasure or pain at mere representations is not 
far removed from the same feeling about realities; for example, if anyone delights in the 
sight of a statue for its beauty, it necessarily follows that the sight of the original will be 
pleasant to him. 1340a12-29 (trans. Jowett slightly modified.) 
 
 
The first problem is the lacuna which is found in two main manuscripts. Politics has 
been preserved in five main manuscript sources. There is a Latin translation that dates 
at least from 1274 made word by word by the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke, 
who in turn used a Greek codex now lost that is designated as Γ and. There are four 
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main Greek manuscripts remaining: Μs, in Milan, and  P(1,  2 and  3.), all in Paris.178 All 
the remaining manuscripts depend on these five and, according to Susemihl, only 
“supply confirmatory evidence in isolated passages.”179 The manuscript Μs, in the 
Ambrosian Library in Milan, has a blank space that occurs between χωρὶς and ῥυθμῶν, 
where τῶν was omitted but later added by another hand. The lacuna also appears in 
several manuscripts of the first Latin translation made by William Moerbeke which 
seems to show that their common source, the now lost Γ, also had it.  This made 
Newman think about whether or not the Greek text that Moerbeke used had also the 
same lacuna and he acknowledges that although probable this is impossible to know.180  
 
The lacuna assumption is crucial especially for the influential emendation proposed 
by Franz Susemihl mentioned in the introduction. According to him, we need to add 
“τῶν λόγων διά”181 in order to make sense of the passage. The translation would be: 
“Even without words rhythms and melodies move men’s feeling in sympathy”.  
Stephen Halliwell thinks that we are “obliged to accept” Susemihl’s emendation at 
1340a13 arguing that “without this textual alteration, it remains opaque why Aristotle, 
when trying to show that music can change its hearer psychologically, would here wish 
to cite the power of words to elicit emotional sympathy independently of rhythms and 
melodies.” 182   I think that the emendation is not necessary and in fact distorts 
Aristotle’s thoughts. Halliwell and all the others following Susemhil are open to 
several objections that reveal that they hold the wrong interpretation. In what follows 
I will present those objections and present my own interpretation according to which 
Aristotle is precisely talking, as Halliwell says, about the “power of words to elicit 
emotional sympathy independently of rhythms and rhythms.”  
 
The passage under discussion (text A above) has been the object of controversy 
between those who believe that Aristotle is considering μουσική in a narrow sense as 
instrumental music and those who understand it to be taken by him in a broad sense as 
                                                 
178 According to Susemihl most manuscripts are from the fifteenth century and P2 and P3 are from the 
fourteenth century, but not earlier.  
179 Susemihl 1894, 1.  
180 Newman 1902 (vol. 3) 125. 
181 Susemhil 1894, 592. 
182 Halliwell 2002, 244. 
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music accompanied (or not) by words. If we accept the first option then Aristotle’s 
treatment of music and its educational implications are concerned only with melody 
and rhythms. The other option, the right one I think, is that Aristotle also included 
words. If we accept the first one then Aristotle could be accused of inconsistency. If 
what we have said about emotions is true, i.e. that they require an intentional object 
over which we make a judgment, then it would not be possible to arouse emotions in  












The term μουσική is certainly equivocal and its translation depends on the context. 
This is explicit at 1339b20-21 where μουσική is characterized as existing with voice 
(μετὰ μελῳδίας) or as bare (ψιλή) music.  The terms μέλος and μελῳδία are also 
ambiguous; both can be used as equivalent to melody, i.e. a sequence of notes, roughly 
speaking, but also could be translated as song, i.e. a melody accompanied by words. 
For example, μέλος is used to refer to the music of Olympus, a famous aulos player, 
who is described as the “first to introduce instrumental music to the Greeks.”183 I think, 
however, that at 1340a19 μέλος should be translated as song and not as pure melody, 
so that the lyrics in the music provide the intentional object for the emotions in the 
“story”. There is an “aboutness” which can be related to the object of emotional 
judgments: 
 
Rhythms and songs (μέλη) supply imitations of anger (ὀργή) and gentleness (πραότης), 
and also of courage (ἀνδρεία) and temperance (σωφροσύνη), and of all the contraries to 
                                                 
183 Ps. Plutarch, On music 5.  
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these, and of the other qualities of characters (ἤθη), which are very close to the real ones, 
as we know from our own experience, for in listening to such strains our soul undergo a 
change. 
 
There are some good reasons for this translation. At 1340a13 μέλος is qualified by 
αὐτός, and the same occurs at 1340a38. In these instances the translation should be 
melodies in themselves, meaning pure melody without words. At 1340a19 μέλος 
appears unqualified and we should be careful and consider, as I think is the case, that 
it may refer to a melody accompanied by words, i.e. a song. At 1341b23-24 Aristotle 
describes the elements in music: ἐπεὶ δὴ τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ 
ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν.  A superficial translation would say: Now we see that music exists by 
melody and rhythm.184 But μελοποιία is not a mere melody; it is literally a melodic 
composition and usually refers to music and lyrics together. 185  More clearly, at 
1339b21 μελῳδία explicitly means song: music and words together. If Aristotle wants 
to speak about instrumental music he refers to it as melody in itself (1340a13; 38), or 
as bare (ψιλή) music at 1339b20. Plato had already considered that rhythms (ῥυθμοί) 
along with harmonies (ἁρμονίαι) and words (λόγοι) were the constitutive parts of a 
song (μέλος),186  thus μέλος involved a cognitive/discursive element beyond mere 
melodies and rhythms. 
 
Another way in which the instrumental music appears is when we consider the 
equivalence between melody in itself with ἁρμονία. According to Aristoxenus, 
harmony is a part of a song and so at the very beginning of his Elementa Harmonica 
(I.1) he says: “The science concerned with μέλος has many parts and is divided into 
several species, of which the study called Harmonics must be considered one.” Here, 
μέλος is translated by Barker as melody but he adds in a note that most probably its 
meaning is song, broadly conceived, although he does so hesitantly because nowhere 
else does Aristoxenus use the term with that meaning.187 As an element of music, the 
                                                 
184 Jowett translates: Now we see that music is produced by melody and rhythm.  
185 Cf. Poet. 1449b33, Halliwell (1986, 239) notes: “Aristotle couples melopoeia with lexis, ‘lenguaje’ 
or ‘style’, and he defines the latter as ‘the composition of the spoken verses’. Lexis, in other words, 
excludes lyric portions of tragedy, and if we were to take melopoeia as referring only to the music of 
these sections, it would follow that Aristotle had defined and analyses tragedy in such a way as to 
overlook the verbal component of lyric poetry altogether”.  
186 Rep. 398d1-2. 
187 Barker 1984, 126. 
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science of harmonics is concerned with neither rhythms nor words. Harmonics is about 
systêmata and tonoi, which can be understood roughly as scales and dominant keys 
respectively. Thus, ἁρμονία may refer to melody in the sense of the arrangement of the 
notes; if we add to it words and rhythm then we have μουσική as a whole.   This helps 
to explain the meaning of the pairing rhythms and harmonies that Aristotle uses at 
1340b17-18 and at 1341b19 when he says “we have to consider rhythms and ἁρμονίαι, 
and their use in education.” It occurs similarly in Poetics 1447a24 where the 
combination of harmony (ἁρμονία) with rhythm are the means of flute playing, not 
rhythm with μέλος. Similarly also in Poetics, at 1448b20-21we find again the pair 
ἁρμονία and rhythm, not μέλος and rhythm. This must be considered also at 1341b32-
35:  
 
We accept the division of songs (μέλη) proposed by certain philosophers into songs of 
character, of action, and passionate or inspiring, each having as they say, a mode 
(ἁρμονίαι) corresponding to it. (trans. Jowett, replacing μέλη  as songs instead of   Jowett’s 
melodies). 
 
As said above, the term ἁρμονία can be understood as a musical mode, roughly 
speaking as a scale. Now, although Aristotle uses elsewhere ἁρμονία as a counterpart 
of rhythm, i.e. as melody,188 in the passage above it would be a nonsense to say that 
the divisions of melodies correspond to a particular melody.  I think, however, that 
melê could be understood here as song or as pure melodies which in turn have a 
corresponding harmoniai. It is not improbable that Aristotle had not always made a 
technical distinction between harmony and melody and from what we have in Poetics 
and Politics that seems to be the case. He seems to declare his ignorance about 
technical matters; with respect to the hierarchy between rhythms and melodies in 
education he says: “the subject has been very well treated by many musicians of the 
present day, and also by philosophers who have had considerable experience of 
musical education” (1341b27-29).  
 
With all the above it is more than reasonable that at 1340a19 μέλος refers to song 
rather than melody. Yet there is one more important reason for this approach. Aristotle 
                                                 
188 Aristides Quintillianus sometimes also uses harmony instead of melody. De musica I, 1, 2;  II, 4, 57.  
II, 7, 65. 
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says that rhythms and μέλη supply imitations of qualities of different characters (ἤθη): 
anger (ὀργή); gentleness (πραότης); courage (ἀνδρεία); temperance (σωφροσύνη); 
“and of all the contraries to these […] which hardly fall short of the actual affections.” 
In addition, he says that the listener has the same feeling (συμπαθεῖς)189 with the 
representation and in doing so he is able to judge those representations. Now, virtue, 
he says, “consists in rejoicing and loving and hating rightly” and so  “there is clearly 
nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and to cultivate as the power of 
forming right judgments, and of taking delight in good characters and noble actions” 
(τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν). Here 
it is explicit that rhythms and songs (μέλη) represent good characters but from what 
Aristotle says it does not follow, necessarily, that music represents also good actions. 
We therefore have two different statements: first, music represents moral characters 
and, second, one part of virtue consists in judging correctly and enjoying 
representations of good moral characters and good actions. In Poetics we read: 
 
 The objects the imitator represents are actions, with agents who are necessarily either 
good or bad (Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ 
σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι) – the diversities of human character being nearly always 
derivative from this primary distinction, since it is by badness and excellence men differ 
in character (κακίᾳ γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ ἤθη διαφέρουσι πάντες). It follows, therefore, that 
the agents represented must be either above our own level of goodness, or beneath it, or 
just such as we are; in the same way as, with the painters, the personages of Polygnotus 
are better than we are, those of Pauson worse, and those of Dionysus just like ourselves. 
It is clear that each of the above–mentioned arts190 will admit of these diversities (τὰς 
διαφορὰς) […] Even in dancing, flute playing and lyre playing such diversities are 
possible; and they are also possible in the nameless art that uses language, prose or bare 
verses.  (1448a1-11) 
 
                                                 
189 The occurrence of συμπαθέω in other places does not denote a recognition more “cognitive” than 
that necessary in sense perception or in involuntary reflexes. In the Prior Analytics, soul and body 
change simultaneously (70b16 sympaschein allélois, which probably has the same meaning as at 70b7-
8 hama metaballein).  Cf. Ps. Aristotle, Physiognomics 808b11-15: “Soul and body seem to me to affect 
each other sympathetically (sympathein allêlois) A change in the state of the soul alters the appearance 
of the body, and, conversely, when the appearance of the body changes, it changes the state of the soul 
as well”. Plato compares a sympathetic feeling with the reflective act of yawning when others are seen 
to do the same: “When Critias heard this and saw that I was in a difficulty, then, just as in the case of 
people who start yawning when they see other people doing it, he seemed to be affected by my troubles 
and to be seized by difficulties himself”. Charmides 169c. However, in In De anima the sympathetic 
reaction only occurs when there is a belief. At 427b22 we read: “When we are of the opinion 
(δοξάσωμεν) that something is fearful we fell the corresponding emotion (συμπάσχομεν)”.   
190 Dance, poetry and instrumental music. 
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The same objects that are mentioned in Politics now are clearly referring to words and 
not to instrumental music. Music qua music is able to represent the diversity of 
characters, i.e. being noble or vulgar, not actions. What would be the noble actions 
that Aristotle is referring to here? Is instrumental music also able to represent actions 
that could be an object of our moral judgment?191  How could instrumental music 
represent an unjust action or a virtuous one? Moreover, listeners are supposed to love 
and hate and take delight in good characters and actions, so if we are hearing an 
instrumental piece of music that imitates, for instance, anger, should we love or hate 
and enjoy or dislike the anger itself? That does not make any sense. Instrumental music 
lacks any aboutness: if it affects the soul this should be in some way other than 
“emotionally.” The emotions supposedly contained in music, according to Aristotle’s 
thoughts presented so far, cannot be the object of our beliefs because instrumental 
music predicates nothing. As Konstan states, “emotions are elicited by evaluations of 
events and situations”192 and thus the question is what sort of events and situations the 
instrumental music is able to represent. Not being able to represent any situation or 
event, instrumental music does not meet the requirement of being the object of 
emotions.193  
 
But now, for a moment, let me consider whether Aristotle is in fact saying that 
instrumental music does arouse emotions. If that were the case then a further problem 
would arise. In Politics, (1340a19-21) music – let us assume for now that Aristotle is 
talking about instrumental music – is able to represent emotions such as anger (ὀργή), 
                                                 
191 There was an instrumental type of music called “imitative”. Aristotle seems to refer to it in Poetics 
1447a224-26. A particularly interesting kind were the instrumental nomoi, instrumental pieces for solo 
performances similar to our program music. The title and description of the plot work as a guide helping 
to understand what is being represented. Without the text it is impossible to know what the music is 
about. Famously, Pollux (Onomastikon IV,84, cf. Strabo, Geography IX,3,10) mentions the Pythikos 
Nomos: “The auletic nomos has five parts, peira, katakeleusmos, iambikon, spondeion and 
katachoreusis. The nomos is a representation [dêlôma, lit. ‘showing’, ‘display’] of the battle of Apollo 
against the serpent. In the peira [‘test’, ‘trial’] he surveys the ground to see if it is suitable for the contest. 
In the katakeleusmos [‘challenge’] he calls up the serpent, and in the iambikon he fights: the iambikon 
also includes sounds like those of the salpinx and gnashings like those of the serpent as it grinds its teeth 
after being pierced with arrows. The spondeion represents (dêloi) the victory of the god; and in the 
katachereusis [‘dance of triumph’] the god performs a dance of victory. (Trans. Barker) 
192 Konstan 2007, 21, quoting Roseman and Smith 2001, 3.  
193 This, as clarified in the introduction, does not mean to deny that we can get angry because a particular 
interpretation does not do justice to the original piece, but such a reaction is not based on any content 
in the music, and that is what has been under discussion. 
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gentleness (πραότης), courage (ἀνδρεία), temperance (σωφροσύνη), frenzy 
(ἐνθουσιασμός) and also “all of those contrary to these and others characters” (καὶ 
πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν), to which later, fear (φόβος) and 
pity (ἔλεος) are also added. All of these are affections (πάθη), courage being the only 
one which is not always considered an emotion but a virtue.194 In any case, the more 
important question is whether these emotions represented in the musical mimesis are 
about something or are some kind of “empty emotions.” Emotions by themselves are 
neutral in ethical terms. Anger is not something good or bad by itself; it depends on 
what its object is. It is right to feel anger towards injustice and it is bad to be angry 
concerning justice. Both words “towards” and “concerning” imply content; an 
“aboutness” over which to make a judgment. Besides, Aristotle clearly states that 
emotions deprived of content are not a matter of moral judgment: “We are not called 
good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the ground of our 
excellences and our vices, and because we are neither praised nor blamed for our 
passions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, not is the man who simply 
feels anger blamed, but the man who feels it in a certain way), but for our excellences 
and our vices we are praised or blamed (NE 1105b29-1106a2).” Aristotle says further, 
to “get angry, that is easy […] but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at 
the right time, with the right aim, and in the right way, that is not for everyone” 
(NE1109a26-29). Or consider NE 1106b18-24: “fear and confidence and appetite and 
anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too 
little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to 
the right objects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way, is 
what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of excellence.” If a piece 
of instrumental music represents an emotion like anger, what would be the right object 
of the emotion? What would be the pedagogical value of experiencing an objectless 
emotion? Aristotle’s answer has to be none.  
                                                 
194 Aristotle generally considers courage as a virtue, it is something more permanent than an emotion; 
but here it seems that can also be understood as something more fleeting, maybe the opposite of fear, 
some sort of brief impetus that push us to confront an obstacle and not flee from it. Courage is explained  
in Eth. Nic. 3.6, 1115a4–10, 1117b21; Eth. Eud. 3.1, 1228a26–1230a36; MM 1.20, 1190b9–1191a35, 
for gentleness see Eth. Nic. 4.5, 1125b26–1126b10; Eth. Eud. 3.3, 1231b5–26; MM 1.22, 1192b23–38; 





If Aristotle does say that “music” represents actions, as could be argued considering 
the passage at 1340a18, it must be by means of the words contained in the songs 
(μέλη). In Poetics this is said explicitly: “the action is represented in the play by the 
plot” (ἔστιν δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μίμησις),195 i.e. in the words. In the theatre, 
the song is only a decoration, literally the biggest of the condiments (ἡ μελοποιία 
μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων)196 that alongside the visual aspects of the performance helps 
to heighten (συναπεργάζομαι)197 the effects of the whole story: 
 
A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, 
complete in itself; with seasoned language (ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ) […] Here by seasoned 
language I mean that with rhythm and harmony (Poet. 1449b24-28).198 
 
In this passage, as well as in text A (Pol. 1340a12-29), Aristotle puts the emphasis on 
the cognitive aspect of the music, i.e. in the words that convey a “message” that works 
as an object over which we can reflect and react accordingly.   
 
Some scholars, however, insist that poetry “is curiously absent from the Politics”,199  
and that we find “no reference to poetry at all.”200 On the contrary, we should say that 
nowhere in the Politics is it suggested that lyrics are excluded from the whole analysis 
in chapters 5 to 7. In fact, theatrical compositions are also included and in reference to 
them the emotions of pity and fear are mentioned. Also relevant is the exclusion of the 
aulos from education.  The problem is “the impediment which the aulos presents to 
the use of voice detracts from its educational value” (Pol. 1341a24-25). So, if Aristotle 
                                                 
195 Poet. 1450a3-4. 
196 Poet. 1450b15-16. “The spectacle, though an attraction, is the least artistic of all the parts, and has 
least to do with the art of poetry (1450b20)”.  
197 Rhet. 1386a31. 
198 Aristotle seems to be echoing Plato: in the Republic it is said that the poet speaks of matters that he 
does not know, but although ignorant, it seems that he knows because of the “the charm (κήλησις) which 
melody and rhythm by nature have.” To this Socrates says, “what a poor appearance the tales of poets 
make when stripped of the colours which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose” (Rep. 
601a–b). Music has a natural sweetness (ἥδυσμα), Pol. 1340b17. As seasoning for food, De an. 414b13, 
NE 1170b29, Mete, 381b30 Pr. 923a28 Rh. 1406a18, Sens. 442a10. As seasoning of a song Poet. 
1450b16. Plutarch, Amatorius, 769c7-9: “by applying the hêdusmata –melodies and metres and 
rhythms– to speech, poetry makes the educational power of speech more moving as much as it makes 
its potential for harm harder to guard against”. I owe this quote to Sifakis 2001, 57.  
199 Destrée 2013, 322, n.15. 
200 Solmsem 1961, 215. 
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is not considering words as part of mousikê, why does he reject the aulos? The answer 
is that he includes words as part of mousikê; the musical education of children is not 
just passive listening and instrumental playing, it involves singing (1340b20) and 
words.   
 
Finally, the lack of poetry in Aristotle's educational curriculum is questionable; 
educating children without the use of literature would be something extremely strange 
in the ancient Greek context. Aristotle does say that reading and writing should be 
included in the curriculum without mentioning any author in particular, however he 
also says that the two disciplines should be included for practical reasons, such as 
making money and domestic economy, fields in which the noble leisure of reading 
Homer cannot be included. This is another good reason to believe that at least in text 
A it is in the μέλη that we find the words of the poets that depict characters of different 
moral qualities doing good and bad things. 
 
Others before me have also defended the idea that Aristotle is referring to music and 
words together, at least in text A. Janko, for example, believes that in order to react 
correctly to good characters and fine deeds, the object of mimêsis must be 
representations with words.  The passage 1340a14-18 gives, according to him, “clear 
support to the view that Aristotle thought that poetry, and not only music, was 
important in moulding character.”201 Those words, he suggests, are represented in epic 
poetry and tragedy.  In the same vein Lord argues that Aristotle is considering mimêsis 
at 1340a12 as “poetic imitation in the broadest sense.”202  In opposition to them, 
Andrew Ford advocates the proposal “to put the music back into Politics 8.”203 His 
objections are worthy of analysis and that is what I will do in what follows.  
Ford defends the idea that Aristotle’s focus in Politics VIII (chapters 5 to 7) is pure 
instrumental music rather than music accompanied by words and so mimêsis at 
1340a12 refers to artistic representations of pure instrumental music. His aim is 
explained in his introduction: “Only by putting the music back into Aristotle’s 
                                                 
201 Janko 1987, 182 
202 Lord 1982, 269 n. 12. 
203 Ford, 2004,309. 
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mousikê, which means kicking out words where they don’t belong, can we see the 
special problems that rhythms, modes and melodies posed to the political 
philosopher.”204  Like Ford, I am also concerned with the problem of pure instrumental 
music in Politics, but contrary to him, I think that in text A, particularly at 1340a12, 
Aristotle is also considering the words accompanying the music. In what follows I will 
discuss his position and show why I think he is wrongly removing words from mousikê 
at Pol. 1340a12.   
Ford goes against the interpretations that claim that Aristotle includes words in his 
analysis of mousikê in VIII, 5. In opposition to Janko, Ford argues that epic poetry 
used no melos and so could not be the logoi that are left in the mimêsis when rhythms 
and melê are removed. Ford also claims that epic poetry “was not thought in mousikê 
but in grammatikê.”205 With respect to the tragedy he says that there nothing in the 
context that “requires us to think of tragedy.”206 He concludes that epic poetry and 
tragedy are “double unhelpful as examples of logos ‘apart from rhythm and melos,”207 
and only dithyrambs and sung nomes could fit in the context. In response I think that 
Ford’s claim that “epic uses no melos” is contrary to the evidence. There are literary 
descriptions of epic poets accompanying their words with the aid of the instrument 
called phorminx and also visual portraits in vase paintings.208 With respect to tragedy 
he says that “it only uses [words] in parts,”209 but I do not see why this would be a 
problem for the idea that the tragic plot is what is left when we remove the rhythm and 
melody. In fact, the idea of removing the musical decorations from the tragic plot was 
not new.210 
Ford, correctly in my view, draws a distinction between those sections where, 
according to him, Aristotle talks about music and words and those others where he 
focuses on pure instrumental music. I disagree, however, on which passages belong to 
which group. According to Ford, from chapter 5 onwards Aristotle focuses exclusively 
                                                 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ford 2004, 322. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
208 West, 1981, Danek 1989 and Danek and Hagel 1995.  
209 Ford, 2004, 322. 
210 Plato, Rep. 601a–b and Aristotle, Poetics 1453b1-10 and Politics 1340a13. 
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on instrumental music: 
When Aristotle first discussed mousikê in 8.3 it was as one of the four subjects commonly 
taught (1337b23–8). As such, it referred to the curriculum provided by kitharistai as 
distinct from the grammatistai. This included what we call poetry or, in terms of the 
Poetics, representations of moral action in words (logoi), rhuthmoi and harmoniai. 
Singing or listening to such ‘songs’ (melê in the sense of ‘words and music’) is doubtless 
part of what Aristotle envisions going on in noble leisure. […] But (recited) poetry was 
also taught by the grammatistês. Mousikê was chosen to exemplify liberal education not 
because of the instructive content of its words but because it was not obviously practical; 
it was a clearer example of liberal study than grammatikê which imparted useful skills of 
writing and reading […] However, from 8.5 to the end of our text Aristotle bears in on 
mousikê in its narrower sense, ‘consisting of the composition of tunes and rhythms’ as he 
defines it in 8.7 (μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν, 1341b23-4).211   
 
In order to leave mimêsis at 1340a12 as pure music he presents his major objection to 
those saying that music involves words, arguing that rhythms and tunes are responsible 
for conveying emotions to the listener: 
[A] more serious problem with bringing in epic or tragedy here (or even tragic odes) is 
that the whole point of the immediately ensuing discussion (1340a18 ff.) is to highlight 
the strong resemblance (homoiômata) between real emotions and those conveyed by 
rhythms and tunes (1340a19). Aristotle holds that the melê and rhythms communicate 
character more strongly than do impressions directed to other senses (ta aistheta, 1340a28) 
such as sight and taste, and he closes this argument by affirming that ‘there are mimêsis of 
character in tunes themselves’ (1340a38-9: ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς). To bring in words 
obscures Aristotle’s focus on music as a sensory phenomenon, a uniquely potent influence 
on the system.212    
 
I see some problems with Ford’s interpretation. First of all, he makes no distinction 
between songs (melê 1340a19) and melodies themselves, (μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς, 1340a13 
and 38), and it seems clear to me that the two occurrences differ in meaning since 
Aristotle ascribes different powers to each. In the first the power to represent 
characters, actions and emotions and in the second the power to differently dispose the 
listeners. Secondly, he argues that there are “emotions […] conveyed by rhythms and 
tunes”, i.e. by pure instrumental music.  Here I will not address again the question of 
how these emotions are transferred by instrumental music, but will focus on the 
“sensory phenomenon” suggested by Ford.  In his view, tunes themselves represent 
character and this finds a parallel with what happens in visual arts. He argues that at 
                                                 
211 Ford 2004, 315. 
212 Ibid., 323. 
 
 93 
1340a26 Aristotle talks about the “influence on a viewer of a sculpture’s shape ‘in 
itself’ (διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτήν) apart from what is represented.”213 In the subsequent 
note he adds: “this basic pleasure [the view of a beautiful shape] in non-narrative form 
is like that afforded by the ‘drip paintings’ of Poetics 1450a39-50b3: ‘very beautiful 
colours’ applied at random can please (εὐφραινειν) us, albeit less fully than a figure 
drawing (which suggests character and action, i.e. mimêsis).” In the Poetics’ passage 
Aristotle describes the plot as the soul of tragedy, and then he continues to explain this 
idea:  
“[C]ompare the parallel in painting, where the most beautiful colours laid on without order 
will not give the same pleasure as a simple black-and-white sketch of a portrait. We 
maintain that tragedy is primarily an imitation of action, and that it is mainly for the sake 
of the action that imitates the personal agents” (1450a38-50b4). 
 
Ford thinks that “Aristotle does not need the verbal art to argue for the ethical influence 
of music for the Poetics can simply assert that ‘most’ of instrumental arts are imitative 
in the sense of expressing action and character.”214 In support of this claim he refers 
to Poet. 1147a13-16 and 1448a9-10 and gives as an example the Pythian nomos which 
tells a story “simply by the sound of the aulos.”215 It is true that in the mentioned 
passages of Poetics, flute and lyre playing are illustrated as imitative, but what they 
can imitate – as is clearly established in chapter 2 – are the diversities of characters, 
i.e. a noble (σπουδαῖος) person or a vulgar (φαῦλος) one:  
The objects the imitator represents are actions, with agents who are necessarily either 
noble men or vulgar—the diversities of human character being nearly always derivative 
from this primary distinction, since the line between virtue and vice is one dividing the 
whole of mankind. It follows, therefore, that the agents represented must be either above 
our own level of goodness, or beneath it, or just such as we are in the same way as, with 
the painters, the personages of Polygnotus are better than we are, those of Pauson worse, 
and those of Dionysius just like ourselves. It is clear that each of the above-mentioned arts 
will admit of these differences, and that it will become a separate art by representing 
objects with this point of difference. Even in dancing, flute-playing, and lyre-playing such 
diversities are possible; and they are also possible in the nameless art that uses language, 
prose or verse without harmony, as its means; Homer’s personages, for instance, are better 
than we are; Cleophon’s are on our own level; and those of Hegemon of Thasos, the first 
writer of parodies, and Nicochares, the author of the Diliad, are beneath it. The same is 
true of the Dithyramb and the Nome: the personages may be presented in them with the 
difference exemplified… in the Cyclopses of Timotheus and Philoxenus. This difference 
it is that distinguishes Tragedy and Comedy also; the one would make its personages 
                                                 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ford 2004, 321. 
215 Ibid., n. 37. 
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worse, and the other better, than the men of the present day (trans. Bywater). 
 
Neither actions nor emotions are among the objects instrumental music is able to 
imitate. The case of the Pythian nomos – not mentioned by Aristotle – would still need 
words that indicate what sounds stand for each character and action, as is the case with 
modern program music. 
 Therefore, an alternative for Ford is to focus on music as a non-narrative “sensory 
phenomenon”. He writes is his concluding remarks:  
“Whatever a teacher might say or a student be prepared to absorb, what music, qua music, 
uniquely allows the young to learn about virtue is that noble states are enjoyable […] The 
fact that in Politics, as in the Nichomachean Ethics, habituation is presented as addressed 
to the non-rational part of the soul indicates that Aristotle aims to prepare students for 
‘judging’ by inculcating in them a basic faculty of discernment, of taste. Just as one’s taste 
in food (i.e. whether something is sweet or bitter) depends on the health and condition of 
one’s physical constitution, so one’s likes in music reflect one’s character as formed by 
repeated exposure to certain music. In ethics as in politics, developing early habits of 
feeling pleasure and pain rightly makes all the difference (1103b23–5), and is more 
important than learning or knowing (EN 1103a14–17; 1105b1–5).216 
 
If the only thing the young learn from music is “that noble states are enjoyable” then 
is not clear what role is played by the representation of emotions, characters and their 
deeds and what sort of judgments the students should make about them. According to 
Ford, the only thing young listeners are expected to do with respect to virtue is to like 
– in the constant process of exposure – what is noble. It is not clear how this view 
would account for the role of music in the process of learning to experience emotions 
properly – for example get angry – in a right way, at the right time, towards the right 
person, for the right reasons.217 Thus in his conclusion Ford states “Aristotle’s keen 
interest in the effect of music as sound and his clear separation of habituation from 
diagogê and phronesis show that he searches the music in mousikê not for its aesthetic 
or philosophical messages, but for its acoustic and physiological powers.”218  
Ford wants to keep mimêsis at 1340a12 as referring to instrumental music, and doing 
so he must declare that it is narrative, in the sense that a proper artistic imitation is 
                                                 
216 Ford 2004, 332, my italics. 
217 I will return to this ‘mechanical habituation’ in the last chapter.  
218 Ford 2004, 332. 
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not only decoration, but represents characters and their moral qualities in actions: 
For Aristotle, properly artistic imitation goes beyond ‘mimicking’ to representing 
character (ethos), the moral qualities of agents as revealed by their choices and actions 
(Poetics 1448a1, 1449b36 ff.). Such pyrotechnics (what Plato calls thaumatourgia) should 
not properly be included among the mimetic arts.219  
 
This statement obligates him to claim that at 1340a12 instrumental music represents 
characters and their deeds as well as emotions. However, at the same time as he 
describes instrumental music as narrative at 1340a12, he emphasizes the non-narrative 
power music has to move the soul as a “sensory phenomenon” with its “acoustic and 
physiological powers”, claiming that the only thing music, qua music, can do to 
listeners it to inculcate “a basic faculty of discernment, of taste.” Nonetheless, although 
“taste” is important in the sense of like and dislike rightly, the moral education of 
emotions is not simply a matter of taste, but of judgment about the characters’ deeds. 
As defended by Konstan, according to Aristotle “emotions are elicited by evaluations 
of events and situations.”220 This is what we need to have in mind when we consider 
the place of emotions in Politics VIII, particularly 1340a12, which is worthy to quote 
again: 
When men hear imitations, even apart from rhythms and melodies themselves (χωρὶς τῶν 
ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν), their feelings move in sympathy (συμπαθεῖς). Since then 
music (μουσική) is a pleasure, and excellence consists in rejoicing and loving and hating 
rightly, there is clearly nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and to cultivate 
as the power of forming right judgments, and of taking delight in good characters and 
noble actions. (τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς 
πράξεσιν) (1340a19) Rhythms and  songs (μέλη) supply imitations of anger (ὀργή) and 
gentleness (πραότης), and also of courage (ἀνδρεία) and temperance (σωφροσύνη), and of 
all the contraries to these, and of the other qualities of characters (ἤθη). 
 
The verb “judge” (κρινῶ), first in connection to good character and noble action, and 
then followed by the emotions represented by music, makes me think of the exactly 
same verb used in Rhetoric for the description of emotions. If, as Ford seems to argue, 
this judgment has as object the characters, their deeds and the emotions represented in 
a story by instrumental music, why does he conclude that Aristotle’s focus is music 
understood as a “sensory phenomenon” with its “acoustic and physiological powers” 
and that the only thing music qua music can do to the listeners it to inculcate “a basic 
                                                 
219 Ibid., 321, n. 38. 
220 Konstan 2007, 21. 
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faculty of discernment, of taste”? 
Ford declares that the way to defend mimêsis at 1340a12 as poetry would be to 
consider Aristotle’s use of the word akroômenoi. Ford argues that in using this word, 
Aristotle  “could be anticipating his argument from the senses by adding to his 
observation about the ethical effects of the tunes of Olympus the point that poetic 
mimêsis also affect sumpatheia through our sense of hearing”.221 Then, he continues, 
“this effect of verbal imitation is one that passes through the ears prepares us for the 
following argument that sound has the most potent effect on character.”222 He doubts 
this defense because he notes that at a22-3 Aristotle uses the verb akroômenoi with 
direct reference to pure music, where certain harmoniai “change the states of the soul 
when we listen to them (μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων).”  
Nevertheless, at 1340a22-23 there is no mention of the harmoniai as he claims, but the 
changes in the soul are due to the mimêsis that represent emotions, characters and their 
deeds by means of song (mêle) and rhythms.  
In conclusion, Ford wants to attribute to instrumental music a narrative power but 
nonetheless he dismisses it as something irrelevant in the overall analysis of music. I 
agree with him with the idea that to see poetry in all the analysis of Politics VIII is 
wrong because Aristotle does deal with instrumental music. However, I think that he 
exaggerates, and wanting to put back music in Politcs he had wrongly rejected the role 
of the words in mousikê. 
Stephen Halliwell’s interpretation of the “musical emotions” is also worthy of 
exploration. The reason is that he seems to propose that according to Aristotle “the 
emotions involved in musical experiences are cognitively based.”223 He concludes this 
because the listener needs to feel emotions, the right emotions, “judging well”. I agree: 
if there is such a thing as “musical emotions” they must be “cognitively based”, 
because all emotions are “cognitively based” according to Aristotle.  
 
                                                 
221 Ford, 2004, 324. 
222 Ibid. Latter (p. 329), he doubts again whether Aristotle is referring to music with words or not: “We 
have traversed the discourse peri mousikês in 8.5-7 with no need to extend the argument to poetry or 
literature–except perhaps in our crux [1340a12]”.  
223 Halliwell 2002, 239, n.12. 
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Halliwell explains further that a “cognitive pleasure” which is  “afforded by the 
contemplation of mimetic works is accordingly a pleasure of recognition and 
understanding of likenesses.”224  I doubt, however, that Aristotle thought that the mere 
recognition of something imitated would bring pleasure. In fact, although there is a 
natural pleasure in the recognition of imitations (Poet. 1448b4-22), the imitations can 
also produce pain and in some case not only can, but should. This is the whole point 
of the musical paideia: to habituate listeners to feeling pleasure or pain in the right 
way, not just to enjoy any representation independently of the content. Young students 
need to be good judges, not in the sense of art critics who can recognize and understand 
the likeness, but they need to judge what is good or bad in a moral sense.  
The position of Halliwell is valuable because it tries to explain the relationship 
between music and emotions but I think that he leaves the explanation somehow 
mysterious and in contradiction with what Aristotle says about the emotions.  
 
Let us consider what Halliwell describes as the reasons for which, according to 
Aristotle, emotions are aroused from music but not from plastic arts:  
 
[A painting] requires a larger framework of suppositions for its justification–among 
other things, a narrative framework, that is (in the terms of Poetics), an implicit structure 
of ‘action’. The perception of character i[n] such cases will be a process of discursive 
inference, a ‘reading’ of the implied relationship between action and character, rather 
than recognition of an intrinsic property of the ordered “shapes and colours” of the 
material artwork. The qualities of music by contrast are taken by Aristotle to have a 
direct communicative effect on the mind and emotions of the (appropriately receptive) 
hearer, who does not infer that music embodies certain ethical traits but seems to 
experience the appropriate feelings as a necessary part of attending to the music: the 
listener’s mind is “changed” in the very act of listening, and this change is constitutive 
of what it means, in the fullest sense, to hear music.225  
 
Here the mind seems to work as non-reflexive sense perception and little room is left 
for a cognitive process beyond the recognition of the emotions “embodied” in the 
music. The mind changing in the very act of listening reminds us of the organs of sense 
perception which change in the same act of perceiving. If “the emotions involved in 
musical experiences are cognitively based,” as Halliwell claims, it is necessary to show 
what is the object of cognition. According to Halliwell, musical emotions are 
                                                 
224 Ibid. 188. 
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cognitive-based because the listener needs to judge well and feel pain and pleasure in 
the right way. But if the listener’s mind is “changed in the very act of listening”, there 
is not much space for cognition, at least not for the cognition that involves an 
evaluation as to whether or not the thing represented is worthy of pleasure or pain. If 
the ‘cognition’ Halliwell ascribes to the emotions involved in musical experiences is 
a cognition based in the pleasure of the “recognition and understanding of 
likenesses”226 between the music and the real emotions or things represented, then 
Aristotle would be describing in Politics 1340a12-29 a totally different way in which 
emotions can be aroused. In other words, Halliwell seems to interpret that the musical 
emotions represented are transferred to the listener in the very act of listening. The 
cognitive element would be the recognition of the emotions represented as well as the 
evaluation of whether or not those emotions should be liked or not. In contrast, we 
have seen, in Rhetoric Aristotle shows that the emotions are not aroused by the mere 
recognition of an emotion or its representation, but are caused by the judgment of a 






Now, there is one important objection to my position that instrumental music does not 
transmit emotions to the listeners by contagion. Aristotle says explicitly that 
instrumental music is able to arouse at least one “emotion”. At 1340a8-12 it is said 
that the melodies of Olympus produce “enthusiasm” in the listeners, and enthusiasm 
is “a πάθος of the character of the soul” (ὁ δ’ ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἤθους 
πάθος ἐστιν́). Should we translate πάθος as emotion here with the same meaning of 
the emotions as in Rhetoric? I do not think so. Frenzy, the English equivalent of 
ἐνθουσιασμός, is a non-cognitive state or at least can be induced by material means, 
for example by applying drugs or wine, which is precisely what the Aristotelian author 
                                                 
226 Ibid. 188. 
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of the Problems suggests at 954a36 where it is said that altering the temperature of the 
body wine can produce ἐνθουσιασμός. Frenzy/excitement is not an object–directed 
emotion but a general state that is even possible to achieve by mere physiological 
alterations. Also, enthusiasm does not appear in any list of emotions in Aristotle and 
so I think that he uses the term pathos to refer to it as affection rather than as an emotion 
proper. The state of ἐνθουσιασμός is objectless and should thus be considered as 
something different from the emotions discussed in the Rhetoric.  Emotions are 
presented as cognitive processes directed towards an intentional object but frenzy is 
not about something; it is a state empty of content.  All the emotions presented in 
Rhetoric are based on beliefs about an object while the state of frenzy does not require 
any judgment beyond the mere recognition that one is in such state. For example, we 
feel pity because of the undeserved misfortune of someone, we feel angry because of 
an insult. In the case of  ἐνθουσιασμός there is no need for a particular belief; we do 
not need to judge that something is the case. The music affects the listener who enters 
into frenzy without holding any particular thought, just as wine produces the same 
effect without providing any object to the mind. It is true that Aristotle uses the term 
pathos for ἐνθουσιασμός but, because it does not involve any judgment, this 
“affection” of the soul does not qualify among the group of pathê presented in Rhetoric 
and that we have translated as emotions.  
 
 
3.6 Emotions–like close to real emotions? 
 
 
If my analysis is wrong and it is not the words in the song that produce anger and all 
the other emotions in the listener, but rather such emotions are elicited by the power 
of instrumental music, then all accounts of Aristotle’s emotions depending on 
intentionality should be regarded at least as insufficient or incomplete. In order to save 
the case and maintain that emotions for Aristotle were always about something and 
not objectless reflexes it could be argued that the emotions that instrumental music 
arouses are a different kind of emotion or a sui generis type of them. In fact, Aristotle 
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says explicitly: “The habit of feeling pleasure or pain at representations is close to the 
same feelings about realities” (ὁ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἐθισμὸς τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν 
ἐγγύς ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον).227 This closeness to the real 
feelings of pain and pleasure – which are necessary conditions for emotions – seems 
to indicate that we are dealing with an emotion-like state.  The only explanation 
Aristotle provides is an example. If someone enjoys the appearance of a sculpture it 
will necessarily follow that he would enjoy the sight of the original. The likeness is 
thus between two pleasures: the pleasure we get from artistic representations is like 
the one we get from real life and real objects. It is unclear whether the distinction is 
one of degree or some other qualification but I am inclined to the first option. Aristotle 
does at least make a distinction between our responses to representations of plastic arts 
and real situations. In De anima, discussing the nature of phantasia, he seems to state 
that just imagining an object is not enough to experience an emotion: 
 
When we are of opinion (δοξάσωμεν) that something is terrible or alarming, we at once 
feel the corresponding emotion, and so, too, with what is reassuring. But when we are 
under the influence of imagination (κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν) we are not more affected than 
if we saw in a picture the objects which inspire terror or confidence (De anima 427b21-
4).  
 
Merely imagining something fearful is not the same as believing it. When we believe 
that something is fearful then we are faced with a real situation.  I doubt that Aristotle 
refers to a theoretical thinking. For example, I do believe that white sharks are fearful; 
however I do not experience fear as a consequence of my thought. In order to 
experience the emotion we need to believe that something is actually fearful in front 
of us or is a latent menace. This is not to deny that by imagining or thinking emotions 
can be aroused; in fact, it is by thinking and imagining that we experience emotions. I 
think that what Aristotle says is that when we react emotionally to artistic 
representations it is like when the object of our thinking is hypothetical (imagining the 
death of a family member for instance) or when we are recalling memories as actors 
do using what is called “affective memory”. All these emotions have in common a sort 
of disconnection with immediate action. Similarly to the case in Politics –where the 
                                                 
227 1340a23-25. Woerther (2008, 101) states that the emotions aroused by music are “the same” with 
real emotions.  
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pleasure or pain that is taken from artistic representations is close to what we get from 
real objects – in De anima it seems that we have the same sort of distinction. As we 
have seen, for Aristotle plastic arts can only show signs of emotions and their moral 
character is presented only to a slight degree.  The appearances or images of visual 
arts – as well as those phantasmata created in the mind by the imagination – produce 
pleasure/pain and the emotions associated with them to a lesser degree than real 
emotions. One explanation could be found in De anima where Aristotle discusses the 
locomotion of animals: 
 
It is not the reasoning faculty or what is called intellect that is the cause of motion. For 
speculative intellect thinks nothing that is practical and makes no assertion about what is 
to be avoided (φεύγειν) or pursued (διώκειν), whereas motion always implies that we are 
avoiding or pursuing something. But, even if the mind has something of the kind before 
it, it does not forthwith prompt avoidance or pursuit. For example, it often thinks  
(διανοεῖται) of something alarming or pleasant without commanding to fear (οὐ κελεύει 
δὲ φοβεῖσθαι);228 the only effect is a beating of the heart or when the thought is pleasant, 
some other bodily movement (De anima 432b26-433a1). 
 
Thus, whether we consider the instrumental music or the music accompanied by 
words, what we feel would be an emotion–like feeling close to real emotions for two 
possible reasons. First, one option is to consider that the emotions produced by music 
are close to real emotions because they are of a lower degree, i.e. less intense. Second, 
the musical emotion does not involve any action tendency like avoiding and pursuing 
something. We may be afraid of the monster in a movie or afraid of the actions that 
Oedipus is about to do, but we neither run away from the screen nor try to stop the 
actor playing Oedipus from killing his father. The object is not real and so the emotion 
is not strong enough to move us to action as it would have been in a real situation. 
 
The case with instrumental music is even clearer. Assuming that instrumental music 
could imitate the sound of an angry voice and that the emotion represented would be 
immediately transmitted to the listener, what would be the object of the emotion?  
Towards whom or what would be our anger directed? Would it be an objectless 
emotion? If the answer is affirmative then Aristotle contradicts himself since he 
                                                 
228 Hicks translates: “without prompting to fear”; and Smith “without enjoying the emotion of fear”. In 
both cases I think the meaning of Aristotle’s words is lost. The emotion is felt but there is no action as 
consequence of it.  
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describes emotions as object-directed states. My position is that what instrumental 
music produces is an objectless mood but not a specific emotion.  
 
What Aristotle offers – or more justly, what I think Aristotle would offer if he were 
able to respond to the blank spaces – is that with respect to emotions music stands 
between an intentional object and the mind. The object of the emotions, which is the 
target of the emotional judgment, changes its appearance because of the music. This 
is what happens with the words of the orator and the tone of his voice or the visual 
elements in the theatre decorating the plot. The object of the emotion is a situation; a 
particular content provided by the argument of the orator or the story in the play. If 
those elements are not present then the mind itself may provide a proper object to be 
judged. We can understand this idea thinking of a metaphor of music working as a 
window. When we contemplate the world and some music starts playing, what we 
perceive is “colored” by it, or following Aristotle own metaphor, seasoned.  This sort 
of “musical crystal” is thus placed between our mind and the object that we observe. 
In the case of a window between the world and us, if the window changes its properties 
the way in which we see reality is altered. Different types of glass “paint” different 
filters in front of our eyes and over the objects insight; their shape and color distort the 
landscape in front of us. Even a clean transparent window changes our perception. If 
we open the window then things look different; we  see and even hear them more 
clearly. Music, the human voice, and sounds of all sorts also add “textures” to reality. 
That is how Aristotle describes the usage of the voice by the orator and the characters 
in a play. Music, as well, rests between the play in the theatre or the words of the poets 
and listeners. It gives to the words new textures, changing their appearance and 
meaning. However, the listener does not stop at contemplating the music as our sight 
does not stop in the window; the object of our judgment is beyond it and our emotions 
are directed there. This is more clear in films, where the soundtracks, consciously 
perceived or not, stand in the background of our attention. We cry and laugh about 
what happens in the story, about the narrative, deeds, situations or ideas: we respond 
emotionally to something. When we put the focus on the window rather than the things 
seen through it then there is nothing more than shapes and colors, physical properties 
that are empty of content by themselves. It is similar with pure instrumental music; 
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with our eyes closed we can follow the melody and the rhythms by themselves and we 
can see the shapes and textures without trespassing them. Certainly our own thoughts 
may come up and be shaped by the music but then we would have shifted the focus of 
attention from things that are beyond the music. This is not to deny an emotional 
reaction directed by the music. The beauty of an instrumental piece can certainly move 
us; we can feel anger because the music we hear is a hymn of political ideas that we 
reject. All of these reactions and many more may also appear without jeopardizing 
what I have tried to show. What I have rejected, and I think Aristotle would reject too 





3.7 The case of “angry music” 
 
 
Anger is the first proper emotion mentioned by Aristotle as capable of arousal by 
“music”: “In rhythms and songs there are the greatest likenesses to the true natures of 
anger”  (ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ 
τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς).229 For those defending the musical contagion of emotions then it 
is necessary to explain how this would be possible. The emotion of anger (ὀργή) is the 
most discussed by Aristotle; it not only appears among the other emotions in Rhetoric 
but is also discussed in De anima. It is in this latter work that Aristotle explains that 
emotions are always a twofold process compounded of matter and form. As has been 
shown in chapter 2.4, the mind and the body are always affected together when there 
is an emotion.  
 
In what follows I will look at anger as a paradigmatic example and show why it is 
inconsistent with Aristotle’s treatment of emotions to argue that instrumental music is 
                                                 
229 Pol. 1340a18-19. 
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able to produce emotions by means of an acoustic contagion. This treatment of anger 
will serve to clarify further what has been presented so far: that Aristotle understands 
the emotions not as sympathetic instantaneous responses but as appraisals or 
evaluative responses directed at an object.  
 
There are two places where anger is defined: De anima and Rhetoric. In De anima 1.1, 
he explains the two elements involved in the constitution of anger: the matter and the 
form which are in turn realized in the body and the mind. Rhetoric is only focused on 
the formal part of the emotion and does not pay attention to the bodily processes that 
are part of the emotional response. Here I will leave the “boiling blood around the 
heart” aside, because it was already discussed in chapter 2.4, and I will focus on the 
cognitive aspect of the emotion. This means the part of the emotion that a dialectician 
rather than a physiologist would be interested in. The treatment of anger is found in 
Rhetoric II, 2. There we find a definition of anger: 
 
A desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge, on account of a perceived slight 
on the part of people who are not fit to slight one or one’s own. If this is a proper definition 
of anger, it must be felt towards some individual, e.g. Cleon, and not man in general. It 
must be felt because the other has done or intended to do something to him or one of his 
friends. It must always be attended by a certain pleasure–that arises from the expectation 
of revenge. For it is pleasant to think that you will attain what you aim at, and nobody 
aims at what he cannot attain (Rhet. 1378a21-b4).  
 
 
This definition limits the sense of anger to a very narrow meaning. For those defending 
the idea that the listener instantaneously feels the emotion with the music, the question 
is then how this is supposed to work. How would instrumental music represent all the 
elements involved in the emotional judgment with mere sound? How would it transfer 
those elements to the listener’s mind? With the “elements involved” I am referring to 
what was described earlier as the “narrative context” that serves as the object of 
emotions. Taking the case of anger that arises from the perception that someone has 
insulted us or someone we care about, if pure music can imitate anger and the listener 
experiences the same emotion in the very act of listening to it, then somehow he needs 
to judge something in the music that describes a very specific type of insult.  In what 
follows I explain the complexity of anger and why it is problematic to claim that 
instrumental music can arouse this emotion in a listener.  
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David Konstan and Michael Stocker230 develop the subject of Aristotle on anger in 
detail, although without mentioning the imitation of anger in Politics VIII. As I 
mentioned earlier, Konstan just dismisses the affections produced by music as 
something different from emotions without analysing the passage. In his treatment of 
the subject Konstan mostly focuses on Rhetoric, on the basis of which he concludes 
that “it is clear that anger, for Aristotle, is anything but an automatic reflex or 
instinct.”231  
 
Konstan is aware that an account that focuses only on the body can help to explain 
what anger is for Aristotle, but such an account would be irremediably incomplete: 
 
It is conceivable, albeit unlikely in my view, that a sufficient refined physiology of anger 
might be able to single out all cases of true anger –in which the subject had taken account 
of intentions and other psychological and ethical factors– from other emotions as well as 
from instinctive reactions such as the startle effect. Such an account of anger would, 
nevertheless, be crucially deficient, and not only because it would be lacking a 
phenomenological description of the subject’s inner state of consciousness. On a purely 
physical analysis, the means of augmenting or diminishing anger reduce to the 
manipulation of it organic manifestations: rising or lowering of the blood pressure, heart 
rate, and so forth, as by chemical means. Let us grant that these means may be effective. 
It remains the case that they are not exhaustive; for another way of inducing or eliminating 
anger –Aristotle’s way– is to alter the subjects’ view of the reasons for an offense and the 
context in which it was given, including the possibility that is was deserved.232 
  
Aristotle, as we have seen, explicitly denies that pure bodily changes are enough to 
arouse emotions. At most, they can leave the subject in a state of “readiness” to react 
emotionally when faced with a particular object. The alteration of the animal’s bodily 
state “prepares the way” for the entrance of the emotion but without an appropriate 
object in front of the animal’s mind there is no emotional trigger.  
 
Leaving the body aside, let me now focus exclusively on the cognitive aspect of anger. 
The concept of anger that Aristotle develops in Rhetoric is quite different to ours. What 
he understood by ὀργή seems to be a specific type of what we understand by the word 
                                                 
230 Konstan 2004 and Stocker, Michael 1996.especially chapter 10: ‘The complex evaluative world of 
Aristotle’s angry man’ (pp. 265-322). 
231 Konstan 2004, 104. 
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“anger.” Someone may feel anger at himself or at more abstract objects: his football 
team losing the final, or even a red light when he is in a rush. For Aristotle, those cases 
would not qualify for the arousal of ὀργή. In Rhetoric we are told that “anger” is the 
desire for revenge because we have perceived that someone has slighted us. A slight 
(ὀλιγωρία) is defined by Aristotle as “the activation of an opinion about something 
seeming worthless” (1378b10-11). This “severe restriction” of the concept, as Konstan 
says, can be better explained by analysing the three different types of slights that 
Aristotle mentions: καταφρόνησις, ἐπηρεασμός and ὕβρις. The first one, 
καταφρόνησις, can be translated as contempt. It is described as believing that someone 
is of no value and therefore acting accordingly. Contempt or disdain are two possible 
translations for καταφρόνησις. Aristotle says that one feels contempt when one thinks 
(οἴομαι) that something is worthless (1378b16). Holding that opinion and acting 
accordingly is what constitutes the slight. Spite stands for ἐπηρεασμός; it is defined as 
blocking the wish (βούλησις) of someone for the mere sake of impeding his/her wish, 
i.e. with no benefit for oneself, neither revenge nor defence. Aristotle says: “It is a 
thwarting of another man’s wishes, not to get something yourself but to prevent his 
getting it. The slight arises just from the fact that you do not aim at something for 
yourself” (1378b18-20). The last form of slight is ὕβρις; in this context the word may 
be translated as insolence or insult. Aristotle describes it as “doing and saying things 
that cause shame to the victim, not in order that anything may happen to yourself, or 
because anything has happened to yourself, but simply for the pleasure” (1378b24-
27). These examples of slight show how specific the meaning of anger is for Aristotle. 
It may be difficult for us to understand this very restricted sense of “anger”. For 
Aristotle, we would not feel anger if the slight is done by someone looking for a just 
revenge because in such an attack we do not perceive injustice, which is a necessary 
condition in the definition of a slight.233 Even an attack that aims to get some benefit 
would not be considered for Aristotle as a cause of anger. As Konstan says, “anger is 
not a response to harm as such, even when the harm is intentional.”234 Rather, anger is 
a response to the perception of injustice, of someone mistreating us in an undeserved 
and derogatory way, treating us as something unworthy.  
                                                 
233 As Konstan points (2004,109, n. 24), in N.E. 1135b25-29, Aristotle says that “anger resides in a 
perceived injustice”. 
234 Ibid. 109. 
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Considering the complexity of anger, it would be quite a challenge to argue that 
instrumental music is able to, first, imitate all the elements involved, and second, 
transmit those elements to the listener. One alternative would be to emphasise the idea 
that music arouses emotions “close” to real emotions, in which case it would be 
necessary to specify what type of emotions those would be. Even more important, it 
would be necessary to clarify what the object of the emotion would be. If the anger as 
described in Rhetoric is not the only anger that Aristotle has in mind, then what other 
type of it is available? My answer is that there is not any other anger except the one 
just discussed. At least, the intentionality of the emotions cannot be excluded from its 
characterization. There is no objectless emotion in Aristotle; even if we consider the 
case of the of the angry dog in Rhetoric (1380a24-26). Even in that case we are dealing 
with a subject feeling something about something; an intentional response towards 
something, as in the analogy of the dog deposing his wrath when the man representing 
menace sits down and demonstrates submission (Rhet. 1149a23-34). 
 
As we have seen in the Rhetoric, Aristotle thought that there was a particular sound of 
voice when someone is experiencing anger and so it is not totally impossible to 
consider that instrumental music was also able to imitate that sound. However, even if 
this were the case, the listener would hear the angry sound and recognize it as such but 
there is no reason why he should also experience the same emotion. It is not the case 
that we imitate the emotion perceived. For instance, we see Oedipus being angry at 
Tiresias but we do not share his anger. Similarly, just hearing someone screaming in 
pain does not put us in the same condition; it may certainly draw our attention but until 
we discover the origin of the scream, we would not react accordingly. For instance, 
we would react differently if the scream came from someone being unjustly attacked 
or from a television set. Besides, we do not only need an object but also something 
said about that object. The Greeks had instrumental pieces that represented actions and 
the deeds of different characters, but those representations where presented and 
preceded by words. 235  Presumably, the listeners knew the story first and then 
recognized the music as a sign of it. So, if they reacted at one point with fear, for 
                                                 
235 See note 191. 
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example, when the Python fights with Apollo in the Pythian nomos, they do so because 
they are considering the terrible fight between the god and the monster and not because 
they hear drums and cymbals crashing, or whatever was the musical representation of 
the fight.  Moreover, even if we accept that an instrumental piece of music could 
accompany a given text and represent acoustically what happens in the story, there is 
no necessity for the listener to feel the emotion represented. Let us suppose that there 
is an instrumental piece that represents at some point a character screaming possessed 
by anger. To do so, the chosen instrument would presumably imitate the sound of the 
voice of someone screaming in anger (whatever the sound of someone screaming in 
anger may be, as opposed to someone screaming because of another emotion). The 
listener then would be able to recognize the sound and, because he knows the story, he 
would know that the scream heard belongs to someone experiencing anger. All of these 
would not be sufficient to arouse the emotion in the listener. The emotion could be 
extremely vividly represented, the instrument may imitate the scream at the point of 
making it undistinguishable from the real sound, but still the listener would not 
experience anger as a result. If the story tells us that the angry screamer deserves his 
pain we may react with pleasure; or if his anger is the product of an undeserved attack 
we may react with pity. The reaction to the pure sound imitating an angry voice, or the 
sound of any other emotion or thing, is not enough to produce a contagion in the 
listener. The content of the piece of art, in this case music, may be “transferred” to the 
perceiver, I mean here a mere act of cognition, i.e. the object is somehow grasped by 
the mind. Thus the color of a perceived apple, Aristotle would say, would be also in 
the perceiver’s mind.236 In the case of the angry voice, the same would happen. This 
“transfer” of the content of the musical piece would be all the “contagion” there is: we 
hear something that sounds like the voice of someone screaming in anger. Beyond that, 
there is nothing: we do not know who is feeling the anger, neither his reasons nor 
towards whom his emotion is directed.  There is no referential content to anything.  
 
It may be argued that anger exists even without content. For example, it may be said 
                                                 
236 This should not be read to mean a subjectivist position.  The mind grasps the forms which are the 
same for everyone. See De anim. III 8. 
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that it can exist from birth (Cat. 10a1), 237  most probably due to certain bodily 
conditions. In that case it refers to a natural disposition to be easily moved to anger; it 
does not mean that someone would be continuously experiencing anger but that he is 
irascible. The emotion proper appears only when an appraisal is made about an object.  
 
From this section we should conclude that, if Aristotle says that rhythms and μὲλη 
produce anger and other emotions: a) he is being inconsistent and there is no necessity 
of intentional object, nor a judgment for the emergence of emotions; b) he is referring 
to another sui generis objectless type of emotion or c) he is using the term μὲλος as 
song, i.e. music accompanied by words. Alternatively, a) may be a valid choice but is 
disproved if b) or c) are correct. b) is a temptation since Aristotle says that the listeners 
experience emotions “close to the real ones”, however, this alternative is also rejected 
because he never spoke about objectless emotions, and particularly in the case of anger 
he seems to say that anger is not an emotion about general and undefined things. This 
is suggested in one part of the definition of anger quoted at the beginning of this 
section: “If this is a proper definition of anger, it must be felt towards some individual, 
e.g. Cleon, and not man in general.” Thus, the only reasonable alternative is c). We 
react emotionally to the situations and ideas in the words accompanying the music. 
This idea was already proposed in 1812 by Thomas Twining, in his essay 
accompanying his translations of Poetics, entitled:  “On the different senses of the 
word, imitative, as applied to music by the ancients, and by the moderns:” 
 
The expressions of music considered in itself, and without words, are (within certain 
limits,) vague, general and equivocal. What is usually called its power over passions, is, 
in fact, no more than a power of raising a general emotion, temper, or disposition, common 
to several different, though related, passions; as pity, love-anger, courage, &c. The effect 
of words, is, to strengthen the expression of music, by confining it–by giving it a precise 
direction, supplying it with ideas, circumstances, and an object, and, by this means, raising 
it from a calm an general disposition, or emotion, into something approaching, at least, to 




                                                 
237 “Those which are present right from birth as a result of certain affections are called qualities, for 
example madness and irascibility (ὀργή) and the like; for in virtue of these people are said to be 
qualified, being called irascible (ὀργιλοι) or mad.” Cf. Rhet. 1221b10-15 
238 Twining, 1812, 72. 
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3.8 What does music do to listeners? 
 
 
So far I have addressed the question whether there is an emotional effect of 
instrumental music on the listeners in a way that would suggest a negative answer. 
Against most interpretations, I have claimed that Aristotle did not believe that 
instrumental music is able to arouse emotions (as understood in Rhetoric) by a sort of 
acoustic contagion. I have, however, only focused on one part of Politics VIII, namely 
1340a12-29; a passage that I have labeled above as text A. Following that passage, 
where Aristotle discusses the effects of μουσική understood as music and lyrics 
together, he goes on to contrast the representational qualities of visual arts. We have 
already seen that paintings and sculptures only represent signs of emotions but show 
little about the moral character of those depicted.  The next step for Aristotle is then to 
discuss the effects of pure instrumental music. This further analysis will respond to 
Ford’s criticism: “Always seeing poetry in Aristotle’s mousikê intellectualizes musical 
education as a form of ethical instruction through literature. But this flattens out the 
argument by neglecting Aristotle’s keen and sustained attention to the powers of music 
itself.”239 Aristotle does not always analyse music understood as music and text. In the 
text I designate as (B) below, he clearly distinguishes music accompanied by words, 
which is capable of representing actions and emotions, and instrumental music, which 
is responsible for arousing different dispositions in the listeners.   
 
Text B) On the other hand,240 even in melodies themselves (μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς) there is an 
imitation of character, for the musical modes (ἁρμονίαι) differ essentially from one 
another, and those who hear them are differently disposed by each (ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως 
διατίθεσθαι). Some of them make man disposed more gravely (ὀδυρτικωτέρως) and 
anxiously (συνεστηκότως), like the so called Mixolydian, others in a more light-minded 
way (μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν), like the relaxed modes, another, again, produces 
moderate (μέσως) and settled (καθεστηκότως) temper, which appears to be a peculiar 
effect of the Dorian; the Phrygian inspires enthusiasm (ἐνθουσιαστικός) […] the same 
principle applies to rhythms; some have a character of rest (στάσιμος), others of motion 
(κινητικός), and of these latter again, some have a more vulgar (φορτικός), others nobler 
movement (ἐλευθέριος). (1340a38-b10). 
                                                 
239 Ford 2004, 314. 
240 Contrary to what happened with visual arts.  
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The first question here, in particular to those supporting Susemihl’s emendation, is 
why is Aristotle explaining once again the effects that instrumental music produces? 
And if this is indeed another explanation that he chooses to give, then why are these 
effects different to those mentioned earlier?  If, as suggested by those following 
Susemihl, Aristotle first explains the effects of pure melody (μέλη) (in Text A), why 
bother to do it again? My answer is that only now does Aristotle focus on the effects 
of pure music without words.   
 
In order to understand this passage and to give a psychological explanation of what 
happens when we hear music, we need to recall what we have said about the material 
aspect of emotions. Emotions, we said, are compounds of matter and form. By matter, 
I mean the physiological elements involved, especially the temperature of the blood 
and the heart. The form is the “reasons,” the cognitive element in the emotion. For 
example, the matter of anger is the boiling of the blood around the heart; the form can 
have several interpretations, it can be presented as the “reason why” we are angry, 
which involves also the “about what” or “against whom” we experience anger. If we 
remove the cognitive element, what is left is only the stirring of the body. This, as has 
been argued, on a physical level produces the “symptoms” of an emotion: the visible 
bodily signs accompanying it. In psychological terms, it produces what can be referred 
to as mood; an ambiguous and objectless affection. That mood “prepares the way” for 
the arousal of an emotion when a proper object is judged; we would be conditioned 
and inclined to a particular emotion because of our bodily state. Is it possible then that 
music affects the body in a particular way, agitating the heart and causing more heat? 
For Aristotle the answer is in the affirmative. Music, as sound, is not a spiritual thing 
disconnected from matter. No sound means no music; and sound, according to 
Aristotle, has a physical impact on us. It is true that in Politics Aristotle talks about the 
impact of music over the soul because he is concerned with the education of character. 
But this does not mean that he would deny the participation of the body. The only 
mental activity that could perhaps be separate from the body is thinking, but hearing 
and the emotions always occur in conjunction with a physiological change. 
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I cannot, in this work, go into the complexities that are involved in Aristotle’s account 
of sound. The topic has served for the discussion between literalists and formalists 
with respect to sense perception, discussion that is out of the scope of this research241 
However, it seems clear to me that the air inside the ear receives the impact of the 
outer air and reverberates adopting the same shape. The different shapes that the air 
adopts are due to the speed of movement: “Lowness of voice depends on the 
movement being slow and its highness on being quick” (Generation of Animals  
786b25-26). 
 
Then an interesting process takes part inside the hearer: 
 
For the passages of all the sense-organs, as has been said in the treatise on sensation, run 
to the heart, or to its analogue in creatures that have no heart. The passage of the hearing, 
then, since this sense-organ is of air, ends at the place where the innate breath (πνεῦμα 
τὸ σύμφυτον) causes in some animals the pulsation of the heart and in others respiration; 
and that is why we are able to understand what is said and repeat what we have heard, 
for as was the movement which entered through the sense-organ, such again is the 
movement which is caused by means of the voice, being as it were of one and the same 
stamp, so that a man can say what he has heard. And we hear less well during a yawn or 
expiration than during inspiration, because the starting-point of the sense-organ of 
hearing is set upon the part concerned with breathing and is shaken and moved as the 
organ moves the breath, for while setting the breath in motion it is moved itself. The 
same thing happens in wet weather or a damp atmosphere. And the ears seemed to be 
filled with air because their starting-point is near the region of breathing. Accuracy then 
in judging the differences of sound and smells depends on the purity of the sense organ 
and of the membrane lying upon its surface, for then all the movements become clear in 
such cases, as in the case of sight  (Generation of Animals 781a20-b5, tans. A. Platt.).242 
 
This passage has been said to be a later addition.  The first to do so was Peck (1942, 
563-4) in his translation of the treatise. He did not draw on any textual problem with 
                                                 
241 My position against Burnyeat (1995, 421) is that either as a wave or as a mass of air traveling from 
one point to another, it is clear that Aristotle believed in sound as involving some kind of physical 
motion of air. 
242 οἱ γὰρ πόροι τῶν αἰσθητηρίων πάντων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ αἰσθήσεως, τείνουσι πρὸς τὴν 
καρδίαν, τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἔχουσι καρδίαν πρὸς τὸ ἀνάλογον. ὁ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀκοῆς, ἐπεί ἐστι τὸ αἰσθητήριον 
ἀέρος, ᾗ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ σύμφυτον ποιεῖται ἐνίοις μὲν τὴν σφύξιν τοῖς δὲ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν [καὶ εἰσπνοήν], 
ταύτῃ περαίνει· διὸ καὶ ἡ μάθησις γίνεται τῶν λεγομένων ὥστ᾿ ἀντιφθέγγεσθαι τὸ ἀκουσθέν· οἵα γὰρ ἡ 
κίνησις εἰσῆλθε διὰ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου, τοιαύτη πάλιν, οἷον ἀπὸ χαρακτῆρος τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνός, διὰ τῆς 
φωνῆς γίνεται ἡ κίνησις, ὥσθ᾿ ὃ ἤκουσε, τοῦτ᾿ εἰπεῖν. καὶ χασμώμενοι καὶ ἐκπνέοντες ἧττον ἀκούουσιν 
ἢ εἰσπνέοντες6 διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ πνευματικῷ μορίῳ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου εἶναι τοῦ τῆς ἀκοῆς, καὶ 
σείεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι ἅμα κινοῦντος τοῦ ὀργάνου τὸ πνεῦμα· [κινεῖται γὰρ κινοῦν τὸ ὄργανον.]1 καὶ 
ἐν ταῖς ὑγραῖς ὥραις καὶ κράσεσι συμβαίνει τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος, καὶ τὰ ὦτα πληροῦσθαι δοκεῖ  bπνεύματος 
διὰ τὸ γειτνιᾶν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ πνευματικῷ τόπῳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς διαφορὰς ἀκρίβεια τῆς κρίσεως καὶ 
τῶν ψόφων καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν ἐν τῷ τὸ αἰσθητήριον καθαρὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸν ὑμένα τὸν ἐπιπολῆς ἐστιν· 
πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις διάδηλοι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ὄψεως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων συμβαίνουσιν. 
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the manuscripts but focused on the content of the text, claiming that “the passage 
originated as a marginal annotation, intended to supply an account of the inner 
mechanism of sensation, etc., which would supplement the account of the superficial 
sense-organ of hearing and smell which no doubt originally stood here in the text”. 
Later, H.J Drossart Lulofs (1965, 182) followed Peck without further arguments. On 
the contrary, P. Louis (1961) and R. Ferwerda (2005) in their respective translations 
did not follow Peck’s objection to the authenticity of the text but they did not provide 
any counterargument. The only direct response to Peck is offered by Abraham P. Bos 
(2010), from whom I took the previous references. Bos’s main argument has as its 
target the confusion he ascribes to Peck between “the external, heterogeneous, 
instrumental parts of perception (eyes, ears, nose), and the homogeneous, instrumental 
aisthètèria, which are parts of the soul’s instrumental body (Part. anim. II 1, 646a12; 
b6).”243 In what follows I will present Peck’s six reasons to reject the passage as 
authentic followed by Bos’ responses and my own consideration.  
 
The first of Peck’s arguments is that “the introductory γὰρ introduces no real 
explanation or expansion of the preceding argument. The passage is in fact completely 
extraneous to the argument.” Against this, Bos claims that at 781b1-4 Aristotle 
“emphatically reformulates his argument” and the passage as a whole is focused on 
the object just discussed, i.e. on conditions in which hearing is accurate and the purity 
of the αἰσθητήριον. Bos proved earlier in his paper that the  αἰσθητήριον should not 
be confused with the ear nor with the external air that enters into the ear and reaches 
the membrane, but with the sense of hearing which is made of “innate air” and goes 
from the heart to the ear.244   If Peck were right and the previous and following 
discussion in the passage were about the external sense-organ, I think it would be an 
exaggeration to claim that a digression about the inner process of hearing would be 
“completely extraneous to the argument.”  
 
The second argument is that “The reference to De sensu at 781a21 is incorrect […] 
There is no such clear statement in De sensu; at 439a1 the αἰσθητήριον of touch and 
                                                 
243 Bos 2010, 182-183. 
244 781a23–4; Sens. 438b20 and De anim. 420a4–7.  
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taste is said to be πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ, but nothing is said to suggest that sight and smell 
have any further connexion beyond their connexion with the brain.”245 Bos replies 
saying that Peck, as well as Ross, interprets De sensu 2 erroneously. Bos points that in 
that work at 438b8–10 we read: οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἐσχάτου τοῦ ὄμματος ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς 
τὸ αἰσθητικόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐντός.  In Bos’s view, according to Ross in this 
passage it is said that the soul is located “on the inside of the eye.” In doing so, Bos 
says that Ross goes against such an important ancient commentator as Alexander 
(although no reference is given) and that the passage does not say that the soul is “on 
the inside of the eye” but, he argues, is “inside the living creature, i.e. in the centre of 
the living creature, where he constantly situates the soul, including the sensitive soul”. 
I am not convinced that ἐντός refers to the inside of the living being. The context seems 
to suggest that Aristotle refers to the interior of the eye, since before and after 438b8-
9 he talks about the interior of the eye being made of water. Nonetheless, Bos has 
another argument against this second objection of Peck’s. In Parts of animals 656a29, 
Pecks acknowledges, there is a correct reference to De sensu: “The correct view, that 
the ἀρχή of the senses is the region around the heart, has already been defined in the 
treatise Of Sensation, where also I show why it is that two of the senses, touch and 
taste, are evidently (φανερῶν) connected to the heart”. Bos says that in that passage 
there is nothing to deny that hearing and smelling are not also connected to the heart. 
In De Sensu the only reference to the connection between the senses and the heart is 
at 439a1 where it is said that the senses of touch and taste are closely related to the 
heart; while smell is related to the brain, due to the lightness of the heat that is proper 
to odors (438b25, 444a22). Thomas Aquinas discusses in his commentary on De sensu 
the apparent contradiction of two organs being the center of sense perception. He 
argues that the heart is the only center of sense perception and that the brain is only a 
subsidiary organ for sense perception.  In contrast to Peck, he saw in De sensu the 
connection between all the sense organs and the heart, declaring that “the sensitive 
power flows front the heart to the brain, and from there it proceeds to the organs of 
three senses, sight, hearing, and smell.”246 How Aquinas got such conclusion from De 
                                                 
245 According to Solmsen (1961, 558, n. 29) in De sensu “no physiological implementation of the 
statement is to be found”. This is true, but what is said in the passage is not that the whole mechanism 
is De sensu, but the connection between the senses and the heart.  
246 Sed a corde derivatur virtus sensitiva ad cerebrum, et exinde procedit ad organa trium sensuum, 
visus, auditus et odoratus. Sentencia De sensu, tr. 1 l. 5 n. 18. 
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sensu is not clear. The text as we know it does not make such a reference, so either 
Aquinas had another version or he is using material from another text to make an 
interpretation of De sensu.  
 
However, accepting that the reference to the De sensu in the passage of Generation of 
Animals is inaccurate is not enough to dismiss the passage as spurious. The description 
of the region of the heart as the centre of all sensation is found in other, well attested, 
parts of the Aristotelian corpus: “The sensory faculty, the motor faculty, and the 
nutritive faculty are all lodged in one and the same part of the body.” 247  More 
importantly, it is in the same Generation of animals that the passages that connect the 
sense organs to the heart are mentioned. At 743b36-744a5 we read: 
 
The sense organ of the eye is set upon certain passages, as are the other sense organs. 
Whereas those of touch and taste are simply the body itself or some part of the body 
of animals, those of smell and hearing are passages connecting with the external air 
and full themselves of innate breath; these passages end at the small vessels about the 
brain which run thither from the heart. 
 
There are other works where Aristotle refers imprecisely to his own discussions 
elsewhere. 248  This could result from a mistake by Aristotle or a problem of 
transmission of the text, and not necessarily because it correspond to the ideas of other 
author as Peck suggests.  These options do not rule out Peck’s argument but at least 
indicate others alternatives. 
 
The third argument of Peck’s is this: “The passage is concerned exclusively with that 
part of the mechanism of hearing which is internal, not with the superficial sense- 
organ, whereas the reason given for accuracy of hearing and smelling is concerned 
only with the superficial sense-organ (just as the similar argument for sight, which is 
referred to, is concerned only with the eye itself and the skin on it).” Bos’s response is 
his already mentioned view that Peck confused the αἰσθητήριον as the external organs, 
i.e. the ear, the nose, etc. with the proper organs of sense perception. Besides, accepting 
that the passage under dispute refers to the internal mechanism and the texts 
                                                 
247 Parts of animals 647a25-26. See also On sleep. 455b34-456a6. 
248 See French 2005, 70. 
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surrounding it to the accuracy of the external sense organs is not sufficient grounds to 
deny its authenticity. According to Peck, Aristotle’s original text only mentions the 
accuracy of the external sense organs, but even if this were true, it would not mean 
that he denies other internal conditions for the accuracy of sense perception, as in fact 
he does.249    
 
For his fourth point, Peck wrote: “The passage has nothing whatever to say about 
smell.” Bos agrees with this, but nonetheless thinks that “no doubt Aristotle assumed 
his hearers would understand that the hearing argument was applicable mutatis 
mutandis to smelling.”250 To this I only have to add, again, that from the omission of 
the sense of smell it does not logically follow that the passage was not written by 
Aristotle; it could be a mistake or, as Bos says, just taken for granted.  
 
Peck’s fifth argument is that the passage “concludes with a mere repetition of 781a18–
20, to the effect that accuracy depends upon the purity of the organ and its membrane, 
ignoring the whole of the intervening discussion about the internal mechanism.” To 
this, Bos replies that Aristotle “does in fact repeat” the argument but this is not a 
problem because he is not making a distinction, as Peck argues, between the internal 
mechanism and the αἰσθητήριον, which Peck, Bos says, “stubbornly identifies [… ] 
with the ear.”  
 
Even accepting Peck’s interpretation of αἰσθητήριον as the ear I think that in the 
conclusion of the passage Aristotle is not “ignoring the whole of the intervening 
discussion about the internal mechanism”. Aristotle does not need to repeat what he 
just said. As I see it, keeping Pecks’ αἰσθητήριον as the external sense organ, Aristotle 
first mentions that accuracy in hearing is due to an ear which has clear and pure inner 
air inside as well as a functional membrane. He goes on to explain why this is 
necessary, and the reason is that from the ear the sound needs to travel to the heart, the 
center of sense perception. If the air within the ear and the membrane are not clean, 
the heart would not receive the sound or would received distorted sound. Then, after 
                                                 
249 GA 667a14-15 and On memory 550a16-10. 
250  Bos 2010, 184. 
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explaining the inner process, he repeats what he was saying before the digression: that 
a pure organ of hearing and its membrane are necessary for the accuracy of hearing.  
 
Peck’s last point is that “the reference to a place where the connate pneuma causes ‘in 
some’ pulsation and ‘in others’ respiration and inspiration is, as Platt points out, 
meaningless, for no animal respires unless it has a heart.”251 Bos considers this as 
something “almost incredible for an expert like Peck” and simply points out that there 
are animals without respiratory systems that still have pulsation, giving as an example 
On breath 483a15 where he says a non-necessary conjunction of ‘pulsation’ and 
‘respiration’ is shown. There the text refers to the way pulsation occurs in embryos 
even without respiration, and earlier at 483a1 the author of On breath says explicitly 
that “the pulse has no connexion with the respiration”.  However, the reference to a 
spurious treatise such as On breath is problematic, so I think it is better to refer to 
Generation of animals 742a5 where we can also infer that animals first have a pulse 
and only at the later stage of gestation can they breath. Another option is to refer to 
Parts of animal 659b13 where we are told that there are animals that do not breathe 
but nonetheless have an organ analogous to the heart that can perform the same 
functions (681b14-682a8).  
 
So, summing up, Peck’s objections to the authenticity of the passage can be 
successfully countered, and we can consider it as part of Aristotle’s explanation of the 
process of hearing. Furthermore, the premise that sense perception, and particularly 
hearing, has an impact on the heart is confirmed in On memory. There, as in the 
passage of Generation of animals – although worded differently – the idea of sense 
perception making a physical stamp of the object perceived is repeated. Thus, when 
Aristotle asks how memory works, he says: 
 
One might ask how it is possible that though the affection is present, and the fact 
absent, the latter –that which is not present– is remembered. It is clear that we must 
conceive that which is generated through sense perception in the soul, and in the part 
of the body which it its seat, –viz. that affection the state whereof we call memory– to 
                                                 
251 Peck 1943, 564. 
 
 118 
be some such thing as a picture. The process of movement stamps in, as it were, a sort 
of impression of the percept, just as persons do who make an impression with a seal.252  
 
 
The physical impression that sense perception creates is confirmed again when 
Aristotle says that in “those who are strongly moved […] no memory is formed” (On 
memory 450b2). A physical condition of the heart is required; it needs to stay still to 
receive the impressions. This interpretation finds further support in Parts of animals 
667a14-15 where Aristotle says: “in animals of low sensibility the heart is hard and 
dense in texture, while it is softer in such as are endowed with keener feeling.”253 Why 
would there be a difference in the quality of perception depending on the softness or 
hardness of the heart? My answer is that the heart receives physically the impressions 
from the sense organs. Again, in On memory, Aristotle states that the affection of 
recollection254 “is a searching for an image in a corporeal substrate.” This is proven, 
he says, because those who cannot recollect suffer pain, which is still present even 
when they have desisted to recollect. It is like throwing a stone, he says, that cannot 
be stopped once thrown. Similarly, Aristotle adds, those experiencing anger and fear 
have inner motions that, even though the person “set up counter motions”, are still 
present “in the same direction as at first”. This, I interpret, is a sort of physical inertia 
that causes motions in the region of the heart. Aristotle seems to be saying that once 
an emotion stirs us it is difficult to stop the original impulse.  Interestingly for the case 
of music, Aristotle suggests that something similar occurs when we repeat a song 
constantly: “This affection is like that which occurs in the case of names, tunes and 
sayings, when any of them has been very much on our lips; for even though we give 
up the habit and do not mean to yield to it, we find ourselves continually singing or 
saying the familiar sounds.” 255  Following what he says it seems that there is a 
movement in the region of the heart that is the consequence of the involuntary singing.  
                                                 
252 ἀπορήσειε δ᾿ ἄν τις πῶς ποτὲ τοῦ μὲν πάθους παρόντος τοῦ δὲ πράγματος ἀπόντος μνημονεύεται τὸ 
μὴ παρόν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι δεῖ νοῆσαι τοιοῦτον τὸ γινόμενον διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ 
τοῦ σώματος τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν, οἷον ζωγράφημά τι τὸ πάθος, οὗ φαμὲν τὴν ἕξιν μνήμην εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ 
γινομένη κίνησις ἐνσημαίνεται οἷον τύπον τινὰ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, καθάπερ οἱ σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς 
δακτυλίοις. On memory 450a26-b1. Cf. De anima 424a17-24. 
253 Cf. Theaetetus 191c9-d1. 
254 Recollection (ἀνάμνησις), as opposed to memory, is only available to humans. It is, Aristotle says, 
a sort of “investigation” about the past which is deliberative (βουλευτικός), for deliberation too is a 
form of inference (καὶ γὰρ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι συλλογισμός τίς ἐστιν). On memory 453a12-14. 
255 καὶ ἔοικε τὸ πάθος τοῖς γένηταί τι αὐτῶν σφόδρα· παυσαμένοις γὰρ καὶ οὐ βουλομένοις ἐπέρχεται 
πάλιν ᾄδειν ἢ λέγειν. On memory 453a29-32. 
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We need to consider the physical motions of sense perception and that, those motions, 
in turn, resemble the sensible object that caused them (ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ 
τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει  De anim. 
428b13-14). 
  
Moreover, in On dreams there is further evidence of the physical impact of sense 
perception on the heart. We are told there that each particular sense organ produces a 
motion leaving images and residual movements (τὰ φαντάσματα καὶ αἱ ὑπόλοιποι 
κινήσεις 461a18-19) on the heart. Those affections are the material from where dreams 
are made and are literally “preserved movements” in the heart originated by sense 
perception (σωζομένη τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἡ κίνησις ἀφ᾿ ἑκάστου τῶν αἰσθητηρίων 
ἐρρωμένα τε ποιεῖ τὰ ἐνύπνια 461a27-28). How is the physical impact of sound 
preserved in the heart? We do not know. It is certainly difficult to imagine the heart 
conserving different vibrations on it. However, despite the difficulty of conceiving it, 
all the evidence collected here suggests that for Aristotle the heart was physically 
altered by the impact of sound.   
 
Now, there is still one objection to the account of hearing in the passage of Generation 
of Animals 781a20-35. The passage is certainly complex, not only because of the 
lacunas but also because of Aristotle’s confusing description of the blood vessels.  
Michael Frampton has studied the physiology Aristotle offers in this passage and has 
pointed out the contradictions. With respect to the idea of a  “pneumatological 
continuum” and the “channels or vessels” through which sense perception supposedly 
travels from the outside to the heart he thinks that is the work of “subsequent thinkers 
who sought to salvage Aristotle's still incomplete cardiocentric framework.”256 One 
inconsistency in Aristotle’s account is the poor description of the channels connecting 
the organs of the five senses with the heart. He describes a vague vascular system but 
not a pneumatological one. If the only channels available in his system are filled with 
blood then it would be difficult to show how sensation would be transmitted. As 
Frampton notes, “blood is neither continuous (οὐ συνεχές) nor united by growth (οὐδἐ 
                                                 
256 Frampton 2008, 122.  
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συμπεφυκός) with the flesh but simply lies in its receptacle, that is, in the heart and 
blood-vessels.” 257  However, elsewhere Aristotle says that blood is essential for 
sensation (PA 648a2). Accepting that Aristotle may face technical difficulties in 
explaining how the connection is made, there is no reason to doubt that its existence 
is a part of his theory. Moreover, I think that the omission of the description of channels 
connecting the air from the inside to the world outside is not good enough reason to 
deny its existence. Also, there is nothing in the text that contradicts other ideas of 
Aristotle’s, and more importantly, in the same Generation of animals (743b36-744a5) 
the vessels connecting the senses of hearing are mentioned. Even if the existence of 
pneumatic channels is denied, it could be argued that blood, although non-sentient by 
itself, is essential for sensation (PA 648a2) and with respect to hearing, it could be the 
receptacle of the vibrations received from the ear and then carried to the heart, for 
“blood palpitates in the veins” (σφύζει δὲ τὸ αἷμα ἐν ταῖς φλεψὶν, HA 521a6). 
 
Thus, again, the passage should be considered authentic, and Peck’s claim that the 
passage is not original or similarly that of Solmsen that the passage “gives us glimpses 
of new developments in the pneuma-doctrine,”258 should be rejected, considering also 
that the pneuma doctrine, or at least some early view according to which the inner air 
is responsible for sense perception, was already present before Aristotle. 
 
Another reason to believe in the authenticity of the Aristotelian doctrine of the impact 
of sound on the heart can be found in the Problemata, whose author points out this 
connection: 
 
Why do those who hesitate in their speech become worse when they are nervous, but 
better under the influence of drunkenness? Is it because their condition is a state 
resembling apoplexy of some interior part of the body which they cannot move and 
which by its coldness hinders their speech? Wine then, being naturally hot, tends to 
get rid of the coldness, but nervousness creates coldness; for it is a form of fear, and 
fear is a chilling condition.259  
 
                                                 
257 PA 350b3-8. 
258 Solmsen 1961, 175. 
259 Problemata (XI, 36): Cf. Problemata XI, questions 53 and 60. 
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This passage shows that not only was Aristotle aware of this connection, but there was 
awareness also in his school of the bodily states and their relationship with emotions. 
Fear, for example, is in part the result of coldness in the heart. The nervous voice, 
which is a voice in some state of fear, results also from coldness in the heart.  Aristotle 
himself confirms this: in a passage from the Generation of animals it is said that the 
hearts of the bulls are sinewy “and therefore that part by which they set the air in 
motion is in a tense state, like a sinewy string stretched tight.”260 In this case, the air is 
moved upwards from the region of the heart to the mouth and not from the ears to the 
heart, but it helps to show that the presence of air in that region is not absent in 
Aristotle’s works.261 Moreover, in the History of Animals 492a20 Aristotle describes 
the ear as being connected with the palate (στόματος οὐρανόν).262 Thus, although 
scattered across several works in the corpus, Aristotle has all the elements that are 
required for the reconstruction of the channels connecting the vibrating sound in the 
air – through the ears – to the heart. In any event, the idea of a continuous transmission 
of sound waves from the ear to the inner organs was not unknown in Aristotle’s time. 
For example, in Plato (Timaeus 67a7-c1)263 and Hippocrates264 we find very similar 
accounts.  
                                                 
260 GA 787b10-16. 
261See also De Anima 420b26-29: “Respiration is also needed primarily for the region about heart. 
Hence, as we draw breath, the air enters: and so the impact upon the windpipe, as it is called, of the air 
breathed is voice, the cause of the impact being the soul which animates the vocal organs”; see also PA 
669a14. 
262 Probably he refers here to the Eustachian tube.  
263 “In general, let us take it that sound is the percussion of air by way of the ears upon the brain and the 
blood and transmitted to the soul, and that hearing is the motion caused by the percussion that begins 
in the head and ends in the place where the liver is situated. And let us take it that whenever the 
percussion is rapid, the sound is high-pitched, and that the slower percussion, the lower pitch. A regular 
percussion produces a uniform smooth sound, while a contrary one produces one that is rough. A 
forceful percussion produces a loud sound, while a contrary one produces one that is soft”. Timaeus 
67a7-c1. For a detailed analysis of the mechanism of hearing in this passage in Timaeus see Barker 
2000. Onians 1954, 66-72 gives a very good account of authors before Aristotle that hold that the sound 
travels through the ears to the inner organs, particular the φρήν (sometimes midriff, others lungs). 
Onians wrote: “There are many states that the words of a speaker are ‘put into the φρένες’ of the hearer 
(Il. I, 474) […] Clearest of all, though it has not excited notice, is the account of how Odysseus hears 
Nestor calling to wake him. ‘Quickly the sound (or blast, breath, ἰωή, used of wind) came about inside 
his φρένες and he went forth from the hunt’ (Il. IV, 276).  
264  “Of the following things, the mixture is not the cause, e.g. irascibility, indolence, craftiness, 
simplicity, quarrelsomeness and benevolence. Of all such things the nature of the passages through 
which the soul moves is the cause. People’s mental activity is determined by the kind of vessels through 
which soul moves or against which it collides or with which ones it mixes. This is why it is not possible 
to change such things through regimen, for it is impossible to change invisible nature. Likewise, what 




Aristotle’s theory of hearing and the role of the impact of air on the sense organ draws 
on earlier sources.265 Very important to this tradition is a passage in the Laws at 790d-
791b where Plato mentions how young children's nurses and women who cure the 
frenzy of the Korybantes use music to calm children and patients respectively. Plato 
says in the voice of the Athenian: “the cure consists in a movement, to the rhythms of 
dance and song; the mother makes her child ‘pipe down’ just as surely the music of 
the pipes bewitches the frenzied Bacchic reveler”. To the question of Clinias about 
how this occurs, the Athenian replies: 
 
 Both these affections are forms of fear; and frights are due to a poor condition of soul. 
So whenever one applies an external shaking to affections of this kind, the external 
motion thus applied overpowers the internal motion of fear and frenzy, and by thus 
overpowering it, it brings about a manifest calm in the soul and a cessation of the 
grievous palpitation of the heart which had existed in each case. Thus it produces very 
satisfactory results. The children it puts to sleep; the Bacchants, who are awake, it brings 
into a sound state of mind instead of a frenzied condition, by means of dancing and 
playing. 
 
The internal motion of fear and frenzy seems to allude to bodily elements. Aristotle, 
we have seen, also describes fear in material terms as a bodily condition, i.e. coldness 
in the heart. That bodily condition is not, however, enough to explain the whole of the 
emotion, it is only one aspect of it. The cognitive aspect of fear that Aristotle presents 
is absent here. Music then has an influence on the listener altering the body, not 
providing the object of the emotion. What music does here is diminish or increase 
certain bodily conditions. 
 
In relation to the Laws passage, Richard Sorabji266 reminds us of Plato’s account of 
sensations (aisthêseis) as a “movement in the soul via the body”. Sound is described 
as a shock (plêgê) in the air which travels from the ears to the brain and from there to 
the seat of the liver, which, as noted by Moss, is the receptacle of images and phantoms 
                                                 
vessels through which the air moves and the things which it collides. And this (the voice) one can make 
worse or better, since one can make the passages of breath smoother or rougher, but the above is 
impossible to change by regimen”.  Hippocrates, On regimen I, 36 (Joly, p. 156, 23-32). 
265 Anaxagoras DK 52,7, Diogenes of Apollonia DK 64a19, Empedocles DK 406, 501, Plato Tim. 67a7-
c1, Theoprastus De sens. 9. Apart from Plato, I took this references from Beare 1906. 
266 Sorabji 2002, 86. 
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and is related to the emotions.267 According to Sorabji, there is a kinship between the 
motions of the music and some motions in the soul. Posidonius, who used Plato as a 
model, later defended this theory. Galen reports: 
 
Why was it for heaven's sake—I shall put this question too to the followers of 
Chrysippus—that when Damon the musician came up to a woman playing the Greek 
oboe (aulein aulētris) in the Phrygian mode to some young men who were drunk and 
doing frantic things and ordered her to play in the Dorian mode they immediately 
stopped their frenzied antics? For surely they are not taught to revise the beliefs of the 
rational element by the oboe music. Rather they are aroused (epegeiresthai) or calmed 
in respect of the emotional element of the soul which is irrational through irrational 
movements. For help or harm comes to the irrational through irrational things and to the 
rational through knowledge or ignorance. (trans. Sorabji)268 
 
 
Sorabji thinks that the “soul movements in Posidonius are literally spatial movements 
of the soul, since this is what they are in Chrysippus and in Plato.”269 In contrast, for 
Aristotle “such spatial movement of the soul would be unthinkable,”270 especially 
considering De anima I, 3 
 
According to Aristotle, beyond the specific organs for each sense, it is the heart where 
sense perception takes place properly speaking. The heart senses the vibrations, shapes 
or whatever the affection the air receives (which, in fact fact do not really matter for 
my purposes)271  
 
Whatever physiological change is produced by listening, the important thing to 
consider here is that for Aristotle sense perception – as well as emotion – was always 
accompanied by bodily changes. Any explanation that pretends to give an account of 
Aristotle’s thought on the emotional effects of music must consider what occurs at a 
physiological level.  
 
Now we know that the physical impacts of the airwaves in the inner ear are 
transformed by the hair cells in the auditory system into electric signals processed 
                                                 
267 Timaeus 71b-d 
268 Galen PHP 5. 6. 21-2, p. 330 de Lacy. Quoted by Sorabji 2002, 86. 
269 Sorabji 2002, 116. 
270 Ibid. 117 
271 For a discussion about Aristotle on sound see Johnstone 2003. 
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latter by the brain. Nonetheless, what is important here is not the inaccurate and 
rudimentary account of the inner process of hearing provided by Aristotle but the 
emphasis on the participation of the body in the process of hearing and, as already 
could be inferred, also on the process of the “emotional” response to music.  
 
The movements of the heart have a direct impact on the rest of the body and soul. The 
physiological changes in the physiognomy, i.e. signs of emotional states (Pol. 
1340a34), have their origin in temperature changes in the heart. Even a change in the 
imperceptible part of the heart produces a change:  
 
Sensations are obviously a form of change of quality, and imagination and thinking have 
the same power as the objects. For in a measure the form conceived be it of [the hot or 
cold or of]272 the pleasant or fearful is like what the actual objects would be, and so we 
shudder and are frightened merely by thinking (φρίττουσι καἰ φοβοῦνται νοήσαντες 
μόνον). Now all these affections are actually changes of quality, and with those changes 
some parts of the body enlarge, others grow smaller. And it is not hard to see that a small 
change occurring at the center makes great and numerous changes at the circumference, 
just as by shifting the rudder a hair’s breath you get a wide deviation at the prow. And, 
further when by reason of heat or cold or some kindred affection a change is set up in 
the region of the heart, even in an imperceptibly small part of the heart, it produces a 
vast difference in the body, blushing, let us say, or turning white, and tremblings and 
shivers and their opposites.  (Movement of Animals 701b16-33, trans. Farquherson). 
 
Music, in Aristotle’s account of hearing presented earlier, reaches the heart with tense 
or relaxed melodies and fast or slow rhythms,  thus altering one element of the 
emotions, i.e. the heart. This motion may produce physiological alterations that seem 
to be emotional reactions but they are just bodily symptoms of emotions, not emotions 
properly speaking with their respective intentional objects.273  
                                                 
272 Secluded by Nussbaum 1978. 
273 The relation between body and sound is reciprocal. Music changes the body and so predisposes 
the listener to different emotions but also the body of the subject may change the music.  In the 
Pseudo-Aristotelian De Audibilibus (803a24-31) we read how the sound of the salpinx, and so its 
character, is changed by the mood of the player: “In the case of the salpinx; when they are 
revelling (κωμάζωσιν), men relax the pressure of breath in the salpinx in order to make the sound 
as soft as possible. The point can also be illustrated from musical instruments; as has been stated, 
the sounds produced by tightly stretched strings are hard, as are the notes of horns which have 
been well baked. If one touches the strings violently instead of softly with the hand, they 
necessarily respond with more violent sounds.” In Generation of animals it is also pointed that 
there is a relation between the sound produced and the tension/relaxation of the body: “The 
strength in all animals is in their sinews, and so those in the prime of life are stronger, the young 
being weaker in the joints and sinews; moreover, in the young they are not yet tense, and in those 
now growing old tension relaxes; hence both these ages are weak and powerless of movement 
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Many modern interpreters (Butcher, Simpson, Ford, Halliwell and Walker) have tried 
to explain the effect of music according to Aristotle, making a connection between 
“movements of the soul” and the movements of music, but they leave it as a mere 
speculation. The idea is certainly suggestive and, if we trust the reference made by 
Athenaeus, it was already present in Damon, one of the originators of a theory of music 
and education to whom Plato and Aristotle refer as an authority. Athenaeus wrote: “It 
is well said by the school of Damon the Athenian that songs and dances are the 
inevitable result of a certain kind of motion in the soul: those souls that are beautiful 
and characteristic of free men create songs and dances of the same kind, while the 
opposite sort create the opposite” (Deipnosphistae 628c).  Butcher thought that for 
Aristotle the explanation of the musical effect was also a resemblance between certain 
“motions of the soul” and motions of the music. In his work Aristotle’s Theory of 
Poetry and Fine Arts he wrote: 
 
Though we may not be able entirely to comprehend the Greek point of view as to the moral 
import of music, we must bear in mind that the dominant element in Greek music was the 
rhythm; the spirit and meaning of any given composition was felt to reside especially here; 
and the doctrine which asserted the unique imitative capacity of music had for Aristotle 
its theoretic basis in this, that the external movements of rhythmical sound bear a close 
resemblance to the movements of the soul. Each single note is felt as an inward agitation. 
The regular succession of musical sounds, governed by the laws of melody and rhythm, 
are allied to those praxeis or outwards activities which are the expression of metal state.274   
 
Butcher does not explain anything about the “inward agitation” that music produces, 
nor what he means by the “movements of the soul”. Others have tried to explain the 
connections between mental states produced by music and bodily changes. With 
respect to how music “moves the soul”, Ford (2004,324, n.48) says that “Aristotle does 
not give enough information for us to decide how he saw this working” but he 
speculates that “perhaps he traced it to a kinship between musical psychological 
                                                 
[…] Bulls are particularly sinewy, even their hearts, and therefore that part by which they set the 
air in motion is in a tense (σύντονον) state, like a sinewy string stretched tight.” GA 787b10-16.  
After Aristotle Theophrastus also wrote about the production of sound and motions in the soul: 
“For the movement productive of melody, when it occurs in the soul, is very accurate, when it 
(the soul) wishes to express it (the movement) with the voice. It (the soul) turns it (the voice), and 
turns it just as it wishes, to the extent that it is able to turn that which is non-rational.” (Trans 
Barker, as amended, page 61.25–62 Düring = FHS &G 716). 
274 Butcher 1951,125. 
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‘movements’ (kinêsis as changes in states over time)”. This is something more 
concrete than Butcher’s “movements of the soul” but Ford’s point is only a footnote 
and he does not further explore the “psychological movements” he refers to. Simpson 
talks about “motions in the soul”: 
 
One might also note that music is a motion, something that Aristotle mentions in the case 
of rhythm, and that passions and actions too are motions. Music is, of course, a motion in 
sounds while passions are motions in the soul, but one motion can properly be said to be 
“like” another motion (while a shape or color cannot be); and since it is manifest that the 
motions of some music excite motions in the soul ... it is perhaps not unreasonable to say 
that the musical motions contain “likenesses” of the motions they excite.275 
 
    And in the same line Halliwell: 
The mimesis entails something like a kinetic or dynamic correspondence between the use 
of rhythms, tunings and melodies on the one hand, and the psychological states and 
feelings belonging to qualities of ‘character’ on the other: the music ‘moves’ emotionally, 
and we ‘move’ with it.276 
 
Halliwell does not mention “motions of the soul”; rather he refers to “psychological 
states” and to how “music ‘moves’ emotionally.”  I do not object the correspondence 
between the kinesis of music and the “psychological states,” but I would emphasise 
that those kinetic properties and psychological states are connected through a physical 
impact of the sound of music on the body. This must be so if we want to keep Aristotle 
consistent. Sense perception, as well as emotions, are always accompanied by bodily 
changes. I disagree, however, with the idea that music moves emotionally, since its 
only produces an objectless state.  
 
More interesting is the account of Jeffrey Walker: 
 
Angry music would create a corresponding ‘motion’ in the soul of the hearer and in 
consequence would ‘stir up’ the bodily state of anger, especially in a person whose bodily 
nature was inclined to greater average ‘heat around the heart’; and at that point the hearer 
would in fact be angry, albeit groundlessly. [However] blood boiling around the heart 
without any accompanying perception of ‘insult’ is not yet ‘anger’ but only a diffuse, a 
choleric temper perhaps, a readiness to be provoked to anger by the first plausible (or even 
implausible) provocation that comes along.277 
 
 
                                                 
275 Simpson 1998, 272. 
276 Haliwell 2002, 245. 
277 Walker 2000a, 78-79. 
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I think that although Walker does not offer an explanation as to how music reaches 
and alters the heart, and also despite the fact he does not address the textual problems 
in Politics where allegedly instrumental music causes specific emotions, he is more 
accurate than the other authors examined in this account of the impact of music on the 
listener. I hold a very similar view but I do not think that a particular type of music 
would produce a specific bodily condition that matches an emotion. In what follows, 
I will show that what Aristotle says is that the different modes are characterized by 
tense and relaxed motions caused by fast and slow impacts in the production of sound. 
These motions of air produce different general bodily states of relaxation and tension 
in the heart which in turn produce psychological states of calm and excitement 
respectively. He does not say that a particular mode produces a specific emotion.    
 
We need to consider that music and sound are movements of two different types. 
Sound is the movement of air while music is some sort of movement in the “aural 
space.” Aristoxenus was the first to point out this distinction, talking about the “region 
of the voice”. Aristoxenus explains that the voice travels with respect to space (topos) 
in two ways: in singing and in speech. In the former, Aristoxenus talks about an 
intervallic voice since it takes long intervals resting in one pitch before moving to 
another note. When we sing, the voice becomes stationary at some point and takes an 
interval from there to another position where it also remains still for a while. In the 
latter case the opposite occurs. When we talk, the voice is called continuous and so 
remains changing without rest: “it seems to sense perception to traverse a space (topos) 
in such a way as never to stand still […] at least so far as its representation in sense 
perception is concerned” (El. Harm. 8.13ff, trans. Barker). A little latter he reiterates 
that “each of these descriptions is to be understood with respect to sense perception”, 
and adds: “Whether it is possible or impossible for the voice to move and then to come 
to rest upon a single pitch, is a question belonging to a different enquiry, and for the 
purposes of the present science an account of the motion involved in each of these is 
unnecessary.” Aristoxenus’ approach is based on sense perception; he does not deny 
that there are other disciplines that take care of the motions of music in other senses 
but what concerns him is the perception of motion in the listener. A similar approach 
is probably found in the Aristotelian Problems, particularly in XIX, 27: 
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Why is it that of all things which are perceived by the senses that which is heard alone 
possesses character? For music, even if it is unaccompanied by words, yet has character; 
whereas a colour and an odour and a savour have not. Is it because that which is heard 
alone has movement (κίνησις), not, however, the movement in us to which the sound gives 
rise (for such movement exists also in the other things which affect our senses, for colour 
also moves our sight), but we perceive the movement which follows such and such a 
sound? This movement resembles character both in the rhythms and in the melodic 
disposition of the high and low notes, but not in their commingling; for symphony does 
possess character. This does not occur in the other objects of sense-perception. Now these 
movements are connected with action, and actions are indicative of character (919b26-
36). 
 
It seems that the author of this passage distinguishes the physical motion that occurs 
in sense organs from the perception of the listener of movement from one sound to 
another. Andrew Barker also suggests this and connects this passage with Aristoxenus 
El. Harm.3.5 ff.278 A little latter, in XIX, 29 the reference to movements appears 
unexplained: 
 
Why do rhythms and melodies, which after all are only voice, resemble character, whereas 
savours do not, nor yet colours and odours? It is because they are movements, as actions 
also are? Now activity possesses and instills character, but savours and colours have no 
similar effects. (920a3-6). 
 
Aristotle did not approach the matter in the same way as Aristoxenus. For Aristotle, 
the emphasis is on the physical movements sound produces in the listener. 
 
In the text B from Politics (1340a38-b10) discussed above, the most clear allusion to 
music as motion is in the reference to rhythm:  some rhythms, Aristotle says, have a 
character of rest and other of motion, and some of the latter are vulgar and others 
nobler. The ἁρμονίαι, he says, work on the same principles: some are relaxed and 
others enthusiastic. This passage, I think, contains the core of what Aristotle thought 
was the “emotional” power of instrumental music. In brief, what he presents here is a 
dual polarity that equates psychic activity with sounds. In terms of sound, instrumental 
music can be placed between two extremes. Following the principle of the ‘mean’ 
explained in the Nicomachean Ethics, we could say that “musical virtue” is somewhere 
in-between the extremes. Thus, Dorian is the mean between the relaxed and the 
                                                 
278 Barker1984, 197, n. 53. 
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enthusiastic modes; it is the best one because it is the only one to produce a moderate 
and settled temper279 and because “in all things the mean is praiseworthy, and the 
extremes neither praiseworthy nor right, but worthy of blame” (NE 1108a15-16). 
Accordingly: “All men agree that the Dorian is gravest and manliest. And whereas we 
say that the extremes should be avoided and the mean followed, and whereas the 
Dorian is a mean between the other modes, it is evident that our youth should be taught 
the Dorian music.”280 Relaxed modes are equated with the states of low activity while 
the Phrygian, at the other extreme, is enthusiastic and full of energy. The states that 
these different modes and rhythms could arouse in the listener are not emotions in the 
proper sense.  Being ὀδυρτικός (querulous),281 one of the effects of listening to the 
                                                 
279 However in Pol. 1290a12-39:  “There are generally thought to be two principal forms as men say of 
the winds that there are but two north and south and that the rest of them are only variations of these so 
of governments there are said to be only two forms democracy and oligarchy. For aristocracy is 
considered to be a kind of oligarchy, as being the rule of a few, and the so-called constitutional 
government to be really a democracy, just as among the winds we make the west a variation of the 
north, and the east of the south wind. Similarly of musical modes there are said to be two kinds, the 
Dorian and the Phrygian; the other arrangements of the scale are comprehended under one or other of 
these two. About forms of government this is a very favorite notion. But in either case the better and 
more exact way is to distinguish as I have done the one or two which are true forms and to regard the 
others as perversions whether of the most perfectly attempered mode or of the best form of government 
we may compare the severer and more overpowering modes to the oligarchical forms and the more 
relaxed and gentler ones to the democratic (ὀλιγαρχικὰς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας, 
τὰς δ’ ἀνειμένας καὶ μαλακὰς δημοτικάς)”. The reason to oppose the Dorian mode to the Phrygian 
rather than present it as a intermediate between the Phrygian and a relaxed mode can be explained 
following NE 1108b35-1109a19: “To the mean in some cases the deficiency, in some the excess is more 
opposed; e.g. it is not rashness, which is an excess, but cowardice, which is a deficiency, that is more 
opposed to courage, and not insensibility, which is a deficiency, but self-indulgence, which is an excess, 
that is more opposed to temperance. This happens from two reasons, one being drawn from the thing 
itself; for because one extreme is nearer and liker to the intermediate, we oppose not this but rather its 
contrary to the intermediate. E.g. since rashness is thought liker and nearer to courage, and cowardice 
more unlike, we oppose rather the latter to courage; for things that are further from the intermediate are 
thought more contrary to it. This, then, is one cause, drawn from the thing itself; another is drawn from 
ourselves; for the things to which we ourselves more naturally tend seem more contrary to the 
intermediate. For instance, we ourselves tend more naturally to pleasures, and hence are more easily 
carried away towards self-indulgence than towards propriety. We describe as contrary to the mean, then, 
rather the directions in which we more often go to great lengths; and therefore self-indulgence, which 
is an excess, is the more contrary to temperance”. This also explains a passage in GA786b34-78: “it 
seems that the low voice is a sign of a nobler nature, and in vocal compositions low pitch is better that 
the high pitched (σύντονα) ones.”  
280 Pol. 1342b13-16 : περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὔσης καὶ μάλιστα 
ἦθος ἐχούσης ἀνδρεῖον. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν τῶν ὑπερβολῶν ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ χρῆναι διώκειν φαμέν, 
ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἁρμονίας φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ Δώρια μέλη πρέπει 
παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις. In Generation of animals 786b7-9 we read: “As to the voice, it is 
deep in some animals, high in others, in others again in due proportion between both extremes.” (Περὶ 
δὲ φωνῆς, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρύφωνα τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶ τὰ δ’ ὀξύφωνα, τὰ δ’ εὔτονα καὶ πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας ἔχοντα 
τὰς ὑπερβολὰς συμμέτρως).  
281 ὀδυρτικοί εἰσι, καὶ οὐκ εὐτράπελοι οὐδὲ φιλογέλοιοι· ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ ὀδυρτικὸν τῷ φιλογέλωτι. 
Rhet. 1390a21-23.  
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Mixolydian mode is a condition closer to a mood rather than an emotion; a general 
psychological state without a particular object instead of a definite emotion with its 
correspondent intentional object. Thus, in Rhetoric we read that “[Old men] are 
querulous and not disposed to jesting or laughter, the love of laughter being the very 
opposite of querulousness”.  Being not disposed to laughter is not a mental state with 
a particular object and the same is true of the inverse; being disposed to laughter does 
not involves any particular belief in the agent, nor a particular judgment. This is why 
I think the disposition of being querulous can be caused by the effect of instrumental 
music. The impact of sound and music causes bodily changes – and contrary to the 
emotions – it does so without any necessary judgment involved. Therefore, the 
condition of being querulous generates a predisposition towards objects potentially 
presented to the mind but is not a belief about something.  
 
The same is true of being “anxious” (συνεστηκότως): it is a state that does not involve 
any opinion, does not require a “reason” and so, following the author of Problems, we 
could call it at most a superficial affection (ἐπιπόλαια πάθη) (954b15-19).282 Besides, 
none of the states mentioned in this passage are mentioned in any of the “lists” of the 
emotions that we find in other works like the Rhetoric, the Nicomachean Ethic and De 
anima.  
 
The question about how this happened is, however, left unanswered in Politics. Is it 
the case that the relaxed modes were the opposite of the tense ones in a similar way to 
how the major and minor chords are opposites in our perception? Was it just a cultural 
convention or was it based on some natural element in the modes? It seems that 
Aristotle conceived some natural reasons to relate particular types of music with 
different characters. For example in Pol. 1342b20-22 it is said that due to their age old 
men cannot sing in the high-strung modes (τὰς συντόνους ἁρμονίας) and so the relaxed 
ones (τὰς ἀνειμένας) are suitable for them. This condition is something natural for the 
old age. In Rhetoric (1390a), for example, we read that old men are regarded as self-
                                                 
282 “We are often in a condition of feeling grief, though for what reason we are unable to say, and 
sometimes we are in a cheerful condition, but why is not clear”. Such affections and those called 
superficial come to be in everyone to small extent. (πολλάκις γὰρ οὕτως ἔχομεν ὥστε λυπεῖσθαι, ἐφ’ 
ὅτῳ δέ, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν· ὁτὲ δὲ εὐθύμως, ἐφ’ ᾧ δ’, οὐ δῆλον. τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα πάθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιπόλαια 
λεχθέντα κατὰ μέν τι μικρὸν πᾶσι γίνεται).  
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controlled because their desires have relaxed (ἐπιθυμίαι ἀνείκασι) and in a passage 
from Generation of Animals (787b10-16) already quoted we have seen that the joints 
and sinews of old people tend to relaxation, weakness and lack of motion. If this is so, 
the use of terms such as relaxed or tense in a musical context is a direct reference to 
the pitch of the modes. 
 
The question of the character of the harmoniai is a difficult one. It may appear a little 
reductionist to ascribe the fundamental difference between the moods produced by the 
harmoniai exclusively to the pitch and ignore the structural differences of the “scales”, 
but odd as this may appear there is enough evidence to suggest that a significant part 
of the musical ethos was based on pitch.283 If this is what Aristotle has in mind when 
he says “relaxed” modes, there should then be a relationship between the different 
types of physical motion of sound involved in different pitches and the effect on 
listeners. In fact, in De anima that is exactly what we found: 
Without sound we cannot distinguish high and low or acute and grave pitch. The latter 
terms are used by analogy from tangible objects. For the acute, that is the high, moves the 
sense much in a little time, while the grave or low note moves little in much time. Not that 
what is shrill is identically rapid nor that what is low is slow, but it is the rapidity, in the 
other the slowness, which makes the motion or sensation such as has been described. And 
it would seem that there is a certain analogy between the acute and grave to the ear and 
the acute and blunt to the touch. For that which is acute or pointed, as it were, stabs, while 
the blunt, as it were, thrusts, because the ones excites motion in a short, the other slow 
(De anima 420a30-420b4).  
 
For Aristotle, sound is always the result of a physical impact of something on 
something and in something (ἀεί τινος πρός τι καὶ ἔν τινι, 419b10), and that impact 
“does not occur without spatial motion”(πληγὴ δ’ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φορᾶς, 419b13). 
                                                 
283  “Clearly a ‘tense’ mode involved more high notes and was taxing for that reason. It was not 
necessarily higher pitch overall than a slack mode. It might be that both occupied the range d-d’, for 
example, but that in the tense mode the melody moved more in the upper part of that octave, in the slack 
one more in the lower”. (West 1992, 179).  Barker (1989a,164) wrote about the distinction of the 
harmoniai according to pitch: “There is quite good evidence, admittedly, from several periods, that each 
harmonia was in practice associated with a particular range of pitch, some being thought as “high”, 
others as “low” (e.g. Pratinas ap. Ath. 624f, cf. Lasus, quoted immediately before, at 624e; Heraclides 
ap. Ath. 625d; Ar. Pol. 1342b20ff; ps. Plut. 1136c); and this is fact no doubt helped to give them the 
different perceived characters to which our sources refer. But the earliest technical analyses about which 
we have any information pay small attention to this phenomenon, and specify the harmoniai almost 
exclusively by the different interval-structures that they exhibited. (See especially Arist. Quint. 15.10-
20, 18.5-19.10, Aristox. El. Harm. 2.22-5, cf. Cleonides 197.4-199.3, Bacch. 303.5-27, 308.17-309.12).  
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The sense organ receives this physical impact which is differentiated depending on 
whether it is fast or slow, i.e. high or low pitched.  
 
The author of the Problems also acknowledges the relationship between the pitch and 
the physical motion of a sound saying that “the low note is soft and tranquil, and the 
high note full of movement” (Problems XIX, 49, 922b31-32).  
And also an idea in the same direction is found in a later source. In Ptolemy we read: 
The same melody has an activating effect in the higher keys, and a depressing one in the 
lower keys, because a high pitch stretches the soul, while a low pitch slackens it. Therefore 
the keys in the middle near the Dorian can be compared with well-ordered and stable states 
of the soul, the higher keys near the Mixolydian with the stirred and stimulated states, and 
lower keys near to the Hypodorian with the slack and feeble moods (Harm. 2:7:58 and 
3:7:99, trans. Sachs).  
 
Ptolemy is certainly a late source far away from Aristotle. However, Ptolemy’s idea 
of music relaxing and tensing the soul depending on the pitch finds its parallel in the 
reconstruction I have offered of Aristotle’s account of the effects of hearing music, i.e. 
an impact of sound that alters the heart, relaxing or tensing it according to the pitch of 
the music.  
 
The equation between the high pitch and excitement is not completely clear. The 
Mixolydian was associated with high pitch in terms of sound (Bacch. 303.7) and with 
lamentation in terms of the psychological effect that it could produce (Rep. 398e).  The 
order in which the harmoniai are mentioned in the passage of Politics could suggest 
that there is an ascending grouping in terms of intensity. First is mentioned the 
Mixolydian, followed by the relaxed modes then, in the middle, appears the Dorian 
and finally the Phrygian is mentioned.  If the Mixolydian, as we are told by several 
sources, was associated with high pitch then its association with the relaxed modes 
seems unfitting. However, the connexion between the Mixolydian with a high pitch 
and a mood that reflects an intense motion can be saved but in the opposite direction. 
The Mixolydian could make the listeners querulous or serious (ὀδυρτικός) and grave 
(συνεστηκός). Aristotle refers to ὀδυρτικός in Rhetoric saying that being 
querulous/serious means not being disposed to jesting or laughter, and that the love of 
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laughter is the very opposite of querulousness. As for συνεστηκός, (literally compacted 
or contracted) most scholars translate it, as I too did above, as grave or restrained. 
Barker, however translates it as anxiety, following the usage of the noun systasis in 
different sources (Thuc. VIII.71, Eurip. Hippol. 983). It is very plausible, I think, that 
hired mourners used the Mixolydian in funeral lamentations and, if that was so, the 
exaggerated lament, accompanied sometimes even with the tearing of hair and 
clothing, could be a female high pitched music (cf. Laws 800e).284  The contracted 
character of this mode may thus be related to the high pitch and so with a tense 
harmonia.  The anxiety may therefore also be related to a tense state of mind as well 
as a high pitch. 
 
The discussion in this section does not claim to be conclusive for all Greek authors 
who discuss the ethos theory in music. The explanation of the character of the ἁρμονίαι 
based on pitch is coherent, at least in Aristotle’s account, but we cannot overlook the 
evidence of other sources285 which claim that the difference between the ἁρμονίαι was 
due to structural composition of the “scales” and not difference in pitch. In this respect 
I follow D.B. Monro, the author of The Modes of Greek Music (1894), who argued 
that the “difference of pitch was the chief or sole ground of distinction between the 
ancient ἁρμονίαι.”286 It is useful to quote at length his account of the relevance of pitch 
in relation to the modes and the character of the music.  
The beauty and even the persuasive effect of a voice depend, as we are more or less aware, 
in the first place upon the pitch or key in which it is set, and in the second place upon 
subtle variations of pitch, which give emphasis, or light and shade. Answering to the first 
of these elements ancient music [...] has its system of Modes or keys. Answering to the 
second it has a series of scales in which the delicacy and variety of the intervals still fill 
us with wonder. In both these points modern music shows diminished resources. We have 
in the Keys the same or even a greater command of degrees of pitch: but we seem to have 
lost the close relation which once obtained between a note as the result of facts and the 
same note as an index of temper or emotion. A change of key affects us, generally 
speaking, like a change of colour or of movement –not as the heightening or soothing of 
a state of feeling. In respect the second element of vocal expression the rise and fall of the 
                                                 
284 Cf. Ath. 174F and Pollux IV, 76. 
285 Arist. Quint. 15.10-20, 18.5-19.10; Aristox. El. Har. 2.22-5. 
286 Monro, 1985, 79-81. Newman notes that “grief was believed to compress and joy to expand the 
mind” He gives as references Eurip. Alcest 771, Bothe (797 Dindorf) τοῦ νῦν σκυθρωποῦ καὶ 
ξυνεστῶτος  φρενῶν, and Hippol. 937 Bothe (938 Dindorf), μένος μὲν ξύστασίς τε σών φρενῶν, and 
Cic. Tusc. Disp. 4. 31. 66, eodem enim vitio est effusion animi in laetitia quo in dolore contraction. So 
the Stoics defined λύπη as συστολὴ ἄλογος and explained ἠδονή as ἔπαρσις (Diog. Laert. 7. III, see 
Pearson, Fragments on Zeno and Cleanthes, p. 180). Newman 2010, vol. 3, 542-3. 
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pitch, Greek music possessed in the multiplicity of its scales a range of expression to which 
there is no modern parallel. The nearest analogue may be found in the use of modulation 
from a Major to a Minor key, or the reverse. But the changes of genus and ‘colour’ at the 
disposal of ancient musician must have been acoustically more striking, and must have 
come nearer to reproducing, in the idealized form, the tones and inflexions of the speaking 
voice. The tendency of music that is based upon harmony is to treat the voice as one of a 
number of instruments, and accordingly to curtail the use of it as the great source of 
dramatic and emotional effect (Monro 1894, 125-126). 
 
If Aristotle’s understanding of the modes matches Monro’s description then the 
expression of emotions through music according to Aristotle is much more limited 
than most scholars claim. Instrumental music neither represents nor imitates emotions 
as understood by the cognitivist approach presented in De anima and Rhetoric. At 
most, there is an imitation of the acoustic features of emotions and a mimesis of a 
polarity of motions which may be matched with specific emotions and ethos. The 
physical properties of the music, particularly its pitch, were naturally connected with 
physical motions. Different êthê for Aristotle are always presented in polarities: age: 
young/old; genre: male/female, moral: noble/vulgar. Even our bodies could be of a 
certain êthos: weak/strong (Pol. 1339a24). In this context the Dorian mode is the 
noblest and most masculine; suitable for men in the prime of life. The others are 
extremes that match feminine and vulgar characters; too high pitched and with too 
much motion, which is not suitable for good citizens. In Nicomachean Ethics we read 
about this characterisation: 
A slow step is thought proper of the proud man (μεγαλόψυχος), a deep voice, and a level 
of utterance; for the man who takes few things seriously is not likely to be hurried, nor the 
man who thinks that nothing great to be excited (σύντονος), while a shrill voice and a 
rapid gait are results of hurry and excitement. NE 1125a13-16 
 
Note how σύντονος, which is an adjective used to refer to high-pitched music, is here 
transferred to a psychological and moral state.  
Further, in Generation of Animals: 
The deep seems to belong to a nobler nature, and in songs the deep note is better that the 
high-pitched ones (δοκεῖ γενναιοτέρας εἶναι φύσεως ἡ βαρυφωνία, καὶ ἐν τοῖς  μέλεσι τὸ 
βαρὺ τῶν συντόνων βέλτιον) the better lying in superiority, and depth of tone being a sort 
a superiority. GA 787a1-2.287  
                                                 
287 Cf. note 279 above. In the pseudo-Aristotelian Physiognomics 806b27 we read: “[The voice] when 
deep (βαρεῖα) and strong (ἐπιτεινομένη) it is a sign of courage; when high-pitched (ὀξεῖα) and weak 
(ἀνειμένη), of cowardice”. Although at 807a13-25 it is said that is not pitch the sign of 
courage/cowardice but the volume of the voice.  
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Tension and relaxation are the two ways in which music affects listeners. This polarity 
is expressed in the pitch. Higher pitch is related with tension in the physical sense; it 
involves tension in the organs or instruments producing the sound as well as tension 
in the listener’s bodies. As the body is tensioned the mind is somehow, in a way that 
is   unexplained, influenced and “moved” in the same direction when faced with an 
object which triggers an emotion that also involves tension. Tension in psychological 
terms involves agitation, lack of calmness, and so is a characteristic of anxiety, frenzy 
or uncontrolled mourning. On the other hand, a calmer sound, without going to the 
other extreme, is a sign of serenity and so appropriate for reflection and rational 
behaviour.  
 
Let us consider, for example, what we mean by the expression “depressive music.” 
There seems to be a notion of pushing something down as well as something low and 
slow. In psychological terms, depression is a lack of energy, force or motivation. A 
depressive behaviour is easily associated with rest, tiredness or fatigue; it involves 
slow movements and even the facial and bodily expression tends to go in the 
downward direction. The voice is opaque, without strength and in a lower pitch than 
usual. On the contrary, a happy psychological state may be characterized as uplifting 
and full of energy. The voice is stronger and the bodily expression is in the upward 
direction. 
Low, slow and down can be seen as characteristic of the body in a typical sad/painful 
frame of mind. On the contrary, high, fast and up are characteristic of a 
cheerful/delighted soul. These properties are also present in music. Pitch, speed/tempo 
and direction of the melody are in fact used in music to match different psychological 
states. In turn, those physical movements of sound are also associated with moral 
qualities. A noble movement is in the middle between the extremes, not too relaxed, 
not too tense.  This, in my view, is what Aristotle thought about music with respect to 
its power of representation of a human’s state of mind. This is also the only kind of 
musical representation that we can hold, at least if we want to maintain Aristotle’s 
account of emotion as a cognitivist one.  The influence of music on the body, and 
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3.9 Tripartition of the musical effects 
 
 
Aristotle, as set out in the previous section, offers a tripartite division of the effects 
that music produces, i.e. music that elates, music that depresses and music that 
produces a steady temper in between the other two. This division may be older than 
Aristotle and certainly was preserved after him. Other authors, either following 
Aristotle or other sources, repeated this tripartition or very close variations of it. One 
such reiteration is found in Aristides Quintillianus: 
 
We call one [musical composition] through which we arouse mournful emotions (πάθη 
λθπηρἁ) ‘depressing’ (συσταλτικός), one through which we lift up the spirit (θυμὸν 
ἐξεγείρομεν) ‘exalting’ (διαστατικός), and one ‘intermediate’, through which we bring the 
soul round to peacefulness (τὴν μέσην, δἰ ἦς εἰς ἠρεμίαν τὴν ψυχὴν περιάγομεν). These 
are called ‘characters’ because it is primarily through them that conditions (κατάστημα) 
of the soul are diagnosed and put right. But this is not done by them alone: rather, while 
they assist, as parts, in the remedial treatment of the emotions, we have established that it 
is ‘complete’ melody which offers, in addition, an education that lacks nothing. For just 
as in the case of medicine drugs (ἰατρικῶν φαρμάκων) no one substance has the natural 
capacity to cure the afflictions of the body, but full recovery is brought about by a mixture 
of several, so also in our own field melody alone makes only slight contribution towards 
putting things right, while complete combination of all the elements is fully sufficient. 
(Aristides Quintillianus I, ch. 12, 30.  9-24, trans. Barker). 
 
 
The era in which Quintillianus lived is situated between the 1st and 3rd centuries AD at 
least three or four hundred years later than Aristotle. Nevertheless, there is a chance 
that in this passage he was following the Aristotelian tradition. He, as well as Aristotle, 
discussed the êthos of instrumental music in relation to education. Like Aristotle, 
Quintillianus explicitly states that music by itself is not enough for education, rather, 
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what is needed is music accompanied by words. Interestingly, he also distinguishes 
between complete (teleion melos) and instrumental melody (Aristid. Quint. 4, 20); the 
former being “that which is composed of harmonia, rhythm and speech” (Aristid. 
Quint. 28,8).288  Another similarity with Aristotle is Quintillianus’ use of medical 
metaphors. In his discussion of musical êthos and education Aristotle says that the 
amusement that music produces is like a drug (φαρμακεία)289 and later he says that the 
relaxed modes are intoxicating (μεθυστικός). 290  The tripartition that Quintillianus 
offers is similar but not the same as that of Aristotle. The terms Quintillianus uses are 
συσταλτικός (contracting) for the depressing mood; διαστατικός (extending) for the 
exalting mood and “one intermediate through which we bring the soul round to 
peacefulness”. Aristotle does not use the same terms as Quintillianus but nonetheless 
he talks about three main effects that the melodies produce. The passage is worthy of 
being quoted again here to remind us: 
 
Even in melodies themselves there is an imitation of character, for the musical modes 
differ essentially from one another, and those who hear them are differently disposed by 
each (ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ φανερόν· εὐθὺς 
γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν 
ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἑκάστην αὐτῶν). Some of them make man anxious (ὀδυρτικός) and 
grave (συνεστηκότως), like the so called Mixolydian, others enfeeble the mind 
(μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν), like the relaxed (ἀνειμένας) modes, another, again, produces 
moderate (μέσως) and settled temper (καθεστηκότως), which appears to be peculiar effect 
of the Dorian; the Phrygian inspires enthusiasm (ἐνθουσιαστικός) (Pol. 1340a39-b5). 
 
 
Quintillianus’ passage above has two parallels in the Greek literary corpus: one in a 
later Byzantine source, Manuel Bryennius (Harm. 3.10), and the other in Cleonides 
(Intro. Harm. 13), which in turn is the source of Bryennius. Cleonides, an “abbreviator 
and popularizer” 291  of Aristoxenus, also mentions the three terms employed by 
Aristides Quintillianus: συσταλτικός; διασταλτικός292 and ἡσυχαστικός: 
 
                                                 
288 See also 5,4 and 30, 17-24. Complete melody is present in Plato’s Laws 653-73, Rep. 398d, and 
Aristotle’s Poet. 1447a22. 
289 Pol. 1337b41-42.  
290 Pol. 1342b25. 
291 Strunk, 1952, 34. 
292  Cleonides and Bryennius use διασταλτικός while Aristides Quintillianus uses  διαστατικός. Most 
probably Quintillian’s texts needs to be corrected. Liddle and Scott’s entry to   διασταλτικός refers to 
Cleonid. Harm.13 as well as Aristid. Quint.1.12. 
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Modulation in melodic composition takes place whenever there is a modulation in êthos 
from diastaltic to the systaltic or hesychastic, or from the hesychastic to some of the others. 
The diastaltic ethos in melodic composition is that which reveals heroic deeds and the 
grandeur and loftiness of a manly soul and an affection akin to these (ἔστι δὲ διασταλτικὸν 
μὲν ἦθος μελοποιΐας, δι’ οὗ σημαίνεται μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ δίαρμα ψυχῆς ἀνδρῶδες καὶ 
πράξεις ἡρωϊκαὶ καὶ πάθη τούτοις οἰκεῖα). It is most used in tragedy and in all things that 
border on this character. The systaltic ethos is that by which the soul is brought into 
dejection and an effeminate disposition (διάθεσιν). Such a state will correspond to erotic 
affections and to dirges and expressions of pity things resembling these. The hesychastic 
ethos is that which accompanies quietude of soul and a liberal and peaceful state. To it 
will correspond hymns, paeans, eulogies, consolations, and things similar to these. (trans. 
Oliver Strunk). 
 
As Jon Solomon points out, 293  Cleonides’ description of the diastaltic êthos is 
equivalent with the description of the Dorian êthos by Heraclides Ponticus (in Ath. 
624D). Heraclides describes the Dorian ethos as ἀνδρῶδες and μεγαλοπρεπής; 
Cleonides as μεγαλοπρεπείᾳ… δίαρμα ψυχῆς ἀνδρῶδες.  Similarly, Aristotle (Pol. 
1340b3) says that the Dorian produces a “moderate and settled temper” (μέσως καὶ 
καθεστηκὀτως) and is described as “the gravest and manliest” (περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ 
πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὔσης καὶ μάλιστα ἦθος ἐχούσης ἀνδρεῖον Pol. 
1342b13-14).  Jon Solomon thinks that Aristides Quintillianus and Cleonides describe 
the musical ethos in “musical–medical terms” which is “not an intellectual 
musicological experience, but an emotional–physical (or ‘musical’–physical) 
experience”. In contrast, he argues, Plato and Aristotle equate the ethos with the 
harmoniai. His conclusion is that “the former refer to physical effects, the latter to 
musicological constructs”294. It is true that Aristotle equates the ethos with particular 
modes but he also refers to the emotional-physical nature of the musical ethos. The 
names of the different modes are just examples of a more general classification that 
refers to the physical nature of the modes; a tripartition which involves relaxed, 
moderate and tense modes. 
 
This is what underlies his thought when he says that old men “cannot very well sing 
the high strung mode, and nature herself seems to suggest that their songs should be 
of the more relaxed kind” (οὐ ῥᾴδιον ᾄδειν τὰς συντόνους ἁρμονίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς 
ἀνειμένας ἡ φύσις ὑποβάλλει τοῖς τηλικούτοις).295 This distinction is not made based 
                                                 
293 Solomon, 1981, 98, n. 33. 
294 Ibid. 
295 Pol. 1342b21-23. 
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upon a musicological experience, but on physical and natural properties of the music 
and the performers.  
 
The case with Plato is not as clear as with Aristotle. Plato rejects the lamenting modes 
for his guardians, i.e. “the Mixolydian, the Syntono-Lydian [tense–Lydian], and some 
others of that sort”.  He also rejects the drinking modes which accompany 
“drunkenness, softness, and idleness”; those are the Ionian and those Lydian modes 
(καὶ λυδιστὶ αὖ τινες) which are called relaxed (χαλαραὶ).296 Thomas Mathiesen thinks 
that both “Plato and Aristotle contrasted tense and relaxed, that is, high-pitched and 
low pitched modes”.297 However, contrary to Aristotle, Plato does not mention the 
tense modes as a more general group opposed to the relaxed ones, nor the existence of 
an intermediate between the two. The Dorian and the Phrygian are the only two modes 
accepted by Plato; the first imitates the tones (φθόγγοι) of a courageous man in war or 
in difficulty, someone who “is fighting his fate steadily and strongly” 
(παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτερούντως), whereas the second imitates the voice of 
someone in peace, who in all circumstances acts with self-control (ἑαυτὸν ἐπέχοντα) 
and moderation (μετρίως).” 298  Although the words are not the same, Plato’s 
conception of the Dorian mode finds parallels with Aristotle – both believed that the 
Dorian (Plato adds the Phrygian) was related with moderation – but whilst Plato 
mentions the relaxed modes and the tense–Lydian, it is Aristotle who puts a 





The tripartition presented in the previous section is not only based on the properties of 
music but also on the effects of it. Languid relaxation and excitement are the two 
                                                 
296 Rep. 398e. 
297 Mathiesen 2006, 76.  
298 Rep. 398e-399c. 
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extremes of this division.  As I have argued, these effects of pure music are not labeled 
as emotions; when listeners are affected by the music itself, i.e. without words, 
Aristotle says they are differently disposed (ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι).299 I 
think that this is a key element to the understanding of Aristotle's position with respect 
to the effects of music. Following this interpretation not only the cognitive account of 
the emotions is safe but also an interesting position is revealed. Instrumental music 
produces different dispositions, i.e. “moods”, which are by themselves objectless. 
These dispositions or moods are a physiological and mental pre-disposition empty of 
content. The listener so affected is ready to react emotionally when an intentional 
object is presented (the object of their judgments being the characters and their deeds 
in the drama or in real life). Music then, according to my interpretation of Aristotle’s 
writing, creates a breeding ground which sets the listener in a state of propensity 
towards particular emotions. Different music, elating or relaxing listeners (by means 
of a physical disturbance in the region of the heart) acts as a catalyst for  emotions but 
these only appear after there is an intentional object presented for our judgment. This 
is why Aristotle says that listeners of pure instrumental music are differently disposed. 
The term diathesis, I claim, is different from pathos essentially because the former 
refers to a passive condition which is prior to the appearance of any object in the mind; 
the pathê, narrowly understood as Rhetoric’s emotions, are always active mental and 
bodily processes directed towards an object.  
 
In what follows I will try to show what Aristotle means by diathesis and why we should 
consider its place in Politics VIII in order to make sense of what he says about music 
and emotions.  
 
As we saw earlier, in Categories Aristotle discusses the different types of quality 
(ποιότης). State (ἕξις) and disposition (διάθεσις) are not the same types of qualities; 
states are permanent, like having learned something or having acquired a virtue such 
as justice or temperance. A disposition, on the contrary, is easily changed. The 
examples that Aristotle provides first are hotness and chilliness as well as sickness and 
health. Later he adds the knowledge of something in an imperfect way:  “Those who 
                                                 
299 Pol. 1340a40-41. 
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lack full mastery of a branch of knowledge and are easily changed are not said to be 
in a state (hexis) of knowledge, though they are of course in some διάθεσις, a better or 
a worse, in regard to that knowledge” (Cat. 9a5-8). The translation of diathesis is not 
easy and depends on the context. The only place Aristotle gets closer to a technical 
description seems to be this passage in Categories. Sometimes it can be understood as 
synonym of state (hexis), but in other places it can be translated as the general 
arrangement of something (Metaph. 1022b1), as its condition or disposition, especially 
with regard to the body (GA 778b34).  The main point in Categories is that, contrary 
to hexis, diathesis is easily changed: 
 
Let us call one kind of quality (poiotêtos) state (hexis) and disposition (diathesis). A state 
differs from a disposition in being more stable and lasting longer. Such are the branches 
of knowledge and virtues. For knowledge seems to be something permanent and hard to 
change, unless a great change is brought about by illness or some other such thing. So also 
virtue; justice, temperance, and the rest seem to be not easily changed. It is what is easily 
changed and quickly changed (εὐκινητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα) that we call dispositions, 
e.g. hotness and chill and sickness and health and the like. For a man is in a certain 
disposition in virtue of these but he changes quickly from hot to cold and from being 
healthy to being sick. Similarly with the rest, unless indeed even one of these were 
eventually to become through a length of time part of man’s nature and irremediable or 
exceedingly hard to change–and then one would perhaps call this a state” (Cat. 8b27-9a5, 
trans. Ackrill). 
 
Instrumental music, viz. melodies in themselves (μέλη αὐτή)300 we are told in Politics, 
is able to change the dispositions of the listeners (ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι).301 
These changes are vital for the educational purposes of Aristotle.  If a young listener 
changes his disposition we would not call that a state. But, as the Categories says, if 
his disposition “were eventually to become through a length of time part of man’s 
nature and irremediable or exceedingly hard to change […] then one would perhaps 
call this a state (hexis).” In Politics, when Aristotle discusses the uses of music, he 
questions whether “music conduces to virtue, on the ground that it can produce a 
character of certain quality and habituate (ἐθίζουσαν) us to enjoy in the right way” 
(1339a22-24). The verb ἐθεῖν (to habituate) is key in Aristotle’s treatment of musical 
paideia. The temporary dispositions that music produces in the listener, following 
Categories, can be transformed into permanent states, or more properly, according to 
                                                 
300 Pol. 1340a38-39. 
301 Pol. 1340a40-41. 
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the context, habits. Having a habit is thus a consequence of repetition over time of a 
particular disposition. The disposition, as I said above, contrary to the emotions is not 
in itself an active attitude towards a particular object; rather it is a passive state which 
is an objectless tendency or inclination. In other words, to be prone to anger is different 
from being angry. The first state does not require a definite object in front of us; but 
in the case of active anger we need a concrete object.  
 
In Magna Moralia there is an important distinction between states and emotions, 
where states should be understood as moral habits. This may help us to understand the 
dispositions produced by music: 
 
If we would explain the essential nature of virtue (ἀρετή), we must make ourselves 
acquainted with the phenomena that arise in the soul. They are of three kinds: emotions 
(πάθη), faculties (δυνάμεις), and states (ἕξεις). Clearly, then, virtue must fall under one of 
these headings. Now among emotions we have anger, fear, hatred, longing, envy, pity, and 
the like; and these are all accompanied by pain or pleasure. Faculties, again, are the 
potentialities by which we are said to be capable of these emotions: the potentialities of 
anger, grief, pity, and the like. Lastly, states are conditions of soul which render us well 
or ill disposed in regard to the affections. For instance, if we are too much disposed to 
anger, our disposition is a bad one as regards that affection; nor is it otherwise if we fail 
to conceive anger when due occasion arises (ἕξεις δ᾿ εἰσὶν καθ᾿ ἃς πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχομεν εὖ 
ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν λίαν ὀργίλως, κακῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς ὀργήν, εἰ δ᾿ 
ὅλως μὴ ὀργιζόμεθα ἐφ᾿ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὕτως κακῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς ὀργήν.). The mean or 
middle state is thus one which avoids excess of emotion on the one hand, and entire 
insensibility on the other. When, therefore, such is our state of soul, <as regards anger> 
our disposition is good; and similarly as regards the other feelings. For whereas gentleness 
of temper and mildness are a mean state between wrathfulness and insensibility to anger, 
so it is with boastfulness and self-deprecation. To overrate one’s endowments is the part 
of the former, to dissemble them, the part of the latter; so that it is the just mean between 





A state (hexis), which can be distinguished from a disposition (diathesis) by its 
stability, is related to emotions as a proclivity or readiness to experience them in the 
right or wrong way. In the case of anger, for example, there is a mean between the two 
extremes.  On the one hand the excess of anger and on the other hand, entire 
insensibility. How we react depends on the state in us prior to the situation that causes 
the emotions. This means that the state, which refers to a moral habit in this passage, 
                                                 
302 The passage is almost the same in NE II 5.  
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prepares us to react “when the due occasion arises.” Prior to the “arising of the 
occasion” there is no object judged at all.  
 
What is said about states in the passage of Magna Moralia can be easily applied to 
dispositions. The states mentioned, i.e. the moral habits, are nothing other than 
permanent dispositions that have become such due to their repetition over time.  In 
Categories it is said that “states are also dispositions” although “dispositions are not 
necessarily states” (Cat. 9a1011).303  Dispositions can, however, turn into states if 
“these were eventually to become through length of time part of a man’s nature and 
irremediable or exceedingly hard to change” (Cat. ba3-4).304  
   
The process of habituation to reacting in a particular way is what I think Aristotle has 
in mind when he says that instrumental music can differently dispose the listeners (Pol. 
1340a41). There is no need for an intentional object in order for the disposition to 
come about. As well as with a state (ἕξις) a disposition exists in us even when there is 
nothing in front of us. For example, the courageous man is not courageous only when 
he is facing a danger. Someone is disposed to react emotionally in such disposition 
even though there is no object for judgment in front of him/her.   The emotional 
reaction then is a posterior phenomenon which exists only in the presence of a concrete 
object; the object that music by itself does not provide. Again, this does not mean 
denying that we can react emotionally toward a piece of music. It is totally possible to 
feel anger towards a piece of instrumental music. For example, we may judge that it is 
an immoral piece or that it represents values that we reject; we may also believe that 
its performance does not pay justice to the original composition and feel anger because 
we pay a lot of money to see it and it is one of our favorite pieces. These reactions are 
absolutely possible and nothing of what I have argued intends to dispute that. This 
does not mean that I am allowing exceptions to the cognitivist account of emotions; in 
the cases mentioned here there is a judgment and a belief held about the music, not 
emotions transmitted from the music to the listener.   The problematic scenario is 
where we consider the musical contagion of emotions attributed widely and almost 
                                                 
303 εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ διαθέσεις οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕξεις. 
304 διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη πεφυσιωμένη καὶ ἀνίατος ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος οὖσα, ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξινἤδη 
προσαγορεύοι. 
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uncontroversially to Aristotle: a piece represents anger and therefore its listeners feel 
angry. This is what is inconsistent with Aristotle’s account of emotions and why I 
think my reading offers a coherent interpretation that reconciles his account of 
emotions and what he says in Politics about music and its impact on the listener.  
 
In education, since in the beginning of life the irrational part is stronger than the 
rational, there must be an emphasis on the unreflected response of the students. As I 
have shown, there is still space for rational responses: the right judgments that the 
listeners should reach when told a story. When it comes to the effects of pure 
instrumental music, there is no major participation of reason. It is more like what 
gymnastic does to the body (Pol. 1339b23) or, as mentioned above, like the custom to 
habituate young children to cold temperatures in order to make them stronger 
(1336a12-15). In the case of instrumental music, it is the objectless dispositions of the 
listeners that are altered. After constant repetition they are habituated to the effects that 
music produces in them; i.e. relaxation, excitement or a middle state between the two.  
The listeners so habituated should enjoy, by habituation, the type of music to which 
they have been exposed.  
 
In Eudemian Ethics there is reference to the moral habituation and the formation of 
character. Interestingly, there is also a reference to the different motions to which a 
student is habituated: 
 
That moral excellence, then, is concerned with the pleasant and the painful is clear. But 
since the character (ἦθος), being as its name indicates something that grows by habit –and 
that which is under guidance other than innate is trained to a habit by frequent movement 
of a particular kind (ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πώς)– 
is the active principle present after this process, but in the things inanimate we do not see 
this (for even if you throw a stone upwards ten thousand times, it will never go upwards 
except by compulsion), – consider then, character to be this, viz. a quality  in accordance 
with governing reason belonging to the irrational part of the soul which is yet able to obey 
the reason. Now we have to state in respect of what part of the soul we have character of 
this or that kind. It will be in respect of the faculties of passion, in virtue of which men are 
spoken of as a subject to emotions, and in respect of the habits, in virtue of which men are 
described, in reference of those emotions, either as feeling them in some way or as not 
feeling them (EE 1220a38-b12 trans. Solomon). 
 
A young student then – contrary to the stone – after being moved once and over again 
in a particular “direction”, with a certain intensity and speed, can be changed in his 
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ways. Similarly, instrumental music habituates listeners by disposing them in the right 
way. The young listener in the classroom “is trained to a habit by frequent movement 
of a particular kind.” In the educational context, as we have seen, the Dorian mode is 
that which disposes listeners in the best way possible. It is a mean between the two 
extremes; most probably between the excitement of the tense–high pitched modes and 
the relaxation of those slack–low pitched ones.  
 
The reference in this passage of the Eudemian Ethics to the movements that cause 
moral habituation is certainly strange. It would be adventurous to try to link these 
movements with the movements that music produces. However, a little earlier, 
Aristotle connects them with the different dispositions that the soul adopts in order to 
achieve virtue: 
 
Every disposition (διάθεσιν) is produced and destroyed by some sort of application of the 
same thing, e.g. health from food, exercises, and weather. This is clear from induction. 
Virtue (ἀρετὴ) too, then, is a sort of disposition (διάθεσις) which is originated (ἣ γίνεταί) 
by the best movements in the soul (ψυχὴν κινήσεων), and from which are produced the 
soul’s best works and emotions (τὰ ἄριστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη); and by the same 
things, if they happen in one way, it is produced, but if they happen in another, it is 
destroyed (EE 1220a26-34 trans. Solomon). 
 
The phrase “movements in the soul” in the passage above needs some further 
explanation. We have said that instrumental music produces a physical movement in 
the region of the heart. Now Aristotle refers to movements in the soul that produce 
different dispositions. We said earlier that according to De anima I, 3 the soul does not 
move, so it is necessary to explain further what Aristotle is saying here. An explanation 
can be found in Physics VII, 3. There, studying motions in general, Aristotle explains 
that an alteration, which is a particular type of motion, occurs by sensible causes. He 
takes the case of alterations of human beings, particularly how virtue and knowledge 
are not by themselves alterations. With respect to this he says that “virtue puts it 
possessor in good disposition with regard to its proper emotions” (ἔτι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ 
εὖ διατίθησι πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη, 247a3-4). In doing so, he says that the “becoming 
of the dispositions is necessarily the result of an alteration in the sensible part of the 
soul, which is altered by a sensible object” (γίγνεσθαι δ’ αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον 
ἀλλοιουμένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέρους. ἀλλοιωθήσεται δ’ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν 247a6-7). 
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Now, virtue is concerned with bodily pleasures and pains and these, in turn, depend 
on remembering and anticipating the objects brought by sense perception. Pain and 
pleasure are alterations of the sensitive part (αἱ δ’ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αἱ λῦπαι ἀλλοιώσεις τοῦ 
αἰσθητικοῦ, 247a16-17) and so, in this sense, virtuous dispositions are originated by 
bodily alterations.   
 
The dispositions that the physical motions of music produce in the listener that I have 
claimed are not motions involving pleasure or pain but motions in terms of calm or 
relaxation of the organ of the sensible part of the soul: the heart.  In any case the 
dispositions are in both cases produced by bodily alterations. This is even clearer in 
the following discussion in Physics VII, 3 when Aristotle says that as well as virtue, 
the acquisition of knowledge is not an alteration by itself but nonetheless is 
accompanied by bodily conditions: 
 
 The possession of understanding and knowledge is produced by the soul’s settling down 
out of the restlessness natural to it.305 Hence, too, in learning and in forming judgments on 
matters relating to their sense-perception children are inferior to adults owing to the great 
amount of restlessness and motion in their souls. Nature itself in some cases causes the 
soul to settle down and come to a state of rest (καθίσταται δὲ καὶ ἠρεμίζεται), while in 
others other things do so; but in either case the result is brought about through the alteration 
of something in the body (247b17-248a4 trans. Hardie and Gaye).  
 
The passage of Eudemian Ethics above (1220a26-34) referring to the “movements in 
the soul”, I think, should be understood as movements of a particular function 
originated by the soul, in this case sense perception and appetite which are both 
enmattered functions that always involve bodily changes.  We need to remember that 
“it is impossible that motion should belong to the soul” (DA 406a2) and if it is said 
that the soul is moved or that there is a movement in the soul, it is in the sense that 
something is moved by the soul or that something reaches the soul. De anima explains 
this: 
 
The question whether the soul is moved would more naturally arise in view of such facts 
as the following. The soul is said to feel pain and joy, confidence and fear, and again to be 
angry, to perceive and to think; and all these states are held to be movements: which might 
lead one to infer that soul itself is moved. But this is not a necessary inference. For suppose 
it ever so true that to feel pain or joy and to think are movements, that to experience each 
of these is to be moved and that the movement is due to the soul: suppose that to be angry, 
for instance, or to be afraid means a particular movement of the heart, and that to think 
                                                 
305 See Laws 675c-d. 
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means a movement of this or some other part, some of these movements being movements 
of locomotion, others of qualitative change (of what sort and how produced does not 
concern us here): yet, even then, to speak of the soul as feeling anger is as if one should 
say that the soul waves and builds. Doubtless it would be better not to say that the soul 
pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does so with the soul: and this, too, not in the 
sense that the motion occurs in the soul, but in the sense that motion sometimes reaches 
to, sometimes starts from, the soul. Thus, sense perception originates in particular objects, 
while recollection, starting from the soul, is directed towards the movements or traces of 
movements in the sense organs (408a34-b18, trans. Hicks). 
 
 
It is true that in the passage of Eudemian Ethics  (1220a26-34) there is no reference to 
musical movements but, although probably unconnected, it fits very well with what 
we have being saying about music and it may help to better explain it. Virtue and 
knowledge are states and, as we know from the Categories, states are nothing more 
than permanent dispositions following constant habituation. This also is the case in 
Politics VIII where musical movements cause the dispositions and, in turn, those 
dispositions are causes for different actions and emotions. For example, those relaxed 
modes mentioned in Politics which “enfeeble the mind’ accompanied by those 
rhythms which have a “character of rest” would move the listener to a particular 
disposition. By habituation, i.e. by constant exposure to them, the listener would adopt 
that disposition as a permanent state. Then, when a particular situation arises, the 
actions and emotions of someone in such a state would be aligned with it. With 
different types of music, the listener would be disposed and habituated to react either 
with calm or excitement, or in the educational context, in a middle state provided by 
the Dorian mode.  
 
Other passages making reference to diathesis and motions can be found in On virtues 
and vices. This work is not considered as one by Aristotle himself but nonetheless it 
has been considered a work of the Peripatetic school:306 
 
In general it belongs to virtue to make the disposition (διάθεσις) of the soul good using 
quiet and ordered motions (ἠρεμαίαις καὶ τεταγμέναις κινήσεσι) and in agreement with 
itself throughout all its parts. Whence the disposition of a good soul (ψυχῆς σπουδαίας 
διάθεσις) seems a pattern (παράδειγμα) of a good political constitution. (1251b26-30).  
 
                                                 
306 Zeller, 1883, 145. 
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The quiet and ordered motions (ἠρεμαίαις καὶ τεταγμέναις κινήσεσι) may be equated 
with the Dorian, which is a moderate and steady mode (μέσως καὶ καθεστηκότως) and 
is compared with a good political constitution.307  
 
Now, it may be argued that the disposition that music causes, as mentioned in Politics, 
is just a general response of the listener. It may be said that Aristotle is not using the 
term diathesis in a technical meaning but that he just uses it as a synonym of state, 
frame of mind or any other word that may refer to how the listener is changed by the 
music. So far I have tried to show that within Aristotle’s own work it is possible to 
suggest that the diathesis produced by music has an especial meaning. However, this 
interpretation also finds some support from later sources.    
 
Theophrastus, as reported by Priscian (8.1)308 when talking about the transparent, says 
that “it is necessarily […] either a pathos or a diathesis”, and so we can confirm that 
some distinction existed between the two terms. Pamela Huby309 mentions the close 
connection between diathesis and hexis and the distinction made by Aristotle, but she 
thinks that it is impossible to know whether Theophrastus made such a distinction. If 
Theophrastus were following Aristotle in this distinction, although in another context, 
it would be a good sign for my interpretation: on the one hand music accompanied by 
words is able to provide an intentional object in its representation of human beings and 
thus we would be able to react, judge, and then emotionally sympathize with the 
representation; on the other hand, pure instrumental music only produces a certain 
diathesis, but not pathos.    
 
In On the senses, Theophrastus uses διάθεσις exclusively to refer to bodily 
dispositions; of the body in general or of particular sense organs, such as being in a 
disposition of hot or cold, or full of fire or air (DS 4, 19, 35, 39, 64, 72).310 In medical 
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309 Huby 1999, 53. 
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contexts, the term is used by Erasistratus 311  and Aretaeus, who connects it with 
epilepsia. 312  Galen, in his On Prognosis 313  and in De symptomatum differentiis 
opposes disthesis to pathos as well. 314  Diathesis is not always related to bodily 
dispositions but it is interesting that there is such a connection because, as I have shown 
earlier, the dispositions that music produces are not just mental states but involve 
physical changes through the sense of hearing and so also on the heart. As the bodily 
conditions “prepare the way” (προοδοποιεῖν)315 for the emotions, the dispositions that 
music creates are also a breeding ground that facilitates their emergence.  
 
Philoponus, in his Commentary to De anima, distinguishes between diathesis and state 
(ἕξις) which, he acknowledges, are usually used as synonyms but can also have a 
contradistinguished meaning. 316  After that, he refers to De anima 403a19 where 
Aristotle says that sometimes something fearful is in front of us but we are not moved 
to feel fear. This happens because our body is in a disposition that precludes the arousal 
of the emotions. At other times we are moved to an emotion even if there is just a slight 
reason. Commenting on this passage Philoponus wrote:  
 
That, as he states, these emotions are not peculiar to the soul but to the composite, is 
evident from people who suffer increase and decrease of emotions because their bodily 
disposition (diathesis) is of certain kind. There are people who have such a bodily mixture 
that in spite of the presence of numerous exciting factors they are not moved to anger, 
because in them the blood in the region of the heart is in a cold condition and difficult to 
move, whereas others are inclined to this affection so that even when the exciting factors 
are very slight and feeble, they are immediately provoked to anger because their 
dispositions is of such a kind that the blood in the region of the heart is always boiling […] 
Consequently, if these emotions were peculiar to the soul, they should not be dependent 
on the body nor have their origin in its disposition, but whatever the state of the body is, 
the soul should similarly be moved or not be moved to the emotions. (Philoponus, in An., 
                                                 
311 Indirectly mentioned by Galen, De historia philosophica, in Opera Omnia, ed. C.G. Kühn, 20 vols. 
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316 Philoponus On Aristotle On the Soul .  6, 17-19. Trans. Philip J.van der Eijk. 
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53, 11-28, trans. van der Eijk) 317 
 
Philoponus acknowledges that the disposition of the body is prior to the emotional 
response or at least that the latter presupposes and depends on a certain disposition of 
the body. The disposition of the body involves an inclination towards one emotion or 
its opposite.  
 
In a different, although related context, Aristotle says that the orator should put his 
audience in the right disposition. Doing so, it is easier to convince them; i.e. to make 
them judge in one way or another, and so to experience different emotions.  
 
The orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy 
of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to 
decide, into the right disposition (διακεῖσθαι). Particularly in political oratory, but also in 
lawsuits, it adds much to an orator's influence that his own character should look right and 
that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings towards his hearers; and also that 
his hearers themselves should be in just the right disposition (διακείμενοι). That the 
orator's own character should look right is particularly important in deliberative speaking: 
that the audience should be in the right disposition (διακεῖσθαι), in lawsuits. When people 
are feeling friendly and placable, they think one sort of thing; when they are feeling angry 
or hostile, they think either something totally different or the same thing with a different 
intensity: when they feel friendly to the man who comes before them for judgment, they 
regard him as having done little wrong, if any; when they feel hostile, they take the 
opposite view (Rhet. 1377b22 - 1378a3).318 
 
The orator should change the dispositions of the listeners, putting them in the right 
frame of mind. In order to make them feel and believe what he wants first then to, he 
needs to influence them in a certain way.  This is different to the dispositions that 
instrumental music produces because feeling friendly or hostile towards a speaker 
                                                 
317 Hicks wrote about De anima 403a16ff: “Aristotle’s object in what follows is to prove that every 
mental operation has its bodily concomitant. As many of the bodily changes are internal and 
unperceived, he argues indirectly (sêmeion de a19) from the difference of temperament in man and man. 
This difference of temperament cannot be due to the object, i.e. the external causes (pathêmatôn a20) 
which tend to excite emotion, for in that case the same slight would rouse all men alike to anger, the 
same terrors would excite fear in all alike, whereas it is notorious that the choleric temperament is prone 
to anger on trivial occasions and the melancholic temperament so timid that it gives ways to groundless 
alarms, these differences between man and man being due bodily constitution. Thus anger cannot take 
place without the body, without a concomitant affection of a definite part of the body, and this bodily 
affection cannot take place without soul, for the body in which takes place is at all events animate: to 
ergon ouk huparxei aneu aisthêseôs” (Hicks 1907, 198). I think Hicks is right in the sense that bodily 
differences change the emotional reaction. However, he missed the point that the beliefs about the object 
can also be different, e.g., all men do not equally perceive the same slight.  
318 In Republic 489a Plato uses diathesis as attitude to someone. 
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already involves a judgment. Instrumental music is objectless and so there is no 
previous judgment as in this case. However, the relevance of this passage is that it 
shows that a disposition, here in the verbal form διάκειμαι, refers to a stage prior to 
the feeling of the emotions. The listeners are ‘arranged’ in certain way – in this case 
feeling friendly or hostile towards the orator – and then, now on the basis of what the 
orator says, they judge accordingly and feel the corresponding emotions.    
 
It is important to note that the dispositions of the audience do not only exist before the 
emotion and disappear when the emotion is aroused. The emotions themselves involve 
dispositions. For instance, Aristotle says that the orator needs to know how those 
feeling anger are disposed (πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι εἰσί, Rhet. 1378a23). This 
means that someone already angry is particularly disposed to react when faced with a 
new object. This does not mean that the angry person will respond with anger to every 
new object present to him, but at least he will have a tendency to react with anger. 
 
Closer to a musical context, there is a passage from Proclus. 319  Quoting an 
Aristoxenian doctrine of êthos he uses diathesis as a moral state. In particular, he says 
that the philosophers’ diathesis is extended to their voices (φθόγγοι) “making manifest 
the ordered nature which characterizes every one [of their words].” According to 
Wehrli, the voice, “as expression of man’s essence, is as it were the basis for the ethical 
character of music.”320 Anderson321 righty connects this passage with Plato’s Republic 
(399a7-8), where Socrates asks for music that would be able to imitate the voice 
(φθόγγος) of a courageous and temperate man. Anderson also thinks that diathesis here 
“comes straight out of the Metaphysics and Categories.”322 One reason to agree with 
the connection between diathesis here and its usage in Aristotle’s work is that he also 
makes a connection between a particular moral diathesis and a particular type of 
sound. The Dorian mode, as we have seen, is the most stable and ordered and has the 
faculty to put the listener in a stable and ordered disposition. The quality of the Dorian 
mode, as middle point in terms of pitch between the relaxed and tense modes, is thus 
                                                 
319 Wehrli Aristoxenus fr. 75. (= Proclus’ Platonis Timaeum I 27c). 
320 Die Stimme als Wesensausdruck des Menschen ist sozusagen Grundlage für den ethischen Charakter 
der Musik. Wehrli 1945,71. 
321 Anderson 1980, 88. 
322 Ibid. 
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also transferred to listeners.  Something similar happens here, although the 
transmission is not from the ordered sound of music to the listeners’ disposition, but 
from the ordered disposition of the philosopher to his voice.  The voice of the 
philosopher, Proclus claims here, is ordered as is the disposition of the philosopher 
himself. Here it is worth remembering that Aristotle also believed in the voice as a 
sign of different characters among men (GA 786b7-9, 787a1-2). 
 
Another relevant passage that connects music and diathesis is found in Philodemus of 
Gadara’s On music.  
 
And therefore a musician who seeks such a science, by which he will be able to distinguish how to 
dispose the sense organs  (αἱ ποιαὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πῶς διατεθήσονται), is seeking a knowledge of the 
non-existent, and idly imparts precepts on the subject, since no melody, qua melody, being irrational 
(καθὸ μέλος ἄλογον), either rouses the soul from a state of tranquility  and repose  and leads it to the 
condition which belongs naturally to its character (ψυχὴν οὖτ᾽ἐξ ἀκεινήτου, καὶ ἡσυχάζοθσαν, ἑγείρει 
καὶ ἄγει πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἐν ἤθει διάθεσιν), or soothes and quietens (πραΰνει καὶ εἰς ἠρεμίαν 
καθίστησιν) it when it is aroused and moved in any direction; nor can it turn it aside from one impulse 
to another, or intensify or diminish an existing disposition (οὐδὲ τὴν ὑπαρχουσαν διάθεσιν εἰς αὔξησιν 
ἄγειν καὶ ἐλάττωσιν ὁρμῆς ἀποστρέφειν). For music is not an imitatory art, as some people fondly 
imagine, nor does it, as this man says, have similarities to moral feelings (οὐδε ̀γὰρ μιμητικον̀ ἡ μουσική, 
καθάπερ τι[ν]ὲς ὀνειρώττουσιν, οὐδ ̓ , [ὡς] οὖτος, ὁμοιότη[τα]ς ἠθῶν,) which, though not imitative, yet 
express all ethical qualities such as magnificence, humbleness, courage, cowardice, orderliness and 
violence–any more than cookery (IV col. 36, trans Wilkinson). 
 
 
Philodemus’ attack is directed to Diogenes of Babylon (“this man” in the passage). 
Almost all we know of Diogenes’ account on music comes indirectly from 
Philodemus’ reports about him. This premise may lead us to doubt how accurate and 
objective Philodemus was in presenting his adversary’s ideas. As an Epicurean, 
Philodemus follows the notions that all sense perception is irrational (D. L. X, 31). His 
particular position is clearly summarized by Wilkinson:323 “In itself music is purely 
formal, ἀκοῆς μόνον (col. 10, 19). And therefore it has, φύσει, no cognitive effect; for 
it is not until δόξα comes into play that sounds acquire meaning; and if no cognitive 
effect, then no ethical effect; for passions and moral can only be influenced by 
cognitive means, by λόγοι and διανοήματα.”324  
                                                 
323 Wilkinson 1938, 178. 
324 Wilkinson response to Philodemus: “[Philodemus] was not in apposition to realize that music, 




According to Wilkinson, Diogenes, although a Stoic philosopher, was “probably a 
follower of Aristotle” at least in musical matters. Also, as Linda Helen Woodward325 
has examined, although Aristotle is never mentioned in Philodemus’ De Musica, there 
is good evidence to support the claim that Diogenes is following an Aristotelian 
doctrine.  One reason to think this is the reference Philodemus makes to “how 
[instrumental music] dispose[s] the sense organs” (αἱ ποιαὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πῶς 
διατεθήσοντα). Aristotle does not talk about the specific disposition of the sense 
organs in Politics; rather he refers to how the whole listener is differently disposed 
according to different modes. However, the different dispositions, as I claim, must 
come about through the body and particularly the heart. It is interesting to note that 
Philodemus criticizes the idea that music is able to calm and quieten (πραΰνει καὶ εἰς 
ἠρεμίαν καθίστησιν) the listener when in a state of excitation. Aristotle uses the same 
words when he refers to someone calming his anger, which is a state of excitement in 
the heart: “growing calm may be defined as a settling down or quieting anger” (ἔστω 
δὴ πράϋνσις κατάστασις καὶ ἠρέμησις ὀργῆς, Rhet. 1380a8-9), and again in the 
passage quoted from Physics above, where he says that someone can “settle down and 
come to a state of rest” (καθίσταται δὲ καὶ ἠρεμίζεται) by an alteration of the body. 
 
Another reason to believe in the connection between Aristotle and Diogenes is that the 
latter says that music is not imitative but is a resemblance of character (ὁμοιότητας 
ἠθῶν) and, interestingly, Aristotle uses a related word (ὁμοίωμα) to refer to music in 
Pol. 1340a18. A further connection can be found in column 27,1-14:  
 
Moreover, the beauty and utility in movement and rest is characterized by the healthy body 
in gymnastics, and also [the capacity to] render capable of discernment those senses which 
apply to these. Painting for its part, teaches the sense of sight to judge well many visible 
things. As for music, if it is less necessary than the others, its extreme beauty is obvious if 
it is seized by the ear. 
 
 
                                                 
tom seems to have; we may well believe that certain rhythms are exciting or erotic by nature and others 
hypnotic” (Wilkinson 1938, 179). 
325 Woodward 2010. 
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In his treatment of education Aristotle talks – besides music of course – about 
gymnastic and the body (Pol. 1339b23) and also about painting and how useful it is to 
judge the plastic arts (Pol. 1338a16–19). Delattre, referring to this passage and its 
parallelism of topics and terminology, thinks that it “ensures that Diogenes explicitly 
referred to Aristotle.”326 
 
There is a correspondence between Diogenes (col. 36 above) and the Pseudo-
Aristotelian Problemata, particularly XIX, where music is a kinetic sort of motion and 
it has recemblance ( ὁμοιότης) of moral characters. These similarities have led Andrew 
Barker to say that they are “too striking to be coincidental”. 327  
Another similarity is that Diogenes, like Aristotle, rejects the aulos (col. 41. 29-34) 
and that music understood as useful for leisure (διαγωγή) and as a natural pleasure is 
present in both, in Aristotle (1340b1, cf. 339b19) and in Diogenes, in Philodemus’ De 
Musica (col. 12.1-8): “Not only is music very useful for a life of leisure, but also it 
befits us to practice it as and how it chances, not by Zeus in order to sing in 
accompaniment to stringed instruments for natural pleasure alone.”328 This and the 
other mentioned similarities between Diogenes and Aristotle confirm that the notion 
of a change of disposition was present in the discussion about the effects of music on 
the listener. 
  
In conclusion, in the passage of Politics VIII 1340a38-b10, Aristotle refers to the 
effects of musical modes without words and how “those who hear them are differently 
disposed (ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι). The different dispositions are due to 
the physical impact of the sound of music on the body of the listener. This must be so 
because all the affections of sense perceptions involve the participation of the body, 
particularly the heart. This is how there is a “motion in the soul”, in the sense that there 
is an enmattered faculty as sense perception that moves with the bodily organ.  
 
                                                 
326 Delattre 2007: vol. II, 340, n. 1. 
327 Barker 2001, 363. 
328 οὔτ ̓εἶναι μόνον αὐτ]ὴν χρήσιμωτάτην πρὸ]ς διαγωγήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσ]ήκειν ποεῖσθαι [μουσικ]ὴν 
ὡς ἔτυχεν, οὐχ ὅπως [εἰς] φυσικὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον], μὰ Διὰ, ταῖς χορδαῖς προσᾴδωμεν· 
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The treatment of diathesis by other authors after Aristotle helps us to confirm that 
emotions are not the same as dispositions and that many times the latter term  
(διάθεσις) refers to states of the body.  
 
This impact of music produces an alteration in the sense of hearing and also in the 
heart thus disposing the listener in a particular way. Instrumental music leaves the 
listener in an objectless mood and so predisposed to react emotionally when an object 
is presented to the mind for its judgment.   
 




According to Aristotle, listening to music as well as practising it in a moderate way, 
i.e. not to the extent of becoming a professional musician, is helpful for the 
achievement of virtue and thus helpful for achieving happiness. These ideas seem 
uncontroversial among interpreters, however there is some debate about how this 
process occurs. In this section I want to focus on the role of music in human happiness 
and reveal how this process takes place.  Let me start with a passage where Aristotle 
mentions three uses that music may have: 
It is not easy to determine the nature of music, or why anyone should have a knowledge 
of it. Shall we say, for the sake of amusement and relaxation, like sleep or drinking, which 
are not worthy in themselves, but are pleasant, and at the same time 'care to cease,' as 
Euripides says? And for this end men also appoint music, and make use of all three alike 
-sleep, drinking, music- to which some add dancing. Or shall we argue that music 
conduces to virtue, on the ground that it can form our minds and habituate us to enjoy in 
the right way (χαίρειν ὀρθῶς) as our bodies are made by gymnastic to be of a certain 
character? Or shall we say that it contributes to the enjoyment of leisure and practical 
wisdom (πρὸς διαγωγήν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν), which is a third alternative? 
Now obviously youths are not to be instructed with a view to their amusement, for learning 
is no amusement, but is accompanied by pain.329 Neither is leisure suitable to boys of that 
age, for it is the end, and that which is imperfect cannot attain the perfect or end (ἀλλὰ 
μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγήν γε παισὶν ἁρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις (οὐθενὶ 
γὰρ  ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος). But perhaps it may be said that boys learn music for the sake 
of the amusement which they will have when they are grown up (Pol. 1339a14-33, trans. 
Jowett).  
                                                 






A key element already presented needs to be remembered: music, i.e. music and words 
on my reading, represents the deeds of dramatis personae of different moral characters 
or the ideas of the lyric poet. In front of those representations the listener exercises his 
virtue that “consists in rejoicing and loving and hating rightly”. He must do so 
“forming right judgments and taking delight in good characters and noble actions”. 
Taking delight here is the equivalent of loving. The same idea is constructed in 
Nicomachean Ethics. There, Aristotle says that in order to be virtuous “we ought to 
have been brought up, from very youth, as Plato says, to find pleasure and pain as it is 
appropriate. For this is right education” (1104b11–13, cf. 1105a6-7, 1179b29). In turn, 
in Plato’s Laws we read: 
 
I maintain that the earliest sensations that a child feels in infancy are of pleasure and pain, 
and this is the route by which virtue and vice first enter the soul […] I call ‘education’ the 
initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain 
and hatred, that well up in his soul are channeled in the right courses before he can 
understand the reason why (Laws 653a-b). 
 
 
Aristotle (Pol. 1334b21-24, NE. 110317ff) states that in the human soul the irrational 
part appears prior to the rational. He also characterizes young people as being driven 
by pleasures. For example, the study of music is suited to them because “young 
persons will not, if they can help, endure anything which is not sweetened by pleasure, 
and music has a natural sweetness (ἥδυσμα).”330 According to Rhetoric II, 12, the 
character of young people is hot-tempered, they are sanguine and so prone to anger, 
they show absence of self–control and are inconstant in their desires, consequently, 
“their lives are regulated more by their character than by reasoning.”331 The meaning 
of ‘character’ here is clarified in Eudemian Ethics: “Character is a quality of the part 
of the soul that is non–rational, but capable of following reason, in accordance with a 
prescriptive principle” (1220b6-8; cf. 1212a5-13). Following this “irrationality” of 
youth, Myles Burnyeat, in his essay Aristotle on learning to be good, states:  
 
                                                 
330 Pol. 1340b15-19. 
331 Rhet. 1389a33-34. 
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Musical appreciation will teach and accustom one to judge rightly and enjoy decent 
characters and noble actions through their representation in music (Pol. 1340a14ff) […] 
the child’s sense of pleasure, which to begin with and for a long while is his only motive, 
should be hooked up with just noble things so that his unreasoned evaluative responses 
may develop in connection with the right objects.332  
 
In contrast with Burnyeat’s “unreasoned evaluative responses”, we find Fortenbaugh 
stating that: “The musical paideia is not concerned with developing a pattern of 
reaction to pleasant and painful sensations, but rather with virtue and the ability to 
make correct assessments.” 333  I think that both Fortenbaugh’s and Burnyeat’s 
interpretations can be right if we distinguish what aspects of music are being 
considered. We can react doing “correct (or wrong) assessments” of the technical 
aspects of the work of art as well of the story within it when words are included. At 
the same time, we can have “unreasoned evaluative responses”, as Burnyeat suggests, 
by merely liking or disliking the object perceived. In my view, when music is 
accompanied by words Fortenbaugh is right; in that case we can judge the goodness 
or badness of what we hear (either its technical or moral aspects). In the case of 
instrumental music, Burnyeat is right. Instrumental music, although a rational 
construction ruled by the science of arithmetic, is “wordless” and so “irrational” 
(ἄλογος). Young people, those that have not developed their rationality fully, only 
have “unreasoned evaluative responses” towards it. 
 
Nancy Sherman’s chapter ‘The Habituation of Character’, in her book The Fabric of 
Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue, 334  claims that there are traditional 
interpretations335 arguing that there is a mechanical habituation of moral character; i.e. 
there is “a non–rational training of desires towards appropriate objects.”336 In contrast, 
she states that this habituation is “primarily a form of critical practice.” 337  She 
acknowledges that although children (and animals) have no deliberative capacities of 
                                                 
332 Burnyeat 2012, 271. 
333 Fortenbaugh 1975, 49. 
334 Sherman 1991.  
335 “A mechanical theory is here [Nicomachean Ethics] given by both of the intellect and the moral 
character, as if the one could be acquired by teaching, the other by a course of habits.” Grant 1885, 241-
2; quoted by Sherman 1991, 2. 




choice: προαίρεσις, and action: πρᾶξις (1111a25-6, 1111b8-9, EE 1224a26-30 and 
1240b31-4), they still possess a deliberative part (βουλευτικόν) “but in an undeveloped 
form” (ἀτελής, 1260a13-14). This capacity, Sherman argues and I agree with her, and 
their deliberative faculty is developed over time “gradually and incrementally”. As she 
says: “we are not children, and then, at once, at the majority of age, reflective adults”. 
Pure mechanical habituation, she argues, “ultimately makes mysterious the transition 
between childhood and moral maturity.”338 
 
One of the main sources in support of the position claiming that habituation of 
character is an unreflective process can be found in Nicomachean Ethics:  
 
Think that we are made good by nature, others by habituation, others by teaching. Nature’s 
part evidently does not depend on us, but as a result of some divine cause is present in 
those who are truly fortunate; while argument and teaching (ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ) 
surely do not influence everyone, but rather the soul of the listener must be cultivated 
beforehand by means of habits for loving and hating finely, just like the earth that is to 
nourish the seed. For the individual whose life is governed by passion will not even listen 
to an argument that dissuades him or even understand it (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου 
ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ’ αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν); for how can we persuade such an 
individual to change his ways? And in general, emotions seems to yield not to argument, 
but to force. The character, then, must be somehow be there already with a kinship to 
excellence, loving and hating what is base (NE 1179b23-31, trans. Ross). 
 
This passage seems to put Aristotle in contradiction with himself. Emotions, although 
belonging to the irrational part of the soul, are open to listen and obey reason. Here, in 
contrast, we read that emotions, or at least people affected by them, are literally deaf 
to reason: “they seem to yield not to reason, but to force” (ὅλως τ’ οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ 
ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ). I think that the contradiction is only apparent. Following 
the preceding and subsequent discussion it is clear that in this passage Aristotle refers 
to some young and some older people who are governed by their passions. Arguments 
(οἱ λόγοι), i.e. reason, he says: “seem to have the power to encourage and stimulate 
the generous-minded among the young (φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι 
τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν), and to make a character which is gently born, and 
true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by virtue”. On the contrary, he 
continues, arguments “are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness” 
(1179b4-10).  
                                                 
338 Ibid., 2. 
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That the youth, or at least the best of them, can respond to rational arguments is also 
confirmed in Rhetoric. There, their character is described because, Aristotle claims, if 
we want to convince them we need to know how they are disposed. Thus, his point in 
the passage above is that many respond more to coercive punishment rather than to 
aiming at what is noble. He is not denying what he says in Rhetoric, namely that the 
emotions can be changed by means of argumentation. As I have already shown, in 
Rhetoric, Politics and Poetics Aristotle makes a distinction between audiences: some 
are noble and others vulgar, which is the same as saying that some are more rational 
and others more passionate. The latter types, in the context of Poetics, are more moved 
by artists who decorate the story with music and other visual tricks rather than by those 
who only present the bare facts. In the context of Rhetoric, they are more persuaded 
by orators who appeal to their emotions rather than pure rational arguments. Children, 
like most people, are more inclined to follow their desires and emotions than reason. 
However, as Sherman rightly proposes, it would be reductionist and absurd to claim 
that their education is completely devoid of reason. It is true that habituation is more 
important than argumentation in order to educate children, but the moral habituation 
is not composed of pure “unreasoned evaluative responses”. Sherman says: 
 
Cultivating the dispositional capacities to fell fear, anger, goodwill, compassion, or pity 
appropriately will be bound up with learning how to discern the circumstances that warrant 
these responses. Hitting the mean in our affective response, i.e. getting right degree and 
nuance of the reaction, and in general its inflection, would be inconceivable apart from 
some critical judgment which informed it.339  
 
Moral characters are formed out of corresponding acts (1103a31-b21; Rhet. 1369b6), 
i.e. we become just by doing just acts. Now, virtue, as has been described by Aristotle, 
is an act of critical judgment. Loving and hating, or feeling pain or love (Aristotle 
seems not to make a distinction), towards an object are acts of discrimination. This is 
most clear in the passage of Politcs that we discussed above: 
 
When men hear imitations, even apart from rhythms and melodies themselves (χωρὶς τῶν 
ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν), their feelings move in sympathy (συμπαθεῖς). Since then 
music (μουσική) is a pleasure, and virtue consists in rejoicing and loving and hating 
                                                 
339 Sherman 1991, 8. 
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rightly, there is clearly nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and to cultivate 
as the power of forming right judgments, and of taking delight in good characters and 
noble actions.340 
 
If we maintain that, as I think is the case, according to Aristotle we become virtuous 
by doing virtuous acts, there should be a way in which listening to the music makes 
the listener participate in the moral characters represented.  It is true that we become 
virtuous doing virtuous acts but, as Sherman claims, “actions presuppose the 
discrimination of a situation as requiring a response, reactive emotions that mark that 
response, and desires and beliefs about how and for the sake of what ends one should 
act.”341 The act of discrimination, I think, is only possible in response to the narrative 
contained in the music or supplied by context. It is not a reflection like feeling pleasure 
or pain when something is sweet or sour; it involves beliefs and criteria, although in 
children these are not fully developed. The moral judgment of the characters and their 
deeds is fundamental in the musical paideia.  
 
However, there seems to be space for another sort of judgment that could be concerned 
with technical aspects of the music. Aristotle wonders whether or not students should 
learn to play music themselves or just get used to being passive listeners. We read in 
Politics: 
 
Why should they learn themselves, and not, like the Persian and Median kings, enjoy the 
pleasure and instruction which is derived from hearing others? (for surely persons who 
have made music the business and profession of their lives will be better performers than 
those who practice only long enough to learn). If they must learn music, on the same 
principle they should learn cookery, which is absurd. And even granting that music may 
form the character, the objection still holds: why should we learn ourselves? Why cannot 
we attain true pleasure  and form a correct judgment (κρίνειν ὀρθῶς) from hearing others, 
like the Lacedaemonians?- for they, without learning music, nevertheless can correctly 
judge, as they say,342, of good and bad melodies (ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὅμως 
δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὥς φασι, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν) Or again, if 
music should be used to promote cheerfulness and  a noble pastime (εὐημερίαν καὶ 
διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέριον), the objection still remains- why should we learn ourselves instead 
of enjoying the performances of others?343  
                                                 
340 Pol. 1340a12-18. 
341 Sherman, 1991, 15. 
342 “They say”, but probably is not true, because, as Aristotle explain latter (1339b23-39), musical 
education that involves performance is necessary to become a good judge. Also, as Kraut 1997, 189-
190 suggests, “Aristotle’s low opinion of Spartan ‘virtue’ […] makes unlikely that he agrees that they 
do in fact develop character through music”. And also Kraut gives as references: “VII. 2 1324b5-9, VII. 
14 1333b5-35, VII 15 1334a41-b5, and VIII. 4 1338b11-17”. 
343 Pol. 1339a33-b6. 
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 It may be claimed that Aristotle is referring to a technical judgment about the music. 
The word χρηστός can be used to mean good in a technical way, in the sense of 
appropriateness or practical aptitude. Thus there are bees that are better than others 
(HA 55A27) and there are also good householders (GA 744B17). But the word is also 
used in a moral sense (EE 1214a21, NE 1146a13). This latter usage, I think, is the one 
used by Aristotle. In the Politics passage, after mentioning the effects of music upon 
the character he returns to the question of whether or not students should learn to play 
and sing: 
 
Clearly there is a considerable difference made in the character by the actual practice of 
the art.344 It is difficult, if not impossible, for those who do not perform to be good judges 
of the performance of others […] they who are to be judges must also be performers, and 
[…] they should begin to practice early, although when they are older they may be spared 
the execution; they must have learned to judge what is good and delight in it, thanks to 
the knowledge which they acquire in their youth (τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς διὰ 
τὴν μάθησιν τὴν γενομένην ἐν τῇ νεότητι).345  
 
Sherman notes, and I agree with her, that “his principal point is not that they will be 
bad aesthetic critics. That may be true too. What he means, rather, is that they will be 
inadequately prepared to judge ethical character in the music, in literature and in real 
life.”346 Lord makes a similar argument, but he explicitly states that musical training 
“cannot possibly be understood as to be training of ‘good judges’ in the sense of good 
literary critics.”347 If this were the case, Lord holds, children would have to learn 
different musical modes, but instead they are only allowed to listen and practise the 
Dorian mode. The training in music, Lord concludes, “does not greatly contribute to 
an ‘aesthetic’ appreciation”, and thus, the ‘correct judgment’ Aristotle mentions 
should be “understood as moral judgment of noble things” rather than an aesthetic 
judgment of “beautiful things as such.” 348  Similarly, Schoen-Nazzaro thinks that 
                                                 
344 “For the pleasure proper to an activity increases that activity. For those who perform their activities 
with pleasure judge better and discern with grater precision each thing, e.g. those finding pleasure in 
geometry become geometers, and understand the subject–matter better, and similarly also, lovers of 
music, lovers of building and so on, make progress in their appropriate function when they enjoy it” 
(1175a29-35).  
345 Pol. 1339b23-39. 
346 Sherman 1993, 18. 
347 Lord 1982, 99. 
348 Ibid., 99-100. 
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music provides pleasure because we delight in seeing the proportions between the 
emotions imitated and the real emotions: “mathematical beauty of harmonic 
progressions will not be the measure of the enjoyment given by a piece. Rather, for 
Aristotle the intellectual enjoyment of music will be based on the contemplation of the 
proportion between the development in a musical imitation and the emotion itself”.349 
A different position is offered by Pierre Destrée; he thinks that perhaps according to 
Aristotle the pleasure that an adult gets from music is “the understanding of its 
structure” and adds that when Aristotle asks if music contributes to phronêsis 
(1339a25) he “most probably refers to the critical judgment about the beauty of 
music”.350 The early training in music would then contribute to the future adulthood 
of the free citizens and musical critics. Destrêe notes: “this aesthetic theôria accessible 
to every citizen of the best city should be considered to be an approximation of the 
philosophical one.”351 Depew thinks in a similar direction arguing that “this technical 
knowledge [of music] is crucial to the subsequent development of both practical and 
theoretical knowledge.”352 
 
In opposition to Destrée, I think that it is quite clear that Aristotle’s concerns about 
music are not related to “the understanding of its structure.” Children, slaves and 
animals can still experience pleasure through, at least, some part of music. The rational 
act of understanding the musical structures seems irrelevant for the formation of 
character, even for the students that learn to perform. They learn in order to be better 
“judges” but if the technical skills were the goal of their training then, as Lord suggests, 
it would be more logical to instruct them in all the modes.  It is evident that some 
technical skills and knowledge would come even if only the Dorian mode were 
thought; but Aristotle is silent about it.353  
                                                 
349 Schoen-Nazzaro 1978, 270. 
350 Destrée 2013, 318.   
351 Ibid., 319. 
352 Ibid., 368.  
353 The position of Friedrich Solmsen also goes against the idea of an intellectual understanding of 
music: “The effect of music is ethical not intellectual; in the terms of Aristotle’s system it relates to the 
moral rather than the intellectual virtues. Had Aristotle really, as it is alleged, carried the ideal of the 
philosopher in the life of the citizens, the occupation recommended for their leisure would not be music 
and the virtues and capacities to be developed in the leisure hours would not be the moral but the 
intellectual” (Solmsen 1961 216). An the next page he continues: “The scholê which Aristotle 




Although related, the terms technical and aesthetic are not the same. It is one thing to 
claim that Aristotle does not care much about whether or not music students learn the 
technical aspects of music, such as the mathematics behind it, but it is another thing to 
claim that he does not care about the beauty of the musical representations, either 
instrumental or accompanied by voice. Students learn in order to enjoy what is καλά 
and similarly they learn to judge ὀρθῶς. Both terms, as has been pointed out by 
Elizabeth Jones, have a semantic range that goes from technical good to moral good.  
I think it would be a mistake to consider the judgments in only one perspective. 
Something totally wrong from the technical point of view would be unable to express 
its object and a piece of music expressing a good moral character would also certainly 
be considered beautiful. So, there may be room to consider that the student must judge 
correctly in both a technical and aesthetic way but the important point is that the 
emphasis is mostly οn the moral judgment.   
 
According to Jones354, Aristotle makes a distinction between two pleasures emerging 
from music; one “only accessible to those who have learned to perform” and another 
which is “a natural pleasure felt by all listeners regardless of performance 
experience.” 355  The pleasure accessible to everyone, rooted in animal desires, is, 
Aristotle says, like the pleasure that we get from sleeping and drinking (Pol. 1339a16-
17).  The other pleasure, Jones argues, is only available to those who have had musical 
training. According to her it is a “kind of pleasure […] formed in response to the moral 
dimension of music – specifically those rhythms and melodies that represent noble 
characters and actions.356 This second pleasure is one which is only available to the 
man who as a youth engaged in continuous musical practice, has assimilated to the 
noble characters represented, and understands how to musically perform the same 
                                                 
opinion on the basis of what he actually says, not on hypotheses as to what he may have said in chapters 
that are lost or would have said in chapters that were never written)” (Solmsen 1961, 217). 
354 Jones 2012. 
355 Ibid., 169. 
356 Since Jones believes that Aristotle “specially focuses on the attributes of music rather than [on the] 
verbal poetic content” it is intriguing what sort of actions she considers instrumental music is able to 
represent. (Jones 2012 164, n.9). 
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ethos.”357  This leads her to conclude that the listener who has been educated in 
musical performance may experience two different and contradictory pleasures at the 
same time. On hearing a musical piece that expresses a bad moral character the listener 
may experience “pleasure from the music per se” and, on the other hand, “pleasure or 
pain in response to the noble or ignoble character status of melodies and rhythms”.358 
This would mean that, for example, an educated man would feel pleasure listening to 
those “perverted modes and highly strung and corrupted melodies” (τῶν ἁρμονιῶν 
παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα)359 that Aristotle 
rejects; but at the same time would feel pain because of the bad characters represented. 
This seems unlikely because it makes a distinction contrary to Aristotle’s arguments. 
According to Jones there is a pleasure that is available to every listener; this “pleasure 
from the music per se,” she claims, is indicated when Aristotle states that the educated 
children should enjoy beautiful music, “and not merely360 the charm common to all 
music, which even some animals enjoy, as well as a multitude of slaves and children” 
(καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔνια ζῴων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ 
πλῆθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παιδίων) (1341a15-17). She concludes that this is an 
indication that Aristotle considered two pleasures could be felt simultaneously. The 
common “charm” I think Jones refers can be seen here:  
 
Music is pursued, not only as an alleviation of past toil, but also as providing recreation. 
And who can say whether, having this use, it may not also have a nobler one? In addition 
to this common pleasure, felt (αἴσθησιν) and shared by all (for the pleasure given by music 
is natural, and therefore adapted to all ages and characters (1339b42-1340a5).361   
 
A little bit earlier Aristotle explains this common pleasure provided by music, it is, he 
says: “amusement and relaxation, like sleep and drinking, which are not worthy in 
                                                 
357 Ibid., 174. 
358  Ibid. 176. “Since the uneducated, lower-class man has no training in singing or playing and 
instrument nor experience in performance, he is unable to recognize, understand or feel moral pleasure 
in music. Without any training to inform his reaction to a performance, his response and subsequent 
pleasure reflects the purely auditorial, the non–cognitive ‘natural pleasure’ which music provides”.  
359 Pol. 1342a23-2. 
360 Jones’ stress.  
361 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μή ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμιωτέρα δ’ αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν 
εἰρημένην χρείαν, καὶ δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς  ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς, ἧς ἔχουσι πάντες αἴσθησιν 




themselves, but are pleasant” (1339a16-18).362 Most people get involved in music 
looking for these pleasures, which are not for the sake of anything future,363 but for 
the alleviation of past toils. A free educated citizen, and Jones is right about this, can 
also participate in this pleasure, which is available to everyone; but she is mistaken in 
asserting that a freeman would find amusement and relaxation in any type of music. 
The reason is that “the pleasure of the best man is the best, and springs from the noblest 
sources” (1338a9). Vulgar music is vulgar not only in the sense that it represents bad 
moral characters but the music per se is unworthy of the freeman. Those who have 
learned what is beautiful and take delight in proper things cannot enjoy the same 
objects as those who have not been so habituated.   It is true that “the pleasure given 
by music is natural, and therefore adapted to all ages and characters” but it would be a 
mistake to say, as Jones seems to suggest, that all music could be a source of 
amusement and relaxation for everyone without distinction.  
 
My interpretation is that those students trained in performance would be better judges 
than those that have not because, even though they have being trained in only one 
mode, i.e. Dorian, they would be habituated to feel pleasure in that mode and recognize 
when a piece is set properly to it. Then, once they grow up, knowing at least the basics 
of how to perform, they would be better prepared to judge whatever music they hear, 
for example, how far the pitch of a melody would be from that of the Dorian mode. 
They would be able to recognize how melodies and rhythms depart from the middle 
point that the Dorian mode represents to the extremes of tension and relaxation.  
Knowing how to play would definitely help to understand and better judge technical 
aspects of music but, more importantly, it would also help to know and judge whether 
or not the musical piece played is vulgar or noble, and so to feel pleasure or pain 
accordingly. On one hand we have the right pleasure taken from the words, i.e. the 
pleasure taken in the characters’ deeds represented. There is where the emotions are 
directed, to the narrative in the poetry within the music.  On the other hand there is a 
pleasure on the pure instrumental part; pleasure shared by everyone, even slaves and 
                                                 
362 παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύσεως, καθάπερ ὕπνου καὶ μέθης ταῦτα γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὰ μὲν οὐδὲ τῶν 
σπουδαίων, ἀλλ’ ἡδέα. 
363 “Relaxation, then, is not an end; for it is taken for the sake of activity” (NE 1176b35) “Pleasant 
amusements (τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖα) […] we choose them not for the sake of other things […] most 
of the people who are deemed happy take refugee in such pastimes (diagogas) 1176b line 12. 
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some animals. That pleasure emanates from a common part of music which is 
connected to relaxation and amusement and so not with the intellectual pleasure in the 
understanding of the musical structures.  Young children would then be habituated to 
the Dorian mode and would react, as Burnyeat states, with “unreasoned evaluative 
responses”. However, contrary to what Burnyeat says, this type of response would be 
only to the music per se and not to the characters and their actions. Without a reasoned 
evaluative response the young listener would not be able to experience anger as 
Aristotle understood it. While the instrumental music should be always a noble one, 
i.e. the Dorian, the characters and deeds presented could be not so. This is the only 
way children may love and hate rightly because, if the “child’s sense of pleasure”, as 
Burnyeat proposes, “should be hooked up with just noble things” there is no point in 
music representing anger or any other emotion involving a rejection of something. I 
therefore think that there are two different ways in which children are habituated to be 
good in Aristotle’s educational program. On the one hand, they are habituated to be 
good by the exercise of reason, which involves understanding the stories narrated by 
poets and reacting emotionally to those stories.  In doing so, young listeners make the 
judgments required to react emotionally to the characters and deeds within those 
stories. Emotions involve a cognitive element, beliefs and judgments directed at 
objects; and we evaluate those objects on the grounds on which we have learned to 
feel pleasure and pain. On the one hand, if a young listener reacts with anger towards 
an injustice represented by the poet’s words, it is necessary that he has first grasped at 
least some understanding of the concept of justice. On the other hand, instrumental 
music does not require words to cause a reaction; without any narrative content it only 
provides bodily motions, either noble or vulgar – not emotions – which children learn 
to like and imitate by continuous exposure. This habituation to the noble movements 
of the right music is mechanical and does not involve judgments like those required 
for the arousal of emotions. It is like habituating the body of young children to cold 
temperatures in order to make them strong (Pol. 1336a12-15.) I use the term 
“mechanical” to refer to the unreflective habituation that the young students would 
acquire through constant exposure, in one case to cold water, in the other to noble 
movements in music.  Without words or reason (logos) the young listener would not 
understand that the Dorian mode is noble but would “learn”, i.e. would be habituated 
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to like it, by constant repetition. Later, with the progressive development of reason, he 
will recognize and enjoy the same character of the Dorian mode in others things, 
activities and people. He would prefer manliness, moderation and stability rather than 
the extremes of relaxation and excitement offered by the other modes. The Dorian is 
thus opposed to the Phrygian as calmness is opposed to rashness. The latter is a quality 
of those who act irrationally and driven by their passions; the first is a sign of someone 
prudent as deliberation should be slow (βουλεύεσθαι δὲ βραδέως).364  
 
Let me now focus on a more sophisticated pleasure only available to freemen. Beyond 
the relaxation, amusement and pleasure we get from music, it is suggested in the form 
of a question that music may also contribute to leisure and practical wisdom: πρὸς 
διαγωγήν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν.365 The choice of “practical wisdom” for 
the translation of φρόνησις is not completely clear. In Nicomachean Ethics φρόνησις 
is contrasted with σοφία, this latter term referring to the intellectual virtue of 
theoretical wisdom which deals with universal truths. Thus, the virtue of φρόνησις 
refers to practical wisdom; it deals with particular cases and serves us to deliberate 
how to act in the right way.   There are, however, some instances where φρόνησις 
seems to refer to theoretical wisdom, as is the case in some passages of the Eudemian 
Ethics (1215a34, b2 and 1216a19-20). If this were the case, the positions of Depew 
and Destrée mentioned above would gain more plausibility, namely that Aristotle has 
in mind the intellectual development of the students of music. Nevertheless, the term 
φρόνησις appears at least thirteen times in Politics and at no time does it refer to 
intellectual development in terms of theoretical wisdom. In fact, at 1277b25 it is said 
that it is the virtue which is particular to the ruler; and that is practical, not theoretical 
wisdom. But still, what does it mean to say that music contributes to practical wisdom 
and what implications does this have for our study?  
David Depew thinks that among the functions Aristotle ascribes to music, the pastime 
in leisure (diagôgê en têi scholeî)366 is the only one that transcends mere entertainment 
                                                 
364 NE 1142b5. 
365 Pol. 1339a25-6. 
366 Diagôgê (διαγωγή) can be broadly understood as a way of life (HA 534A11, 589A17); sometimes 
as an activity that involves amusements (παιδιαί) chosen for their own sake (1176b12) and others as 
differentiated from those amusements (1127b). Friends are said to bring a pleasant passing (diagôgê) to 
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and relaxation. There must be something else behind mere unreflective habituation; 
and so he thinks that catharsis and character building are possible “by introducing 
reflection and learning”.367 As Aristotle points out, music may contribute to wisdom 
(phronêsis 1339a26) and learning (mathêsis 1339a37). If this is accepted, then Depew 
concludes: “unless music engages rationality, the distinctive human function (ergon), 
on both the producing and receiving end, cannot be fully endlike according to 
Aristotle’s general principles.”368 In other words, “it is in the non-musical part in 
which tragic catharsis resides; [it] rest[s] on the learning involved in actively following 
the plot to its resolution [...]; thus tragedy affords a kind of learning [...]; it sharpens 
and exercises practical wisdom [and] that is just what is required of the endlike leisure 
processes of Pol. VIII.”369 Depew’s interpretation is tempting, especially because it 
supports the idea that music in Politics involves words.  However, I think that it is 
possible to argue that instrumental music also contributes to leisure, practical wisdom 
and learning. As said above, the calmness and moderation that the Dorian mode creates 
can lead one to adopt such calmness and moderation in others aspects of life. The 
exercise of practical wisdom is certainly improved if decisions are made with 
calmness. This does not mean that we should always act slowly – that would be absurd 
– but we should always act with as much calmness as the particular situation permits. 
In other words, if young children were used to the moderate temper that the Dorian 
mode represents they would incorporate by habituation the same character. On the 
contrary, if they were habituated to the Phrygian mode they would learn to react with 
excitement without taking enough time to evaluate different situations, thus allowing 
their emotions and irrational impulses to take precedence over reason.  
 
Now, instrumental music not only contributes to phronêsis but also to the pastime in 
leisure (diagôgê en têi scholeî). Leisure plays an important role in Aristotle’s Politics 
                                                 
our life (1171b13). It is opposed to what is necessary  (Met. 981b18; 982b23) and it is said that God is 
always in this state of diagôgé (1072b 14).  
367 Depew 1991, 368. 
368 Ibid. 
369 Ibid. 369. Supporting his position we read in De sensu 437a11-15: “It is hearing that contributes 
most to the growth of intelligence. For rational discourse is a cause of instruction in virtue (φρόνησιν) 
of its being audible, which it is, not directly, but indirectly; since it is composed of words, and each 
word is a thought-symbol”. 
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because without it, happiness, the final aim of the political activity, is not possible.370 
In that context Aristotle says that “there are branches of learning and education which 
we must study merely with a view on a pastime in leisure, and these are to be valued 
for their own sake”.371 We have seen that music, instrumental or not, is useful for 
moral purposes and so we may ask if that use makes it something that we do not value 
for its own sake. What seems most probable to me is that the moral effect would 
certainly be a desired one but in its absence the free enjoyment of music would still be 
















                                                 
370 But leisure of itself gives pleasure and happiness and enjoyment of life (τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν ἔχειν αὐτὸ 
δοκεῖ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ ζῆν  μακαρίως) 1338a1-3. 







In the history of philosophy of music the study of Aristotle’s position on the topic pales 
in comparison with other figures such as Pythagoras, Plato or Aristoxenus. Certainly, 
there is less material available in his works than in the work of the other authors 
mentioned, and from what we have it seems – only at first glance – that he did not 
offer any substantial nor original contributions. 
  
This, however, is not true. Aristotle’s account of music marks a departure from a 
dogmatic mathematisation of the phenomenon. Numbers and their different 
combinations in ratios were not the foundational structure of the universe: there was 
no Music of the Spheres, nor an invisible “Counter-Earth”. For the construction of 
such a fable their advocates had to pull a rabbit out of the hat and create out of nothing 
the existence of a hypothetical celestial body in order to count ten of them and thus 
keep their theory – or mathematical dogma– coherent. It is true that Aristotle still 
subordinated the science of harmony to arithmetic, but with him music also becomes 
a natural phenomenon, especially because he considered sound and acoustics to be 
constitutive elements in his analysis of the musical experience. For Aristotle, music is 
based on the science of harmony and so on mathematics, but it had also a physical side 
in the natural world, making it available to human sense perception. Rather than a 
supernatural construction supporting the whole Cosmos, for Aristotle music was a 
human art. 
 
In the human sphere, Aristotle denied that the soul could be defined as harmony but 
this did not lead him to disagree with the idea that music had a strong power over it. 
Following his master, and indirectly an older tradition of Damon and Pythagoras, 
Aristotle was a vivid defender of a musical paideia. However, contrary to Plato – who 
only allowed two types of music in his ideal city –Aristotle was more tolerant and 
understood that music that may seem inappropriate for the education of infants could 
have another function in a different context. Thus, in social terms, Aristotle had a 
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prudential approach to music, less strict and more inclusive than that of his master.  It 
was prudential because he considered what type of music was suitable for different 
ages and characters at different times and situations.  
 
One of the most important contexts in which Aristotle thought music was important 
was education. There, the young children need to be habituated to love and hate 
properly, i.e. directing their love and hate to the right objects. At that age, their rational 
faculties are not fully developed, thus it is their irrational side that needs to be nurtured. 
Music was therefore thought as a key tool to guide the emotions.  
 
Music has been pointed to as the “language of the emotions”; an idea that is accepted 
and spread as a popular opinion. It seems that there is no discussion on whether we 
can or not react emotionally towards a piece of instrumental music. However, what 
has been continuously claimed about Aristotle is something different: that there was a 
sort of musical contagion of emotions. A piece of music imitating the acoustic 
properties of someone experiencing anger  – something that Aristotle thought totally 
possible, we have seen – would thus arouse the same emotions in the listener. This 
position finds support in readings of book VIII of Politics that follow Susemihl’s 
emendation at 1340a13: instrumental music, without words, has the power to transfer 
the emotions expressed to the listener. However, once Aristotle’s account with respect 
to emotions is studied there appear to be inconsistencies with this position that are 
difficult to solve. If angry music arouses anger in the listener, what is the object of that 
anger?  This problem of an emotional contagion through music is of big importance in 
modern discussions of philosophy of music. The problem has not, however, been 
transferred to the philosophy of Aristotle. Scholarship devoted to ancient music tends 
to accept the “musical emotions” in Aristotle and all its implications without 
considering what Aristotle says about emotions. Once the Aristotelian account of 
emotions is considered, then it is unavoidable that inconsistencies are found. For 
Aristotle, emotions are based on appraisals of something: cognitive processes with 
intentionality where there is something predicated about something. Emotions are not 
the result of a “blind contagion”. 
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While those working on ancient music do not consider Aristotle’s account on 
emotions, those who devote themselves to the topic do not consider the case of 
“musical emotions”. Almost all the cognitive constructions of a systematic 
Aristotelian position about the emotions studied here – that are made primarily on the 
basis of Rhetoric and De Anima – do not discuss “musical emotions”, and those who 
are aware that there is something Aristotle says about music, do not discuss the details 
of the text in Politics. They say that there is no such a thing as musical emotions or 
that music is always accompanied by words.   
 
The acknowledgment of the existence of the problem is in itself one of the main 
conclusions of this thesis. All the cognitive readings of Aristotle’s account of emotions 
should deal with the objections that arise from the possibility of a musical contagion 
of emotions. If it is accepted that we become angry just by listening to “angry music” 
then all cognitive constructions are at risk. The idea, repeated through ages, is that 
music enters into listeners as into a black box, the only visible result being the 
outcome: an emotional reaction that imitates the emotion expressed in the music. This 
mysterious effect contradicts all Aristotle says about emotions.  
 
The second conclusion has to do with the solution that has been offered. Instrumental 
music is able to arouse feelings of pleasure and pain and also to create dispositions in 
the listeners but not emotions proper as defined in De anima or Rhetoric. According 
to Aristotle, when we listen to music different physical properties of its sound affect 
the body, particularly the region of the heart, which is the center of sense perception 
and where the internal physical aspect of the emotions takes places, e.g. boiling blood 
around the heart in the case of anger. Even a small change in that region can predispose 
someone to react emotionally. This movement in the body corresponds to the 
movement of the music; there is a polarity between motion and rest or excitement and 
calm which is based on the physical properties of the acoustic phenomena. High and 
low pitch are in this sense equal to more or less motion. This effect in the listener – 
contrary to what happens with emotions – is not the result of a judgment of any type 
but only of sense perception. Music may produce pleasure or pain in terms of sense 
perception and in that sense our reaction has intentionality: we feel pain/pleasure on 
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account of the music. We can also judge the beauty or correctness of a particular piece 
and experience an emotion. However, none of this is problematic for Aristotle. The 
problem emerges only when it is suggested that the listener experiences the same 
emotion as the music expresses as a result of a sort of contagion.  
 
What does occur is a change in the disposition of the listener. There is an alteration in 
the state of excitement or rest which is accomplished by the physical impact of the 
sound on the body, thus preparing the way for the arousal of a particular emotion. This 
emotion, however, appears only when there is a judgment about an object. In this 
model, some sort of music, for instance one expressive of anger, moves the heart in 
excitement generating a similar bodily condition to that present when one experiences 
the emotion. However, such condition is only one aspect of emotions for Aristotle: it 
refers to the material conditions, i.e. the bodily state. It is an objectless state because 
there is nothing to be angry about and in this sense the state lacks the form, by which 
I mean the other hylomorphic element needed for the existence of emotions which I 
have interpreted as the judgment. 
 
Music therefore has the power to prepare the listener and put him in a state of readiness 
to respond emotionally once he is exposed to a particular object. The disposition is 
objectless and precedes emotion. This was the case in the Greek theater and is also 
what we experience now in movies. Imagine we take all the images and dialogues 
away and only present to an audience the incidental music from the soundtrack.  The 
audience may react with pleasure or pain and have an aesthetic experience, but they 
will not be moved to fully-fledged emotions unless some content fills the empty space. 
Music, then, serves to adorn and season the story but is powerless to tell the story by 
itself.  
  
This interpretation, although reconstructed from different contexts in the Aristotelian 
corpus, remains, I think, true to the letter and spirit of Aristotle's texts. It offers at least 
a plausible solution to the apparent inconsistency between what he says about music 
in Politics and what he says about emotions in Rhetoric. Inconsistency is certainly a 
possibility. Maybe Aristotle would respond that he did not think about the problem 
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presented here. Nonetheless, from what we have seen, it seems that from what he did 
say, a solution, which allows us to preserve the consistency of Aristotle’s theory, is 
available.  
 
The problem cannot be denied, either by those studying what Aristotle said about 
music or by those working on his account of emotions. I hope I have offered an 
overview of the problem; the main passages and issues that need to be considered for 
the debate. My solution attempts to rectify a historical misconception about what 
Aristotle said about music. As a result, at least a footnote in the chapter of the history 
of philosophy of music needs to be added. I hope that I have made that small 
contribution. 
 
For further studies in the philosophy of music, especially those concerned with the 
relationship between music and emotions, my interpretation of Aristotle’s position on 
the topic may be helpful. The essential connection between mind and body that 
Aristotle offers helps us to understand the emotions and all the mental processes 
involved in a comprehensive way. The inclusion of the body in the study of 
relationships between music and emotions is rare in modern scholarship in the field of 
philosophy of music. A comprehensive modern account should follow Aristotle’s path 
and consider matter and form, not only in the study of music but also in the study of 
other human activities, especially arts, where both creative process and reception 
involve strong participation of emotions. Only taking into account mind and body 
together, as Aristotle said, will we gain a complete understanding of human emotions 
and, with it, a more clear answer to the still mysterious and always fascinating “spell” 
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